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ABSTRACT 
 
Ian Crowe: Public Spirit and Public Order.  Edmund Burke and the Role of the Critic in Mid-
Eighteenth-Century Britain 
(Under the direction of Dr. Jay M. Smith) 
 
 
This study centers upon Edmund Burke’s early literary career, and his move from 
Dublin to London in 1750, to explore the interplay of academic, professional, and 
commercial networks that comprised the mid-eighteenth-century Republic of Letters in 
Britain and Ireland.  Burke’s experiences before his entry into politics, particularly his 
relationship with the bookseller Robert Dodsley, may be used both to illustrate the political 
and intellectual debates that infused those networks, and to deepen our understanding of the 
publisher-author relationship at that time.  It is argued here that it was Burke’s involvement 
with Irish Patriot debates in his Dublin days, rather than any assumed Catholic or colonial 
resentment, that shaped his early publications, not least since Dodsley himself was engaged 
in a revision of Patriot literary discourse at his “Tully’s Head” business in the light of the 
legacy of his own patron Alexander Pope.   
Through a focus on two of Burke’s Tully’s Head projects in particular, the 
Vindication of Natural Society and the unfinished “Abridgment of the English History,” we 
are able to see how that revisionist process converged upon the problem of how to promote 
public spiritedness and civic engagement without jeopardizing the political and social order 
established in the kingdom in the wake of the Glorious Revolution.  We can also trace 
Burke’s distinctly Irish contribution to the reconfiguration of a “Patriot” discourse within that 
 iv 
segment of London literary society.  What emerges is a sustained critique of the intellectual 
strategies employed by Lord Bolingbroke and Lord Shaftesbury, particularly their reliance 
upon philosophical and historical skepticism, and a fresh rhetoric of Patriot criticism built 
upon an alternative, allegorical and religiously syncretic understanding of the 
interdependence between the “natural” and “artificial” in human society.   
Burke’s professional and personal relationships with Dodsley and with writers such 
as Joseph Spence and Joseph Warton in Dodsley’s Tully’s Head “circle” provides a 
challenge to received opinions not only of the roots of Burke’s political thought, but also of 
the use of concepts such as “Patriotism,” “Nationalism,” and “Enlightenment” in 
understanding the role of the critic in the mid-century British Republic of Letters. 
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Introduction 
 
A little more than a year before his death, Edmund Burke published one of his most 
powerful works of political rhetoric.  His Letter to a Noble Lord, which appeared in February 
1796, was a response to attacks by the Duke of Bedford, a Whig aristocrat of radical 
persuasions, on Burke’s acceptance of a pension from parliament for services to his country.  
Those services included, primarily, Burke’s attacks on the ideology of the revolutionaries in 
France, and Bedford’s underlying claim was that Burke had fashioned his antirevolutionary 
writings to secure his financial future.  “At every step of my progress in life,” Burke argued 
in response, “(for in every step was I traversed and opposed), and at every turnpike I met, I 
was obliged to shew my passport, and again and again to prove my sole title to the honour of 
being useful to my Country, by a proof that I was not wholly unacquainted with it’s [sic] 
laws, and the whole system of it’s interests both abroad and at home.”1  Scholars have taken 
this text to illustrate Burke’s lifelong, barely repressed anger at being the eternal outsider in 
his adopted country.  Dogged “in every step” by his Irish ethnicity (he was born in Dublin of 
“Old Irish” or “Anglo-Norman” stock) and his Catholic sympathies (his maternal family 
were Irish Catholic landowners in County Cork), his survival at the heart of the British 
Protestant Establishment seemed to depend, according to this reading, upon repressing his 
                                                 
1
 Edmund Burke, A Letter from the Right Honourable Edmund Burke to a Noble Lord, on the Attacks 
made upon him and his Pension in The House of Lords, by the Duke of Bedford and the Earl of Lauderdale 
(London, 1796), 29.  See also Edmund Burke, Writings and Speeches, 9 vols., ed. Paul Langford et al. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981-  ), 9:160.  Future references to Burke’s collected works will be to this edition unless 
otherwise stated. 
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national loyalties and religious sympathies.  The price of such repression—ironic, given 
Burke’s later conservative credentials—was a “Jacobin flame” that ran through his rhetoric 
and burst out finally in this scorching attack on the ingratitude of the system he had spent his 
career defending.2 
There is, however, an alternative way of interpreting the language of the Letter to a 
Noble Lord.  It is one that reads the language of the text out of, rather than into, the strategies 
and circumstances by which Burke established himself in the literary and political circles of 
mid-century London.  Burke’s Letter was not the first such defense by a novus homo against 
the aspersions of his social superiors.  As Frans De Bruyn has pointed out, Alexander Pope 
had penned a similar stylistic broadside against Lord Hervey in 1733, and Burke’s self-
description is heavily influenced by his intention of portraying his own enemies as 
paradigmatic dunces in the Scriblerian mode.3  The Letter is not a revelation of the deeply 
suppressed anger of an outsider: rather, in borrowing that ironically deferential tone to 
ridicule its target, it is the invocation by an ailing man of a world in which he had once felt at 
home, to which he had been readily admitted, and in which he had forged an astonishingly 
successful career. 
In the decade that had followed his migration to London in 1750, that world had 
centered upon the publishing business of Robert Dodsley and the network of writers and 
politicians that Dodsley had drawn to his bookshop, Tully’s Head, in Pall Mall.  It was a 
network that owed its origins to Pope and to the cultural and political critiques of Walpole’s 
                                                 
2
 The phrase “Jacobin flame” belongs to Michel Fuchs.  See Edmund Burke, Ireland, and the 
Fashioning of Self. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, 343 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996), 
12. 
  
3
 Frans De Bruyn, The Literary Genres of Edmund Burke.  The Political Uses of Literary Form 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), esp. 19-58.  “A Letter to a Noble Lord” was not published in Pope’s own 
lifetime, but appeared first in 1751, in William Warburton’s edition of Pope’s works.    
 3 
“Robinocracy” that flourished in the 1730s.  After Walpole’s fall, in 1742, and Pope’s death 
two years later, Tully’s Head continued to prosper, reinterpreting Pope’s legacy as poet and 
critic, particularly as it had evolved within the broader movement of political opposition 
termed “Patriotism.”  As part of the process, it strove to redefine the concept of Patriotism 
itself in response to the experiences and preoccupations of a new generation of writers and 
politicians.   This was the world of the young Edmund Burke:  his “title to the honour of 
being useful to my Country” was that of one such new-generation Patriot, the “Country” in 
question was the political union that existed under the crowns of England, Scotland and 
Ireland, and his usefulness that of the critic, who promotes public order by energizing public 
spirit in the cause of true, “natural” society. 
The chief goal of this study is to recover, as far as is possible, the authentic 
intellectual and professional contexts of Burke’s early career as a writer—contexts freed 
from anachronistic terminology or retrospective interpretations of Burke’s political thought.  
Such an exercise will enable us to construct a more nuanced and complex picture of Burke’s 
early intellectual development and of the literary profession that he joined.  It will also 
expose enduring limitations in our understanding of two central terms of eighteenth-century 
British intellectual history:  “Patriotism,” as it informs the critical literature of the 1740s and 
1750s, and the “Enlightenment,” as it is used to designate the goals and central principles of 
the intellectual classes in this period.  Something should be said about the roots of these 
conceptual limitations before we consider the current state of interpretations of Burke’s own 
intellectual biography.  
In its broadest sense, “Patriotism” may be defined as a mode of criticism fitted to the 
new political realities that emerged out of the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 and to the new 
 4 
vocabulary of civic virtue and public duty shaped by this constitutional upheaval.4  “Patriots” 
considered liberty (or freedom from servitude), the prize of that revolution, as dependent 
upon the vigorous nurturing of a “publick-Spiritedness” that itself had to be rooted in a 
perception of, and reverence for, the true foundations of natural order.  Put another way, the 
quality that made the spirit of civic engagement truly public was its moral imperative—the 
good of the community—derived directly from a belief that the natural origins of society 
were to be found in the providentially ordered needs and aspirations of mankind. 
Central to this study will be the ways in which Bolingbroke and other leading Patriot 
voices were seen, from the 1740s, not to have lived up to that benevolent moral imperative, 
but to have betrayed Patriotism by artfully substituting in their criticisms one form of 
unnatural order for another.  To grasp this charge in its various forms, however, we need to 
understand first how the vibrant import of this term Patriotism has been dulled by two 
contrasting historical perspectives.  It has, first, been increasingly overshadowed by a 
narrative of British “patriotism,” with which it did share some superficial characteristics.  
Second, where it has retained its distinctiveness, “Patriotism” has been bound too rigidly to 
the specific goals and interpretations of its most prominent exponent, Henry St. John, 
Viscount Bolingbroke, whose Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism and The Idea of a Patriot 
King appeared in 1749.  Relating “Patriotic” texts to looser patriotic themes of national 
distinctiveness, exclusivity, and bellicosity has been fuelled by scholarly concerns to explain 
the intellectual roots of nationalism.  Working back from the openly nationalist aspirations of 
                                                 
4
 How far, for example, could John Locke’s philosophical justification for the Glorious Revolution be 
translated into a practical program of civic education and discourse?  The popularity of Lord Shaftesbury’s 
Whig critique of Locke, and the adaptation of Shaftesbury’s own positions by Francis Hutcheson, exercised an 
important influence on this vocabulary, as will be discussed below.  See Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and 
Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics in England, 1660-1780. Volume II: Shaftesbury to 
Hume (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 5 
self-styled patriots in Revolutionary France, researchers have combed the literature of mid- 
and early-eighteenth-century Britain for a similarly assertive language of cultural and 
constitutional superiority.  As they have done so, “Patriotism” has become increasingly 
overshadowed by what Gerald Newman termed “the low flame of eighteenth-century English 
patriotism, of irrational ‘local attachments’…fanned into the consuming fire of nationalist 
‘demands and actions,’ ‘anger and self-assertion.’”5  Linda Colley redeemed patriotism from 
Newman’s charges of irrationalism by linking it to the more systematic construction of 
British identity supposedly instigated by the British political elites after the Union of 
Scotland and England in 1707; but her work failed to address the terminological confusions 
to which the importation of patriotism into the early part of the century had given rise.6   
In times of heightened international tension, Patriot writers undoubtedly turned out 
material that would seem familiarly “jingoistic” to later generations.  But Patriotism was 
engaged in the promotion of home-grown talent and national historical and literary traditions 
for quite other reasons.  Such “cultural protectionism” developed as a medium through which 
the universal virtues of “publick Spiritedness” could most effectively and efficiently be 
conveyed to an increasingly broad citizenry, since it was precisely in the reconciliation of 
local affections and universal benevolence that Patriotism located the natural order that 
underlay true moral and political liberty.  To this end, wars of religion and constitutional 
revolutions in the seventeenth century had encouraged literary critics and historians to 
reconsider ways in which the sources of Classical civic virtue could be grasped through the 
                                                 
5
 Gerald Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740-1830 (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987), 60. 
 
6
 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).  
Those confusions are well represented in Ben Rogers, Beef and Liberty: Roast Beef, John Bull and the English 
Nation (London: Vintage, 2003), esp. chapter 4, and Peter Mandler, The English National Character: The 
History of an Idea from Edmund Burke to Tony Blair (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
 6 
particulars of local or national contexts and exempla, and, in this sense, “cultural 
protectionism” owed much more to the debate between the “Ancients and Moderns” than it 
did to the grounding of power structures in notions of national exclusivity and superiority.7  
When Burke, in the Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), made his famous 
reference to venerating “the little platoon we belong to in society,” he was not, as is now 
generally assumed, placing the little platoon as the culmination and sublimation of our social 
loyalties and identity , “an assertion of British difference, even superiority.”8  He was arguing 
that public spirit had to draw its energy from local affections in order to transform it into that 
respect for universal principles of social order, without which those local affections could 
never be perfected.9 
A further confusion over the term “Patriotism” arises out of the prominence of Henry 
St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, and his circle in the intellectual history of early-eighteenth-
century Britain.  In many respects, of course, this prominence is justified.  Bolingbroke 
popularized the term; he gave “Patriotism” some coherence through his eclectic political, 
philosophical, and historical writings; he promoted it through an influential network of 
writers, oppositional politicians and poets, most famously John Gay, George Lyttelton, and 
                                                 
7
 The term “publick Spiritedness” appears as a definition of Patriotism in the third edition of Bailey’s 
Universal Etymological English Dictionary (1726).  
 
8
 Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, 2002), 15.  The original quotation can be found in Burke, Reflections, 135.   Spencer and 
Wollman acknowledge here their debt to P. Thody, The Conservative Imagination (London: Pinter, 1993). 
 
9
 See, for example, John Brown, Merit. A Satire (Dublin, 1746), 8-9: “Let gen’rous actions then your 
name adorn; / Mankind for mankind mutually was born. / Who for the publick, life devoted spend, / Most nobly 
answer their creation’s end.”  Burke’s criticism of the French revolutionaries was precisely that their 
universalism was, in fact, particular, and therefore had to be imposed by force.  He argued in the same way 
against the doctrine of “geographical morality,” upon which Warren Hastings attempted to justify his violation 
of native Indian customs in the interest of Imperial order while he was governor general of Bengal.  That his 
own Patriotism was grounded in universalist moral and philosophical assumptions shortly to be undermined by 
David Hume among others may help to explain why it was subsumed in the growth of nationalism by the end of 
the century, and why a detailed study of it has yet to be written. 
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Alexander Pope.  As a result, the history of Patriotism has come largely to follow the 
contours of Bolingbroke’s turbid career.10  Fuelled by a hatred of Walpole and the Whig 
parliamentarians who forced him into exile in 1715, “Patriotism” was subject to the 
suspicions of hypocrisy, insincerity, and treachery that dogged Bolingbroke’s own 
reputation, and it was divested both of purpose and any lingering pretension to principles 
when its followers, though not Bolingbroke himself, seized power on Walpole’s fall, in 1742 
only, it appeared, to continue the system of their great enemy.  All that remained was for 
Samuel Johnson to issue the coup de grâce when he famously termed Patriotism’s short-
lived, Pittite revival of the 1760s “the last refuge of a scoundrel.”11   
This high-political, Bolingbrokean narrative of Patriotism fails to incorporate the 
ways in which the meaning and praxis of that term were constantly under renegotiation as 
shifting social, political, cultural, and even commercial, factors demanded changes to the 
rhetoric of political opposition.  In defining the term in the 1730s and 1740s, as part of his 
campaign against Walpole and the “Robinocracy” of early Hanoverian England, Bolingbroke 
developed three powerful critiques designed to expose the dual threat of Whiggery and 
Toryism.  These were: the residual threat of priest-craft and superstition to the body politic; 
the subversion of the historical legacy of an ancient constitution of liberties by cliques of 
self-interested politicians; the debasement of rhetoric and taste by the commercial and 
political classes as a means of dulling criticism and covering their tracks.  In combination, 
these factors go a long way to explaining the nature of the threat to liberty that was the 
consistent rallying cry of the Patriot; but the lord’s essentially atavistic appeal to “superior 
                                                 
10
 For a broad survey of Bolingbroke’s political and intellectual biography, see Isaac Kramnick, 
Bolingbroke and His Circle: the Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1968); and H. T. Dickinson, Bolingbroke (London: Constable, 1970). 
 
11
 James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. R.W. Chapman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 615. 
 8 
spirits” and a “Patriot King,” while it certainly drew strength from Bolingbroke’s own stature 
as an aristocrat, polymath, and statesman, represented only one strategy for restoring virtue 
and liberty to the sphere of government.  Each of those three critiques became increasingly 
problematical as devices for respectable opposition: the customary attack on priest-craft 
appeared a backdoor to irreligion and secularism; the methodology employed to identify 
inherited constitutional liberties appeared unsupportable historically; the rhetoric of lofty 
social elitism and esoteric skepticism became exposed as inadequate foundations for 
galvanizing a critical but orderly public spirit in the burgeoning, rapidly expanding public 
sphere of the 1740s.  Consequently, during Burke’s early years in London we find writers at 
Tully’s Head reconsidering the relationship between religion, history and the rhetoric of 
criticism, and working to reconfigure the Patriot legacy for fresh social, cultural, and political 
circumstances. 
This process is apparent over time in the publishing list of Dodsley’s business, where 
we can reconstruct the debate within Patriotism that surrounded Edmund Burke’s early 
writings, both in London and in Dublin.  The aspects of that debate which will form the focus 
of discussion in this dissertation include:  a defense of Lockean “orthodoxy” against the 
secularizing tendencies in Lord Shaftesbury’s Stoicism;  the recovery of the religious 
underpinnings of natural philosophy by distinguishing “respectable” critiques of enthusiasm 
and superstition from the propagation of religious skepticism and atheism;  an attempt to 
reconcile legitimate modes of historical skepticism with the upholding of central tenets of 
sacred history and of the role of providence in particular;  the promotion of allegory as a 
mode of conveying universal principles of the natural moral order, against conventional 
charges of obscurantism. 
 9 
Significantly, each of these positions cut across the current of our well-entrenched 
assumptions about the “Enlightenment.”  As a result, it has proved difficult to situate 
Dodsley, Tully’s Head, and Burke comfortably within the broader narrative of the 
“Enlightened” discourse.  Just as Burke’s own career suffers from the apparent denouement 
that was his campaign against Jacobinism, so the eighteenth-century Republic of Letters is 
viewed primarily through the gap that had opened up between the philosophes and the 
political and religious establishments by the end of the century.  From this perspective, 
secularization, rationalism, and growing alienation from the norms of ancien régime society 
continue to constitute the identity of “Enlightened” critics, who were forced to repress, 
disguise or encode their opposition to prevailing power as a means of avoiding censorship, 
censure, and penury.  Measured against such a standard, Dublin and London in the mid 
eighteenth century appear parochial and tame intellectual environments.  Granted, a 
burgeoning reading market was fuelling innovations in book design and journals in this 
period, and taking the Restoration coffee house into a host of new urban and domestic sites.  
But how are we to measure the political purchase of a book trade that made its money off 
works such as Clarissa, translations of French histories of England, and the literary polemics 
of the irascible, prolific bishop of Gloucester, William Warburton?  What are we to make of 
a Republic of Letters that never spawned a Republic of Virtue?  
  Again, Burke offers a useful illustration of the points at issue here.  Given the 
comprehensiveness of his attack upon the French Revolution, much time is still spent 
situating him in opposition to “Enlightenment” thought, or defining a point where he buried 
earlier attachments to “Enlightened” causes in Ireland and America.  This state of affairs is 
testimony to the enduring influence of Peter Gay’s narrative of the triumph over superstition 
 10 
and prejudice of a “coalition of cultural critics, religious skeptics and political reformers” 
who were united by “a program of secularism, humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom.”12  
Gay’s “Enlightenment,” is still, in Roy Porter’s phrase, the “point of departure” for our use of 
the term, and, while the “stormy” family of philosophes may have been expanded and 
diversified since, their kinship remains defined (rather paradoxically) by a shared “political 
strategy” centered upon “the right of unfettered criticism.”13  That last phrase, in particular, 
extracted from Kant’s 1784 tract Was ist Aufklärung?, still awaits unpacking.  Porter himself 
has rightly drawn attention to Gay’s crucial identification of philosophy with criticism in the 
Enlightenment, only to ignore the whole question of why, when, and where the art of 
criticism became synonymous in the minds of intellectuals with the promulgation of 
programs for social, political, and cultural reconstruction.        
Mark Hulliung and Dena Goodman have utilized the innovative methods of the “New 
Cultural History” to pry open our assumptions about Gay’s “Enlightenment,” Hulliung 
through a consideration of Rousseau’s internal critique of his fellow philosophes, and 
Goodman by shifting attention to the practical and personal dynamics that constituted the 
“Republic of Letters” as an alternative community to that of Louis XV’s France.  But even 
here thickened contexts remain rooted in the teleology of eighteenth-century French history 
and in the goal of explaining radicalism as somehow the historic destiny of the movement.14  
Most recently, Jonathan Israel’s Radical Enlightenment has attempted to break away from 
the defining presence of the French Revolution by positing a radical enlightenment that was 
                                                 
12
 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation.  The Rise of Modern Paganism (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1966), 3. 
 
13
 Roy Porter, The Enlightenment (London, MacMillan, 1990), 5;  Gay, Enlightenment, 4, 8, 3. 
 
14
 Mark Hulliung, The Autocritique of Enlightenment: Rousseau and the Philosophes (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994); Dena Goodman, The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the 
French Enlightenment  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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almost complete by 1740, but mutatis mutandis perpetuated the idea of an intellectual 
movement fired by ideas that could be traced through, but were rarely defined by, the untidy 
practicalities of horizontal contexts:  it merely replaced Rousseau with Spinoza.15  None of 
these responses opens up the term “Enlightenment” and challenges Gay’s Kantian 
assumptions in a way that can bring Burke and Tully’s Head in from the periphery.16 
Those historians who have made the case for Burke’s place within the Enlightenment 
tradition have done so for one of two reasons.  First, Annabel Patterson, in her self-styled 
“New Whig” history, has acknowledged Burke’s early attachment to the principles of the 
Enlightenment in his support of the American colonies, the better to expose him as a betrayer 
of that cause later in his career.  Her argument serves to reinforce the charges of venality and 
inconsistency leveled at Burke by the “New Whig” supporters of Charles James Fox—and, 
of course, by the incautious “Noble Lord”—but it does not challenge the received 
understanding of Enlightenment thought.17  A second, more imaginative attempt at 
recovering an Enlightened Burke has brought about such a challenge.  In voluminous studies 
over the past few decades, J.G.A. Pocock, unhappy with the reasoning that renders figures 
such as Gibbon and Burke “either not English or not Enlightened,” has attempted to present a 
Burke “who saw himself defending Enlightened Europe against the gens de lettres and their 
revolutionary successors” and who “stands for Counter-Enlightenment, in Isaiah Berlin’s 
                                                 
15
 Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
 
16
 Nor does Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: the French Counter-Enlightenment 
and the Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), which (putting “modernity” aside) 
commits the double-sin of reifying a coherent Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment from around 1760. 
 
17
 Annabel Patterson, Nobody’s Perfect: A New Whig Interpretation of History (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002).  Patterson sees Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord as an apology for what she styles his 
“political turn-coatism” (p. 244). 
 12 
phrase, only in the sense that his is one kind of Enlightenment in conflict with another.”18  
Pocock’s strategy relies upon constructing a “history of Enlightenments,” whereby an 
eclectic collection of thinkers, including conservatives and churchmen, can be incorporated 
into intellectual networks through the particularities and peculiarities of their own national 
circumstances.  These networks are then, at a deeper level, given a shared identity through 
the common goals of extricating the world from religious wars and developing a “series of 
programmes” for redefining church authority and church-state relations.  The latter point was 
the ground upon which national Enlightenments competed, and where, in his British corner, 
Burke played out a life-long contribution.19 
Pocock’s treatment of Burke’s position within the dominant strands of 
“Enlightenment” thought in the eighteenth century has proved highly valuable to the 
intellectual historian and to Burke studies.  Multiplying Enlightenments, however, does not 
necessarily overcome the teleological issues involved here, especially when recourse is still 
made to unifying factors that remain entirely abstract and programmatic.  At the same time, 
nationalizing Enlightenments risks overlooking the cohering influence exerted by the sheer 
practical mechanics of a functioning republic of letters (or république des lettres), including 
the economics of book production and the exploitation of market demand, from at least the 
early and mid part of the century—and, one might add, by the very dislocation and migration 
consequent upon the religious and political upheavals that covered Europe in the latter half of 
the seventeenth century.  We need only consider Bolingbroke’s philosophic exiles in France, 
John Toland’s European wanderings, Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques, the generations of 
                                                 
18
 J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion, Volume 1: The Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon, 1737-
1764 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 7. 
 
19
 J.G.A. Pocock, “The Redescription of Enlightenment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 125 
(2004), 101-17.  
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Irish forced to seek education in France and Spain, the astonishing popularity of universal 
histories and of fictionalized accounts of exotic travelers to and from the Orient, even the rise 
of public subscription lists across national boundaries, to appreciate that writers and readers 
did see themselves as  participating in an international dialogue that shared certain principles 
and practices, though not programs or ideologies.  Despite the advances that Pocock’s 
research contains, then, the central problem remains:  as with nationalism and Patriotism, we 
are faced with a concept, “Enlightenment,” that has been stretched back anachronistically to 
appropriate a fluid and diverse, mid-eighteenth-century intellectual milieu, the “Republic of 
Letters.”  How else might this situation be rectified?   
J.C.D. Clark has argued recently that historians should jettison talk of “The 
Enlightenment” altogether, since the term only emerged as a description of an historical 
period toward the end of the nineteenth century.  Clark’s exercise in historicization, like his 
similar assault upon “eighteenth-century radicalism,” does much to recover a sense of how 
the intellectual discourse of Europe before 1789 must be approached on its own terms.20  
What it fails to incorporate is the fact that contemporaries such as Burke himself, while they 
may not have settled on a label, perceived strains of thought that were secular, rationalist, 
programmatic and politically virulent.  The Reflections itself was, to some degree, an 
exercise in conceptual retrospection, of imaginative historical reconstruction, where Burke 
marked the growth over time of a system of metaphysical reasoning that he believed had 
invaded and perverted the république des lettres.  That Burke identified such a system with 
atavistic religious enthusiasm rather than with benevolent liberalism is not, in itself, 
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sufficient argument for denying the usefulness of a term such as “Enlightenment” tout 
court.21  
The position adopted by this study offers an alternative strategy to all of the above 
that addresses the weaknesses in the approaches of Pocock and Clark while acknowledging a 
debt to their critical insights.  It involves recovering the more narrow connotations of the 
term Enlightenment, including its secularizing and programmatic aspirations, but 
simultaneously situating it as just one, competing (though ultimately dominant) movement 
within the wider intellectual community.  That community described itself as a “Republic of 
Letters,” a functioning society where academics, writers, and booksellers self-consciously 
discovered a convergence of social identity, habits and intellectual engagement, rather than 
of particular intellectual programs, and as such “Republic of Letters” is preferred over 
“Enlightenment” as a tool for historical analysis in this study.  It is also a term that, as 
Donald Kelly reminds us, significantly originated in a desire for order, not innovation, at a 
time when scholars were striving to impose procedural norms upon what appeared almost a 
surfeit of new ideas.22 
Two points follow from this.  First, “Enlightenment” should be used sparingly until 
that point, later in the century, when certain intellectuals appeared to be undermining the very 
nature of the Republic in their commitment to a program of anticlericalism and political 
reform—although, as has been indicated above, critics such as Burke himself saw similar 
dangers presaged in some of the Patriot discourse around Bolingbroke and in Shaftesbury, 
dangers decidedly more pressing in mid-century Ireland, where constitutional liberty actually 
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Ashgate, 2002), 70-71. 
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meant the domination of a minority church, than in London.  Second, dimming the focus on 
“Enlightenment” broadens our perspectives on the diversity, tensions, and vibrancy that 
constituted the mid-century Republic of Letters.  After all, beneath the veneer of Georgian 
stability and confidence, British and Irish politicians shared continental concerns in that they 
remained haunted by the specter of disorder, of dynastic, denominational, or imperial 
rivalries, and, against this background, Burke’s involvement with Tully’s Head brings to 
light a community of writers in London and Dublin more socially diverse, cosmopolitan, and 
religious than generally assumed.  It is a complex, self-conscious “Republic of Letters” 
whose citizens employ a rhetoric of civic participation and social and cultural criticism 
designed to nurture productive social intercourse rather than promote radical change, and 
who see their role as one of integrating the energizing of public spirit with the defense of 
public order.   
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
Our reconsideration of the key concepts of Patriotism and Enlightenment now enables 
us to appreciate better the problems raised by traditional historiographical and 
methodological approaches to Edmund Burke’s own intellectual biography.  Burke’s early 
writings, those penned between his entry into Trinity College, Dublin, in 1744, and his 
employment as personal secretary to the politician William Gerard Hamilton from 1759, 
have received increased attention in recent years, in line with growing interest in the author’s 
aesthetic thought and Irish background.  Whether that interest has been focused on the 
rhetoric of the sublime, or on repressed conflicts of national identity and colonialism, or both, 
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these researches have undoubtedly opened up interesting psychoanalytical and rhetorical 
perspectives on their subject, enriching our understanding of the complexity of Burke’s 
thought by nudging discussion beyond his dominant identity as the anti-Jacobin icon of 
modern conservatism.   
From the close of the Second World War until the early 1990s, attention to Burke’s 
thinking had focused largely upon whether his campaign against the French Revolution had 
been driven by a commitment to Classical and Christian natural law beliefs or was, rather, 
the final rhetorical flourish of an inveterate but eloquent political pragmatist.23  The latter 
view of Burke, as more accomplished in political propaganda than political philosophy, had 
come to define academic orthodoxy in Britain largely owing to the enduring influence of the 
historians Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, whose studies of parliamentary politics in the 
eighteenth century played down the significance of principles and ideology in the formation 
of public policy in favor of an analysis of networks of personal patronage.  Burke’s 
relationship to natural-law thought, meanwhile, constituted the core of a “Burke revival” in 
the 1950s and 1960s that invigorated Burke studies in the United States at least until the end 
of the century but that had limited impact across the Atlantic.  Indeed, in the charged context 
of the Cold War, this “revival” was often reduced by unsympathetic scholars to a complaint 
that Burke’s work had been appropriated by new conservative and neo-Thomist American 
writers—those to whom J.H. Plumb referred, in the 1960s, as Burke’s “Cult,” and whom 
Conor Cruise O’Brien warned were using their hero’s writings “to validate the policy of 
American counter-revolutionary imperialism”24   
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O’Brien, however, differed significantly from Plumb in holding the political thought 
of his fellow Irishman in high regard.  His powerful work The Great Melody: A Thematic 
Biography of Edmund Burke, restated the charge against America’s new-conservative 
Burkeans while finally putting any lingering Namierites to the sword; but it also established 
an interpretative shift of its own by presenting a crypto-Jacobite Burke whose Irish Catholic 
sympathies stayed with him to his deathbed and fired not only his anti-Jacobinism, but his 
reformist campaigns against British colonial injustices in Ireland, the American colonies, and 
India.  This maneuver served both to sideline the debate over natural law and to reinvest 
Burke’s rhetoric with a passionate sense of social justice.  At the same time, the romance of 
his Irish Catholic roots and his imputed Jacobitism cleared the path for Burke studies to make 
its mark on the burgeoning field of nationalist and postcolonial studies as they impacted the 
history of Ireland.25   
These fresh historical perspectives have stimulated a re-examination of the 
significance of Burke’s “pre-political” writings.  By applying the latest methods of textual 
criticism, they have found in their author’s divided ethnic and religious identities the source 
of the tension he exhibited in his life between a conservative reverence for tradition and a 
radical yearning for social justice.  The most worked over of these texts to date is A 
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Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, which some 
commentators believe Burke was composing ten years before its eventual publication in 
1757.26  Here, an existing body of rich research on Burke’s aesthetic thought has been 
imaginatively reconfigured into a system of politicized aesthetics where social affections and 
structures of exploitation and domination are camouflaged in a conceptual grid stretching 
from affective “beauty” to fearsome “sublimity.” 27       
Other of Burke’s early texts have lately been incorporated into this analytical 
paradigm.  These include, primarily, a short-lived journal, The Reformer, with which Burke 
was closely involved after he graduated from college, Burke’s own private correspondence as 
an undergraduate, and his first published book, A Vindication of Natural Society.  All can be 
dated with precision and have been mined for what they can tell us of the impact on his 
subsequent career of Burke’s eclectic up-bringing and education (he spent some time in his 
early youth in the Cork country with his Nagle relatives, and then attended a Quaker-run 
school before entering Trinity College, Dublin).  On this textual foundation, Michel Fuchs 
composed a fascinating study for the bicentenary of Burke’s death entitled Edmund Burke, 
Ireland, and the Fashioning of Self, and Luke Gibbons, in his study Edmund Burke and 
Ireland has provocatively incorporated them into the aesthetics of the Philosophical Enquiry 
to uncover signs of the ways in which Burke negotiated the imputed stresses of the colonial 
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and religiously persecuted aspects of his own family background.28  This research has served 
to connect Burke and the Dublin of his youth more tightly to wider intellectual currents such 
as the Scottish Enlightenment and trends in aesthetic theory in France, and to deepen our 
awareness of Irish pedagogical theory in the early eighteenth century—although such success 
has come at a high price, since some historians are on the verge of ushering into the world an 
“Irish Enlightenment” to vie with its older, established Scottish sibling!29   
Whatever their uses and shortcomings, all of these approaches to Burke’s early 
writings have remained tethered to a rigidly linear perspective on their significance, which 
has meant valuing them not for what they tell us about the intellectual and social climate of 
their time but for how they illuminate their author’s later political campaigns.  Consequently, 
they acquire purchase only insofar as they can be fitted into narratives laden with teleological 
assumptions—nationalism, Romanticism, Imperialism and the like, or located within 
established intellectual currents: Lockeanism, perhaps, or Neo-Aristotelianism, Court 
Whiggery, or proto-Romanticism.  Either way, the horizontal contexts referred to earlier, 
including the practical processes of bookselling, the commercial demands of a constantly 
changing readership market, and the networks of collaborative literary associations, remain 
on the periphery.  Even the “New Cultural Turn,” with its emphasis upon the 
interdependence of text and context, has generally failed to reflect the vital interaction 
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between publications and the multifaceted sites of their reception.30  This is largely because 
poststructuralist criticism has privileged the constructive, or imaginative, agency of the text’s 
author above the objective, diverse and unpredictable pressures that make the text, in reality, 
a product of negotiation between a number of interested parties.  Such privileging of the text 
actually allows researchers the room to insert their own ideological assumptions or presentist 
concerns between author, publisher, reader, and patron in a way that perpetuates reductionist 
assumptions about those relationships.31   
This study follows in the spirit of the original aims of the New Cultural History in the 
sense that it aims to recover the leverage of those horizontal contexts, in their own terms, 
through adopting a microhistorical method.  This choice has been influenced by Giovanni 
Levi’s argument that microhistory offers a “framework of analysis which rejects 
simplifications, dualistic hypotheses, polarizations, rigid typologies and the search for typical 
characteristics” and thereby undermines seductive assumptions about the “automatism of 
change.”32  Yet, even here, earlier microhistorical studies have drawn criticism for merely 
applying reductionist macrohistorical schema to microhistorical subjects, as Dominick 
LaCapra has shown, for example, in his compelling critique of Carlo Ginzburg’s The Cheese 
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and the Worms.33  In this respect, the writings of the ethnographer George E. Marcus are of 
interest in suggesting strategies for “the use of biographical narratives as a means of 
designing multi-sited research” that remains, as far as possible, open-ended in its 
expectations:  “The idea is that any cultural identity or activity [in this case, of the public 
critic] is constructed by multiple agents in varying contexts or places” which require the 
researcher to be prepared to assimilate into his analysis “both intended and unintended 
consequences in the network of complex connections within a system of places.”34  The 
emphasis here is not on constructing parallel biographies and then applying the sum as a 
norm for the period.  Instead, it is on juxtaposing cross-sections of biography to provide 
“points of entry” into the wider currents and “interactive experiences” shaping social and 
cultural identity. 
In the chapters that follow, then, a number of sites and personal associations will be 
examined for the way they overlapped and interacted to shape the contours of Burke’s early 
career and writings.  The resulting nexus, or cross-section of this intellectual milieu will 
address the gaps that have opened up between sub-sections of the historical field, such as the 
history of the book and the history of ideas, by recovering the symbiotic relationship between 
the aspirations of the writer and the personal, institutional, and commercial networks within 
which he had to maneuver and through which he shaped his critiques.  By interrupting the 
vertical, teleological approaches that inject both stasis and anachronism into the analysis of 
intellectual movements, this study will help us to restructure our understanding of 
expectations, pressures, status anxieties, and multiple “professional” identities in a way that 
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reflects more authentically the experiences and perceptions of historical figures such as 
Burke.  It will also help us to appreciate more fully the interaction of such perceptions with 
preexisting mentalities, accumulated expectations and defined experiences.  This, after all, is 
both the warp and weft of the “Republic of Letters.” 
The first chapter of this study comprises an examination of Robert Dodsley’s Tully’s 
Head business as part of a cross-section of the British Republic of Letters mid-century and as 
a formative influence upon Burke’s early career as an author and critic.  Dodsley was not 
merely an accomplished talent-spotter, but an active contributor to the market of ideas.  
Rising from footman to bookseller entirely through the patronage of Alexander Pope, his 
early professional years in publishing were spent in the service of Pope’s own literary career 
and the wider cause of the Patriot literary assault upon the “Robinocracy.”  But Dodsley 
showed his true professional acumen in the renegotiation of that Patriot polemical tradition, 
when new modes of criticism appeared necessary to convey to an ever broader readership the 
message that liberty (the constant Patriot watchword) could be secured only through a public 
spirit, or engagement, that was, at the same time, a true acting out of public order.  In the 
collaborative publishing ventures that secured its reputation in the 1750s, we can see the 
fruits of a commercial and intellectual network at Tully’s Head that set to work transforming 
and updating the critical legacy of Pope and the lessons of Bolingbroke’s political 
philosophy.  The result was a refashioned discourse of orderly criticism that drew its strength 
from native aspects of the civic inheritance—the genius of the Anglican settlement, a fresh 
constitutional historiography, and an imaginative deployment of the inheritance of 
Elizabethan allegorical writers such as Edmund Spenser.  The chapter closes with references 
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to two figures whose work was significant in this process: the churchmen and scholars 
William Warburton and Joseph Spence. 
This was the environment from which Burke’s first book-length publication, A 
Vindication of Natural Society, emerged in 1756.  Chapter 2 is devoted to an examination of 
how a collaborative network of writers at Tully’s Head shaped a critique of Lord 
Bolingbroke’s contested intellectual legacy and influence upon Pope, and of how that 
collaborative process influenced the composition of Burke’s text.  This contextualization of 
the Vindication will serve to reaffirm the traditional, satirical reading of that problematic text, 
and challenge its recent appropriation as evidence for Burke’s imputed angst over injustices 
in British colonial Ireland.  It will also show how the Vindication can provide a valuable 
window into the wider debate within the Republic of Letters of the correct role and aims of 
the critic.   
The third chapter explains Burke’s successful penetration of Tully’s Head by showing 
how his upbringing and education in Ireland had already infused his writing with Popeian 
imitations and had informed him in the salient aspects of Patriot debate in London.  It 
challenges notions, all too uncritically accepted today, that Burke’s Irishness would have 
been a severe handicap in an increasingly assertive and nationalistic England, and shows how 
the vibrant exchange of ideas and personnel in the publishing and theatrical circles across the 
Irish Sea contributed to his identity as a writer and critic.  Indeed, the urgency of 
reconsidering the place of religious toleration, national history, and public rhetoric in shaping 
the identity of a free, prosperous, Protestant Ireland was made particularly evident by two 
episodes that disrupted Dublin society during Burke’s student days: reaction to Thomas 
Sheridan’s reform program for the Dublin theater in 1747-48, and Charles Lucas’s populist, 
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demagogic campaign for election to the Irish parliament the following year.  Both 
campaigns, it is argued here, shaped Burke’s idea of the proper responsibilities of the public 
critic and therefore formed a vital aspect of his transition to London; but both have been 
misrepresented to various degrees by attempts to make them the backdrop of Burke’s 
supposed initiation into a proto-Irish Nationalist mentality. 
The chief significance of Burke’s Irish upbringing was, in fact, precisely that he 
experienced first hand, and as a self-professed insider, divisions over the Hibernian and 
Protestant Patriot legacy of Molyneux and Swift, fought out between figures such as Lucas, 
who held to a tight Bolingbrokean paradigm in their propaganda, and other Patriots who saw 
necessary reform as proceeding from within the existing constitutional arrangement with 
Britain.  Among the latter figures, Sir Richard Cox emerges as, of all writers, the closest to 
the youthful Burke in style and content.  The nature of this connection, which has not been 
explored by Burke scholars to date, is pursued in the final chapter of the dissertation where 
Burke’s writing career after the success of the Vindication is considered, particularly in 
respect of his unfinished “Abridgment of the English History.”  The “Abridgment,” which 
was never published during Burke’s lifetime, remains understudied and undervalued to this 
day; but it shows us crucially that Burke had made considerable advances in the development 
of an accessible style of Patriot history that was designed to promote the civic virtues that 
lead to liberty through a mixture of religious providentialism and literary allegory.  Burke’s 
failure to complete his project, and the subsequent appearance of histories by Hume and 
Gibbon have unfairly relegated this episode in Burke’s formation as a critic to the margins.  
In many ways, Burke’s historical mind was his greatest literary contribution to the Patriot 
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project of Tully’s Head in the 1750s, and it still has much to tell us about the sophistication 
and variety of British intellectual life at that period. 
The picture of Burke that emerges from this study is intended to capture those 
dominant personal and intellectual influences that have been sidelined by historiographical 
and methodological orthodoxies to date; but it cannot claim to offer a fully comprehensive 
coverage of Burke’s formative years in the Republic of Letters.  For example, recent 
scholarship is gradually clarifying the importance of Miltonic themes in Burke’s rhetoric that 
are too systemic and broad to be incorporated here.  Nor will Burke’s most famous pre-
political work, the Philosophical Enquiry, be addressed in detail, since the literature on its 
place in the development of aesthetic theory is already voluminous.  Furthermore, the reader 
will not find a resolution to the vexed problem of natural-law thought in Burke’s writings, 
although it is hoped that Burke’s treatment of the state of nature in the Vindication will 
contribute to new avenues of research that are just now taking us beyond the responses to 
Stanlis’s work that have dominated the theme over the past few decades.   
Finally, consistent with the intention of treating Burke’s mid-century milieu as a 
period on its own terms, this dissertation is not designed to be built upon positions that Burke 
was to adopt in his later political career.  That is not to say, however, that its reconsideration 
of the “pre-political” Burke offers no clues to explaining important aspects of his later career.  
Burke’s justly famous rhetoric in defense of prescription and providence, in support of justice 
for Imperial subjects, against programs of social or political innovation, all sprang from 
insights into the nature of religious, historical, and poetic truth anchored in the Republic of 
Letters that he knew as a young man.  The role of critic that he formed there continued to 
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dictate his approach as a member of parliament, rendering him much more effective as an 
opposition spokesman than he ever was holding the levers of power.   
Indeed, Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord is in many ways the great curtain call of the 
Tully’s Head critic.  Summoning the genius of Pope, our author raises his pen to defend 
public-spiritedness and public order against a fresh strain of disorder and chaos.  An 
unwitting betrayer of his lordly class, the bovine Lord Bedford has sealed an unholy alliance 
with the Enlightened betrayers of their art—“Pleas’d to the last, he crops the flow’ry food, / 
And licks the hand just rais’d to shed his blood.”35  It is in this charge of double-betrayal, not 
spurned loyalty, ethnic resentment, or repressed radicalism, that this work most truly reflects 
the experience of its author and his world. When read as such a Patriot critique, even its 
swan-song, it shows how urgently the mid-eighteenth-century milieu deserves fresh 
consideration, not just among Burke scholars, but among intellectual historians of the 
eighteenth century. 
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Chapter 1 
Getting inside Tully’s Head 
 
1: Pope’s Footman 
 
Robert Dodsley’s bookselling business operated in Pall Mall, London, under the sign 
of “Tully’s Head,” and it was the making of Edmund Burke, financially, intellectually, and 
professionally.  While we do not know the actual circumstances, and even the year, in which 
Burke first met Dodsley, it is clear that the ambitious Irish immigrant had become received 
into Dodsley’s circle of writers by 1756, when Dodsley accepted for publication his first full-
length manuscript, A Vindication of Natural Society: or, A View of the Miseries and Evils 
arising to Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society.1     
In quick succession, Burke was to place two further works with Dodsley, the highly 
successful Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
(1757), for which Dodsley paid treble the fee he had for the Vindication, and, in collaboration 
with his friend William Burke, An Account of the European Settlements in America (1757).  
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That same year, Dodsley also commissioned his new star to write a history of England.2  
When he offered Burke the editorship of the Annual Register the following year, the terms, 
though not beyond expectation, were generous, and they marked Burke out as an example of 
a relatively new phenomenon in the self-styled Republic of Letters—the professional writer 
with his own, low-born, bookseller patron. 
By the time he engaged Burke, Dodsley had built up extraordinary financial and 
literary leverage which he dispensed and nurtured through gatherings at Tully’s Head. He 
had launched a number of highly respected publishing enterprises, including two serial 
anthologies—A Select Collection of Old Plays (1744-46) and A Collection of Poems by 
Several Hands (1748-58), and an innovative, two-volume educational textbook, The 
Preceptor (1748).  He had also achieved success in the journal market with The Museum, or, 
Literary and Historical Register (1746-47), and the popular monthly The World (1753-56), 
and he owned an interest in the Adventurer and the London Evening Post.   A successful 
playwright and respected poet, he counted Alexander Pope, Samuel Johnson, William 
Shenstone, David Garrick, Sir George Lyttelton, and Joseph Spence amongst his closer 
acquaintances, and with these connections he had been able to instigate an effective, 
collaborative literary operation astutely positioned, physically and figuratively, between the 
palaces of Westminster and St. James.3 
Dodsley’s historical profile has risen deservedly in recent years, with the publication 
of his surviving correspondence in 1988, the appearance of a new biography, and extended 
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treatment of his business projects in line with the development of historical sub-categories 
researching the history of the book, of reading, and of publishing.4  And yet historians are 
still a way from incorporating fully into their work the dynamics of the processes through 
which bookseller, writer, and market would have interacted—how, in our case, practical 
publishing concerns, short-term market preoccupations and professional relationships 
centered upon Tully’s Head impacted the shaping of Burke’s early publications.  While those 
dynamics will be considered in more depth at the beginning of the next chapter, it would be 
worth laying out more broadly at this point three possible explanations for this flat 
interpretation of the professional relationship between Dodsley and Burke. 
First, and perhaps most understandably, there is a scarcity of surviving 
correspondence from either party in the years leading up to 1758.  Indeed, there are just two 
extant letters from Burke for the year 1752, and only one thereafter for the whole period to 
August 1757.  His first surviving letter to Dodsley can be dated to early September 1759, by 
which time he had known the bookseller for some years.  Dodsley’s first reference to his 
protégé appears in a letter of January 10, 1758, a little over three months before he signed 
Burke on as editor of his new journal the Annual Register.  Here Burke appears simply as one 
of a company that dined at Tully’s Head.  A year later, we find Dodsley explaining, in 
response to an enquiry from the poet William Shenstone, that “That Mr Burke who writes so 
ingeniously, is an Irish Gentleman, bred to the Law, but having ye grace not to follow it, will 
soon I should think make a very great figure in the literary World.”5  Indeed, Dodsley’s 
                                                 
4
 James E. Tierney, ed., The Correspondence of Robert Dodsley, 1733-1764 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); Harry M. Solomon, The Rise of Robert Dodsley: Creating the New Age of Print 
(Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996).  The only earlier biography is Straus’ 
Robert Dodsley. 
 
5
 Tierney, Correspondence of Robert Dodsley, 330, 393. 
 30 
surviving correspondence is not only thin (his brother, James, burned his personal papers on 
his death), but what remains is largely lacking in character, personal details or stylistic flair.6  
Despite the scarcity of evidence, and James Dodsley’s incendiary zeal (which could plausibly 
indicate a higher degree of personal intimacy in Dodsley’s professional communications than 
one might expect), Betty Rizzo has concluded that Dodsley’s “interests were largely confined 
to his writing and his business, the making and selling of books,” and that “his friends were 
cultivated through and for the sake of these interests.”7  The effect of such speculation is to 
reinforce the impression that Dodsley’s contribution to Burke’s professional development 
could hardly have been anything more than commercial acumen and astute talent-spotting. 
Second, while recent scholarship has enriched our appreciation of Dodsley’s own 
literary output alongside his bookselling business, the artificial division between his creative 
and professional work has remained redoubtable.8  This is a result, probably, of the sub-
disciplines of the “New Cultural History” that have compartmentalized new methodologies 
and allowed the perpetuation of economically reductionist analyses of the bookseller-author 
relationship.  As a result, the interactive processes between bookseller, writer, and market 
have remained elusive.  Betty Rizzo, again, gives surprisingly uncritical credence to the 
formulaic complaints of authors of the mid eighteenth century that “booksellers in general 
[were] corrupters of art, mere tradespeople who exerted an unnatural control over the 
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profession of authorship,” and duly unravels Dodsley’s own literary persona to expose him as 
“a proto-capitalist amoralist masking himself as an honest man.”9  Such circular reasoning 
indicates the presence of an ideological template that cannot accommodate the common 
ground that bookseller and author shared in anticipating changing markets, or negotiating the 
fluidity of their own public identities.   
The third reason why historians, and commentators on Burke in particular, have 
remained comfortable with a Dodsley who, in Straus’s words, “rose…by accepting people 
who from various reasons were desirous to help him” is that crediting him with more artistic 
purchase would complicate any interpretation of an author’s work predicated on the 
consistency of the author’s own thought.10  Carl B. Cone, for example, read the Vindication 
as a first salvo in Burke’s “lifelong struggle against the rationalism of his century.”  Peter 
Stanlis, in similar vein, argued that the author, “With characteristic insight, even at age 
twenty-seven…perceived the revolutionary tendency of the state of nature theory, which in 
his last years was to help to destroy the established order.”11  More recently, Seamus Deane 
has written that “A Vindication anticipates, in inverted form, much of what Burke will later 
say against the French revolutionary belief in the possibility of a secular society based on 
natural rights, productive of a ‘perfect Liberty’.”12  Biography naturally privileges 
intellectual consistency over contingent personal influences, sometimes in spite of itself, and 
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even in the most perceptive and rigorously detailed studies of Burke, such as F.P. Lock’s 
two-volume life, Dodsley remains very much at the margin.13   
How can we do a better job of assessing Dodsley’s influence in shaping the debut of 
his anonymous satirist in 1756?  The answer is that we must be willing to experiment with 
fresh analytical methodologies.  Given the scarcity of archival material for both Dodsley and 
Burke in the crucial years 1750-1756, this means that we must reconstruct the relationship 
between the two largely by drawing together a mass of surrounding evidence, thickening the 
immediate context within which Burke’s early projects were published, carefully scrutinizing 
overlapping and interlinked personal and professional fields, and searching for patterns of 
repetition within Dodsley’s publishing network in the early 1750s.  Such a microhistorical 
approach opens up fresh and exciting questions:  How did Dodsley understand his duties and 
responsibilities as a bookseller and writer in the Republic of Letters?  Why did certain writers 
appeal to Dodsley?  To what extent were Tully’s Head publications, and those that Dodsley 
financed through other booksellers, coordinated to nurture certain critical debates within the 
reading market?  What was the extent of the intellectual and commercial influence on 
Dodsley of his patron Alexander Pope, and how did the personal friendships, animosities and 
controversies that Pope left at his death impinge upon Dodsley’s commercial options?  
Finally, what was the extent of the intellectual influence of Pope on Dodsley as an aspiring 
member of the literati, and to what extent was Dodsley able to invest his business agendas 
with a coherent and vivifying intellectual stamp of his own?  When we situate Burke’s arrival 
on the London literary scene in 1750 within the nexus of these enquiries, we find that certain 
long-term ideological themes lose their import, while more immediate concerns and relations 
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are highlighted in a way that alters considerably our appreciation of Burke’s critical methods 
and professional aspirations.     
 
Robert Dodsley was the son of a dissenting schoolteacher from Mansfield.   Breaking 
off his apprenticeship to a local stocking weaver in his early teens, he sought prospects in 
household service, and first came to the attention of the literary world through poems that he 
composed while working as a footman for Charles Dartineuf, an illegitimate son of Charles 
II, member of the Kit Kat club, and friend of Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope.  In 1732, a 
subsequent employer, Jane Lowther, financed through private subscription the publication of 
Dodsley’s first collection of writings, A Muse in Livery, which included verse in extravagant 
praise of Pope.  By the end of that year, Dodsley was sending Pope manuscripts for 
comment, including a play, The Toy-Shop, which, on Pope’s recommendation, was staged by 
John Rich at Covent Garden.14  From the profits of this work, and with the addition of a gift 
of £100 from Pope, Dodsley set up in the bookselling business at Tully’s Head in April 
1735.15 
Pope, at the time, was cementing his relationship with Henry St. John, Viscount 
Bolingbroke, who was directing opposition to Robert Walpole’s system of patronage through 
a variety of philosophical and journalistic enterprises including, earlier, the weekly 
Craftsman.  Expressing his admiration for Bolingbroke’s intellect and character on several 
occasions, Pope became more bold in his own criticism of the Whig government and its 
creatures, a fact that helps in a number of ways to explain the poet’s generous patronage 
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toward the rising footman, Dodsley.  There was, first, a propagandistic purpose.  Dodsley’s 
origins brought with them the indelible mark of an outsider and a frisson of potential disorder 
that had become associated with the figure of the footman in urban areas and theatrical 
circles.  While his earliest published poem, Servitude (1729), is an appeal to moral duty and 
mutual respect between servants and masters, and his Toy-Shop is a gentle satire on the airs 
and graces of “society” folk, Dodsley’s chief theatrical triumph after 1735, The King and the 
Miller of Mansfield, was a much more pointed critique of courtly corruption, reminiscent of 
Bolingbroke’s Craftsman.  This play, first performed under the direction of Colly Cibber at 
Drury Lane in February 1737, opens with King Henry II of England lost on a hunting trip in 
Sherwood Forest.  After wandering a while in the twilight, the king eventually finds 
wholesome refuge for the night at the home of an honest, artless miller who is unaware of his 
identity.  “Well,” the king says, “I shall once in my Life have the Happiness of being treated 
as a common Man; and of seeing human Nature without Disguise.”  Among the company is 
the miller’s son, just returned from a lowly position at court.  Having lost the love of his 
sweetheart Peggy to a lascivious courtier who has seduced and abandoned her, he 
unwittingly, satirically lays open to his father’s royal guest the true extent of the court’s 
moral degeneracy: “I love to speak Truth, Sir; if that happens to be Satire, I can’t help it.”  
The king, revealing his identity at last, expresses his gratitude for being brought, both 
physically and metaphorically, out of obscurity and darkness and into a true appreciation of 
piety, sincerity, and plain dealing.  So plain is the oppositional nature of the play that, 
ironically, it incited on its first night a riot by footmen in the audience—four months before 
Walpole’s Licensing Act placed the stage under the censorship of the Lord Chamberlain’s 
office.16   
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Second, Pope doubtless intended his generous patronage of Dodsley as a challenge to 
Queen Caroline’s courtly support for the “thresher poet,” Stephen Duck.  In the hands of 
Pope and his friends, the footman’s acceptance within the circles of their literary elite set up 
a contrast between the open accessibility to talent found in the “true” Republic of Letters and 
the manipulation of mediocrity by a philistine court.  It is a contrast that had already been 
well articulated by Pope’s close friend Joseph Spence in the preface to his Essay on Mr. 
Pope’s Odyssey (1727).  Here, Spence delivers a paean to the egalitarian spirit of a Republic 
of Letters that has given him, an obscure clergyman, a public platform from which to 
criticize the works of an acknowledged master of the poetic arts.  Such disinterested 
criticism, he suggests, far from harboring insubordination, promotes order and health: “The 
learned World, as I take it, have ever allow’d a Liberty of thinking and of speaking one’s 
sentiments.  That serene Republick knows none of the distance and distinctions which custom 
has introduced into all others.  There is a decent familiarity to be admitted between the 
Greatest and the Meanest Person in it….’Tis this ease of access, ’tis the liberty arising from 
it, which constitutes and preserves the felicity of the Republic of Letters.”17  This formulaic 
expression of humility fitted Dodsley’s case, too, and entirely suited Pope, who was never 
allowed to escape the taint of arrivism himself.  It could also claim to be drawing upon the 
weighty Classical precedent of the great critic Longinus who, examining the relationship 
between great literature and the good order of the state in the final extant chapter of Peri 
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Hupsous, had shown how fostering such critical audacity was a republican duty and a 
patriotic enterprise from which no friend or patron should be exempt.18  
Finally, Pope had compelling practical reasons for patronizing Dodsley.  Any amount 
of Longinian justification could not clear Pope and his friends from the charge that their 
critical rhetoric, when directed at governmental corruption, was nothing more than a 
masquerade of self-interested political opposition, or faction.  As such, it came laden with 
financial and personal insecurities, and Pope realized early that he needed a machine to 
support his work that could function independent of political patrons.  In the wake of the 
1709 Copyright Act, then, he constructed an intricate, self-promoting publishing network 
established upon a set of complicated contractual agreements with booksellers and printers.19  
The former footman, who had been apprenticed to Pope’s publisher Lawton Gilliver in 1732, 
and who now owed his commercial break entirely to Pope, was a useful companion in 
opposition, and Tully’s Head bookshop was intended to supplement this network.  Indeed, 
Pope was keen to expand his tactical options in the mid-1730s since he was well aware that 
his forthcoming Essay on Man would be vigorously attacked, once its author’s identity was 
known, by his enemies and writers who had been parodied by the Scriblerians in the Dunciad 
of 1728.  Safely subversive and reliably expendable, Dodsley was a dutiful defender of his 
patron when the backlash against the Essay on Man began.  In 1734, he had published two 
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laudatory poems on Pope’s work: An Epistle to Mr. Pope, Occasion’d by his Essay on Man, 
and The Modern Reasoners, followed the next year by another, Beauty, or the Art of 
Charming.  Now, in the first four years that his business was operational, he published at 
least eight volumes of his patron’s work, on financial terms highly favorable to the author, of 
course.  
Pope’s dependence upon his personal publishing network became all the greater in 
the years following the founding of Tully’s Head, when he became more actively involved 
politically with the network of Patriot opposition writers associated with Bolingbroke.  Pope 
was perhaps attracted by the fact that Patriotism found a powerful patron in the Prince of 
Wales, who established an “alternative” court at Leicester House in 1737.20  He was also, 
however, responding to the urgings of a younger group of aristocratic Patriot politicians, 
“Cobham’s Cubs,” who had formed around Richard Temple at Stowe some years earlier.  
Foremost among these was George Lyttelton, who had gained a literary reputation in 1730 
for his address An Epistle to Mr. Pope, from a Young Gentleman at Rome, penned during a 
visit to Virgil’s tomb in Mantua.  In this important poem, Lyttelton had unambiguously tied 
literary art to political opposition by challenging Pope to “join the Patriot’s to the Poet’s 
Praise,” turn away from satire, and compose epic verse that would vindicate the cause of the 
forces ranged against Walpole.21  Dodsley, probably for ideological as well as professional 
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reasons, followed Pope into this political network and, as a result, came into close contact 
with powerful figures who would leave their own mark on Tully’s Head long after Pope had 
retired, disenchanted, from their circles.  Since Pope’s contribution to Patriotism, as it was 
filtered through Dodsley’s Tully’s Head business, forms the crucial context for Burke’s 
developing understanding of the role of the critic mid- century, it will be worth fleshing out 
here the broader contours of the Patriot literary and political landscape.   
The term “Patriot” was in popular use by 1726, but its origins, for both Bolingbroke 
and others, stretched back to the Commonwealth tradition of the Restoration period and to 
what has generally been termed “country” opposition to court venality and self-interest.   
Writers in this tradition, however, faced a growing problem in the early years of the 
eighteenth century, as publishing opportunities mushroomed and the identity of the reading 
public became more broad and amorphous.22  The problem can be stated thus: “How might 
the critic rouse the spirit of the public against the country’s government without appearing to 
foment social disorder?”  The Revolution Settlement that resulted from the crisis of 1688-89 
was secured with the accession of George I in 1714; and the defeat of a Jacobite rising the 
next year, hot on the heels of Dr. Sacheverell’s “Church in Danger” campaign and laden with 
intimations of renewed theological and ecclesiological strife, served to strengthen the hand of 
the so-called Latitudinarian wing of the Church of England both intellectually, by vindicating 
their critique of religious enthusiasm and “priest-craft,” and practically, by confirming the 
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benefits of doctrinal tolerance within a porous establishmentarianism.23  The triumph of 
dynastic Hanoverianism and of moderate Anglicanism reinforced an acceptance of the 
settlement of 1688-89, upon which conceptual basis “public” discourse could be pursued on 
the model of Shaftesbury’s “amicable collision” of ideas—that is, by a political elite defined 
by breeding and taste.24  Furthermore, Walpole’s successful negotiation of the fallout from 
the South Sea Bubble crisis ushered in a period of relative commercial and economic 
stability.  By 1730, the memories of political discord were sufficiently close to remind people 
of the consequences of disorder, but sufficiently remote to offer a flattering perspective upon 
the achievements of the new order.  In such a situation, it was hard not to interpret the 
perpetuation of direct political opposition to Walpole as the attempt of disaffected outsiders 
to engage disorder in the cause of personal ambition, and, rhetorically, the terms “party” and 
“opposition” were forced into ever more confined channels of political conversation.  Tories 
might have retained a “party” identity longer than historians once thought; but, after 1715, 
they did not act independently as such in power-broking negotiations, exerting their influence 
instead through shifting alliances with Whig factions.25 
As Walpole tightened his grip, then, what options were open to the “Patriotic” critic 
for articulating opposition to the mores and tastes of the contemporary political and social 
establishment?  Answers were sought in Classical parallels.  One such option involved 
cultivating the rhetoric of physical retirement and philosophical detachment, like the 
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enforced exile of Cicero at the end of his life, or the very public withdrawal of the Stoic 
Thrasea Paetus from the Neronian senate.  Another drew on the Catonic ideal popularized by 
Addison’s drama Cato, adopting the role of Jeremiah (to mix one’s traditions) and awaiting 
providential vindication of one’s martyrdom in the greater cause of the res publica.  The 
first-century philosopher-statesman and patrician Helvidius Priscus was an exemplar here in 
the bold and recklessly noble resistance he led to the ambitions of the socially-inferior 
Flavians, even in the wake of Vespasian’s restoration of social and political order after the 
disastrous “Year of the Four Emperors.”  A third strategy involved reconfiguring the 
relationship between the techniques of detached, objective literary criticism and political and 
social comment.  The tools here had been supplied by the surging interest in Classical 
criticism that had begun in France in the last decades of the seventeenth century with 
Boileau’s extraordinarily popular translation of Longinus’s Peri Hupsous, and the works of 
the Ciceronian Quintilian, whose extensive Institutio Oratoria underwent a revival in the first 
half of the eighteenth century.26  By this template, the constitution of the state and the 
character of the citizenry was open to analysis as one might render a poem, identifying and 
praising what is natural, sublime, and spirited in it, and exposing the artificial, the false, the 
base, and the dull.  According to such a method, allegory, metaphor, and analogy might all be 
deployed, subject to Classical standards of criticism, to expose the formal order of a state as 
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false order, or concealed disorder, and the integrity of literary aesthetics used as a touchstone 
for perceiving the source of harmony between the natural and the artificial in society.  This 
was a process noted by commentators of Virgil and Horace, whose poetry negotiated the shift 
from republic to empire by seeking sources of continuing civic vitality in the benign (because 
orderly) dictatorship of the Julian dynasty, and of Tacitus, whose brisk but profound rhetoric, 
like a prism placed perfectly over the narrative of the early empire, filtered order from 
disorder and virtue from vice.  
It was the last of these options that informed Lyttleton’s urgent request to Pope to 
unveil a sublime Patriot literature for those who were “Dauntless Opposers of Tyrannick 
Sway, / But pleas’d a mild Augustus to obey.”27  In coupling political and civic vigilance 
with poetic excellence, Lyttelton was not only drawing upon Virgilian and Horatian 
precedents, but he was promoting the versification of his and Pope’s intellectual mentor, 
Bolingbroke, in epic form.28  From the lofty enforced exile in France between 1715 and 
1725, when Bolingbroke fashioned himself as a philosopher and historian, to the combination 
of retired statesman-farmer and prophetic journalist when he issued the Craftsman from his 
estate at Dawley in 1726, it was Bolingbroke who epitomized the Patriot for many influential 
young politicians.29  And it was Bolingbroke’s Maecenean sense of the artistic duties of the 
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philosopher statesman that explains his assiduous, lengthy, and intimate patronizing of Pope, 
a relationship that began some time around 1710 and, as we have seen, reached a peak of 
intellectual cooperation in the 1730s.30   
The pivotal moment in that relationship was the publication of Pope’s Essay on Man, 
which appears to have grown directly out of Bolingbroke’s philosophical correspondence and 
conversation and, as such, might be considered the first fruits of Lyttelton’s appeal for a 
Patriot successor to Virgil who could give sublime voice to the people in an act of national 
enlightenment.31  The Essay aimed to bring within the compass of its audience a 
philosophical expression of order against which the superficial order, the dullness, of the 
existing regime could be judged and condemned.  In the Craftsman, disorder appears through 
material corruption, venality, and a moral surrender to the enticements of security and 
placement; but it is also exposed historically and philosophically as the artificial order that a 
succession of hierarchies has systematically foisted on an unsuspecting or indolent mob 
through superstition and enthusiasm.  Pope conveys the same message in his Essay in a more 
aesthetic and literary form.  Both writers intend to teach their compatriots how to recognize 
true order by leading them to a discovery of their natural selves—and from there to become 
citizens of Britannia Prisca.   
                                                                                                                                                       
29
 For the significance of the influence of French thought on Bolingbroke’s intellectual works, see Rex 
A. Barrell, Bolingbroke and France (Lanham, NY: University Press of America, 1988).  The roots of 
Bolingbroke’s historiographical ideas are discussed in David Womersley, “Lord Bolingbroke and Eighteenth-
Century Historiography,” The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Practice 28, no. 3 (1987).  See also Folke 
Nibelius, Lord Bolingbroke (1678-1751) and History: A Comparative Study of Bolingbroke’s Politico-
Historical Works and a Selection of Contemporary Texts as to Themes and Vocabulary.  Stockholm Studies in 
History of Literature, no. 47 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2003.) 
 
30
 For an argument highlighting the intimacy of the intellectual relationship between the two, especially 
in the 1730s, see Brean Hammond, Pope and Bolingbroke: A Study of Friendship and Influence (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 1984). 
 
31
 The Essay on Man was dedicated to Bolingbroke and opens with the words: “Awake, my St. John!” 
 43 
But as the Essay was the pinnacle of Pope’s collaboration with Bolingbroke, so it also 
contributed to the decline of their relationship and to a significant reconsideration by the poet 
of his Patriot duty.  In 1739, Dodsley was briefly imprisoned for publishing Paul 
Whitehead’s Manners: A Satire, which had been judged treasonous by the House of Lords.  
Many years later, Johnson aired the opinion that Dodsley had been brought to book “rather to 
intimidate Pope than to punish Whitehead.”32  If he was correct, it was a highly successful 
tactic on the government’s part.  Pope withdrew from the vanguard of Patriot opposition, 
professing his disenchantment with the movement in his poem Seventeen Hundred and 
Forty.  In all likelihood, his concerns about the governmental backlash launched that year 
were aggravated by assaults on the religious content of the Essay on Man, most notably the 
Swiss philosopher and theologian Jean-Pierre de Crousaz.  As a result, he not only removed 
himself from overt political activity but also briskly struck up a friendship with the 
churchman William Warburton, who had defended the orthodoxy of the poem and who was, 
in many ways, the antithesis of Bolingbroke.33  This shift in affections did not mean that 
Pope abandoned Lyttelton’s challenge; but he did alter his tactics, heightening the 
uncertainty within Patriot circles about the most appropriate method of communicating the 
spirit of criticism in defense of natural order.   
If anything, Walpole’s eventual fall in 1742 helped to heighten that uncertainty.  
True, the doors of patronage were now opened to Patriots, but the rhetoric of triumph was 
soon complicated by the disappointments that came with the administration of the former 
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Patriot Whigs Carteret and Pulteney.  Parliamentary investigations into charges of corruption 
against Walpole were restricted or obstructed to such a degree that the new ministers came 
under suspicion of venality themselves.  Foreign policy, given a temporary lift by the British 
victory at Dettingen in 1743, was soon bogged down in inconclusive diplomacy.  Then the 
French triumph at Fontenoy, in May 1745, opened the way for Charles Stuart’s Jacobite 
rebellion and his alarming victory at Prestonpans four months later.   
It would be hard to overestimate the shock delivered to the British ruling elites by the 
“Forty Five,” and the Young Pretender’s advance to Derby the following year.  The 
composition of the rival armies shows that this was not a crisis between nations and 
nationalities but a civil war, and, as such, it was potentially all the more easily transported 
into England.  The underlying fragility of the new British order, sealed by the union of the 
crowns of England and Scotland in 1707, was revealed at just the time when Patriot 
propaganda appeared to have triumphed.  Furthermore, the sporadic recurrence of popular 
disturbances, such as those over the Westminster election of 1749 and the Jew Bill debates of 
1751-53, was an uncomfortable reminder of the volatile nature of the rhetoric of criticism 
when deployed among an increasingly broad and diverse readership.  The footmen’s protests, 
it seemed, were no longer contained within the theaters, and the consumers of journalistic 
fare were no longer confined to Shaftesbury’s elite, engaged in polite and rational 
discourse.34  Britannia Prisca was starting to appear as elusive as ever.   
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II:  Pope’s Legacy 
 
When he died, in 1744, Pope did not bequeath to Robert Dodsley the lucrative 
copyrights for either his published or manuscript materials, which went to William 
Warburton and Lord Bolingbroke respectively.  He did, however, leave Dodsley what 
amounted, in the long run, to a rather more weighty legacy—one that was both personal and 
intellectual and centered upon the network of friends and projects that surrounded him in his 
last years.  Dodsley, for his part, was well positioned to take advantage of the uncertainties 
and opportunities that Pope’s association with Patriotism had helped to fuel, and he nurtured 
his patron’s legacy masterfully, weaving it into a reformation of the Patriot literature of the 
Republic of Letters that simultaneously honored and transcended his patron’s achievements.   
Since it is impossible to understand Burke’s early writings independent of the dynamics of 
this reformation, we need to consider: first, the salient features of the Tully’s Head business 
that made such a process of reformation feasible; second, the specifics of the personal and 
intellectual aspects of Pope’s legacy; finally, the practical results of the incorporation of that 
legacy on Dodsley’s publishing lists and commercial projects, and on his own writings. 
By 1744, Dodsley had already emerged as one of the most prosperous and well-
connected booksellers in the country, and he continued to fashion an image of his business 
that combined respectability with dynamism and innovation.  To start with, the physical 
quality of Tully’s Head as a meeting place of writers, with its spatial relationship to the 
coffee-house origins of the British Republic of Letters, formed an important aspect of the 
bookseller’s professional identity.  While the coffeehouse, like Dodsley himself, had in some 
ways signified the ambiguous quality of social fluidity and accessibility, coffeehouse owners 
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had also been keen to represent their businesses as bastions of a deeper order, and it was this 
that ultimately helped to define their critical function.  Brian Cowan has argued persuasively 
and perceptively that the coffeehouse itself, with all that it meant to the identity of the 
Republic of Letters, did not develop “in complete opposition to the existing structures of late 
seventeenth-century government,” but, “[i]n most cases the coffeehouses of London fit 
smoothly into the various layers of ward, parish and vestry, civic community, and state 
governments.”35  Perhaps in violation of our modern-day expectations, which we draw from 
an environment where order is the norm, markets in the eighteenth century, including the 
market of ideas, worked to reinforce the sense of commitment to an existing moral order, and 
Dodsley was similarly careful to couple his own innovative commercial skills with the 
expected norms of respectability.  He was a vigorous member of the Royal Society, and 
presented an image as the “vir honestus” of his trade with a degree of success that even the 
most industrious of scholars have not been able to tarnish. 
This image was bolstered by the modus operandi at Tully’s Head, where, from at 
least the later years of the 1740s, Dodsley presided over a suitably impressive gathering of 
established and aspiring literary figures.  Samuel Johnson was moved at one point to remark 
that, “The true Noctes Atticae are revived at honest Dodsley’s house,” and there are other 
illuminating incidental references to Dodsley’s commercial salon at work.36  James Boswell 
mentions a brain-storming session, some time before 1753, in which Dodsley, Joseph 
Warton, Edward Moore “and several of [Dodsley’s] friends” attempted (unsuccessfully) to 
agree upon a title for the periodical that was later to become The World.  In one of his own 
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surviving letters, Dodsley throws out a casual reference to a dinner he held in January 1758 
comprising “no less than a round dozen” literary companions (of whom he names, among 
others, Joseph and Thomas Warton, Joseph Spence, David Garrick and Edmund Burke).  
Such esprit de corps spilled outside the confines of the bookshop, too.  The actress George 
Bellamy recalls in her memoirs how, at Covent Garden later in 1758, “All Mr. Dodsley’s 
friends, who were numerous, attended the rehearsal of his piece [the tragedy Cleone]; 
particularly the literati.”37  The results of such social and professional collaboration can 
clearly be seen in the quality of the works that emerged from Tully’s Head—journals such as 
The Museum, for example, which was edited by the Shaftesburian, political radical and 
deistic Mark Akenside and lasted 39 numbers, and a string of anthologies and educational 
texts, including the Collection of Poems and The Preceptor, and specific collaborative 
publications such as Joseph Warton’s edition of Virgil’s Works (1753) and his Essay on the 
Writings and Genius of Pope (1756).38   
Fundamental to this fraternal system was Dodsley’s clutch of journalistic 
investments, which delivered a regular publishing profile alongside lucrative financial 
returns.  Advertisements and astutely placed news items stimulated increased sales and 
profits, and contributed articles and poems could also provide cheap material for later 
anthologies and collections.  By the time Dodsley set up business in 1735, Edward Cave’s 
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Gentleman’s Magazine was selling at the rate of 10,000 issues a month and successfully 
fighting off frantic competition from rival booksellers.  Despite early set-backs, Dodsley 
achieved signal successes after Pope’s death with quality journals designed to inspire the 
market with a taste for the principles of true, Popeian criticism.  Besides their sheer 
commercial value, The Museum: or, the Literary and Historical Register (1746-47), the 
London Magazine (1748), The World (1753-56) and the Annual Register (1758-  ), revealed, 
in their consciously Classical and Addisonian style of criticism, that their owner was a 
bookseller diligently striving against the debasement of publishing sketched in The Dunciad. 
While the empire of Dullness spread unrelentingly westward from Grub Street to the centers 
of polite and political society (an appropriate parallel, perhaps, to Troy’s removal west to 
Latium), Dodsley remained ensconced in his lofty perch in Pall Mall, the antithesis to 
Edmund Curll, that unscrupulous book pirate and peddler of pornography who had been 
pilloried in Pope’s and Swift’s satires.   
With such a carefully crafted public image, Dodsley was ready to absorb and utilize 
Pope’s twofold legacy.  The personal dimension of that legacy comprised an existing 
network of friends that extended from statesman-aristocrats to Anglican intellectuals.  These 
included, in particular, two pillars of the Leicester House opposition, Philip Dormer 
Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield, and Sir George Lyttelton himself.  Both had come forward 
to stand Dodsley’s fine when he was imprisoned over the Whitehead affair in 1739.  
Chesterfield had, indeed, been singled out for praise by Whitehead—“Abroad the Guardian 
of his Country’s Cause; / At Home a Tully to defend her Laws”—and he was destined to 
achieve his greatest political success as lord lieutenant of Ireland, when he presided over a 
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quiescent Irish Catholic population in the tense months of the “Forty Five.”39  Besides his 
own literary contributions to Dodsley’s journals the Publick Register (1741) and The World 
(1753-56), his continuing patronage of Dodsley’s work was important in delivering George 
II’s support for the bookseller’s educational venture The Preceptor, in 1748, and in arranging 
for the staging of Dodsley’s own dramatic tragedy, Cleone, a decade later.     
Lyttelton’s career, however, illuminates even better the trajectory of Dodsley’s own 
in the years following Pope’s death.40  A member of the Prince of Wales’ circle until the 
prince’s death in 1751, and a minister under Newcastle in the mid-1750s, Lyttelton had been 
Dodsley’s patron as early as 1737, when the relationship is mentioned in the Daily Gazetteer.  
His deep attachment to the ideas of Bolingbroke can be seen in his early writings.  These 
include: his Epistle to Mr. Pope; an unpublished essay on the reign of Queen Elizabeth, 
written in 1733 and built upon a parallel between Walpole and Burleigh; Observations on the 
Life of Cicero (c.1733); Letters from a Persian in England to his Friend at Ispahan (1735), a 
Montesquieuian critique of the constitution; and Considerations upon the Present State of 
Affairs, a bellicose political tract dating from 1739.  Shortly after Pope’s death, however, 
Lyttelton appears to have undergone a religious awakening from his earlier deism, perhaps 
under the influence of his cousin Gilbert West, a poet and Biblical scholar.  In 1747 he 
published a theological tract, Observations on the Conversion and Apostleship of St. Paul, 
which Samuel Johnson judged beyond the counterarguments of “infidelity.”  He contributed 
to Tully’s Head as an author and literary adviser, both on projects such as the Collection of 
                                                 
39
 Paul Whitehead, Manners: A Satire (London, 1739), 9.  Chesterfield held the lord lieutenancy from 
1744 to 1746, before embarking on an unhappy period as secretary of state with Newcastle.   
 
40
 Tierney is hardly exaggerating when he suggests that “Dodsley’s allegiance to the government 
followed the fortunes of Lyttelton’s career.”  Correspondence, 21. For Lyttelton’s political and literary career, 
see Rose Mary Davis, The Good Lord Lyttelton: A Study in Eighteenth-Century Politics and Culture 
(Bethlehem, PA: Times Publishing Co., 1939), and Christine Gerrard, The Patriot Opposition to Walpole: 
Politics, Poetry, and National Myth, 1725-1742 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
 50 
Poems and on Dodsley’s own writings, helped found the journal The World in 1753, and was 
the recipient of an extensive and interesting dedication penned by Joseph Warton in his four-
volume edition of The Works of Virgil, which appeared the same year.41  Through Lyttelton, 
Dodsley also struck up a very productive relationship with the reclusive William Shenstone, 
who furnished a number of local literary connections from his estate at the Leasowes near 
Birmingham.  But perhaps the lord’s greatest practical use came at the cresting of his own 
political career in 1755, when he was appointed lord of the Treasury by Newcastle, and 
appears to have provided Dodsley with franking privileges.  He was, all in all, a crucial 
figure at that juncture of literature, politics and patronage which formed the intellectual nexus 
of Tully’s Head and its commercial procedures.  
At the same time, Pope’s less public network of friends provided Dodsley with an 
equally useful pool of scholarly writers.  Foremost here was the Anglican minister Joseph 
Spence, who had known Pope for the last seventeen years of his life and whose observations 
on the art of criticism in the Republic of Letters has been mentioned above.  Spence proved 
an excellent resource for talented writers and translators drawn, in large part, from his old 
school, Winchester, and through his connections as professor of poetry, and later regius 
professor of modern history, at Oxford.  These scholars included Christopher Pitt, the 
translator of Virgil and great-nephew of William Pitt, the Hebrew scholar Robert Lowth, 
William Whitehead, who was to be appointed poet laureate in 1757, the clerical scholar-poets 
Joseph Warton and Glocester Ridley, who all attended Winchester School, and a host of 
minor poets who contributed to Dodsley’s cash-cow periodicals and anthologies of verse. 42   
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This was a rich legacy of talent through which Tully’s Head could attempt to forge a 
reconfiguration of Patriot literature for a new market, and for a rising generation of critics, by 
asking where Pope should be ranked in the pantheon of poetic geniuses.  It was a task that 
Dodsley exploited, and made distinctively popular, through his promotion of poetic and 
dramatic anthologies and literary histories.  These not only provided Pope’s own work with a 
rich historical context, but also served to situate him within an apostolic succession of 
English poets that included Spenser and Milton, and, by so doing, to raise the question of 
how far Pope was worthy of such an honor.  Was he truly, as Warburton contended, the last 
of this illustrious line, or had he ultimately failed to reach the destiny toward which George 
Lyttelton had urged him—that of assuming the mantle of Britain’s epic poet for the new 
age.43   
This was an open-ended, canonical, polemical, and Patriotic, venture; but precisely 
because it drew upon the personal nature of Pope’s legacy, it contained hidden dangers for 
Dodsley.  Not least, in profiting from the critical evaluation of Pope’s genius, he risked the 
charge of ingratitude and lèse majesté from some of the poet’s influential friends, a charge all 
the sharper for an arriviste like Dodsley.  Indeed, wishing to justify his decision to keep 
Dodsley out of a share in the copyright of Pope’s published works in 1755, William 
Warburton was to resort to just such a tactic, accusing him haughtily of not having been 
“very regardful of the memory of a man to whom you was so much obliged.”44  Dodsley 
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attempted to negotiate this danger by channeling potentially sensitive material through the 
bookshop of Mary Cooper in Paternoster Row, and it is significant that Joseph Warton’s 
measured, academic Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope carried Cooper’s name.  Even 
then, we find Dodsley writing to the author in 1755, “I dare say you will contrive in your 
Animadversions to allow [Pope] all his due praise; and where you differ from him will do it 
in such a manner as to render it no impropriety in me to be the Publisher of it.”45  Cooper, a 
retailer rather than wholesaler, carried more popular and polemical tracts than Tully’s Head, 
and coordinated her stock closely with newspaper advertising.  Through her, Dodsley could 
manipulate and modulate discussion on Pope and his personal friends from a number of 
angles while maintaining the impression of prudent detachment.  It is therefore somewhat 
ironic that Warburton’s wrath was fired more by publications he erroneously believed 
Dodsley had an interest in, than by those, such as Thomas Warton’s Observations on the 
Faerie Queene of Spenser (1754), that offended his academic judgment but carried the 
Tully’s Head imprint openly.   
However astute a businessman Dodsley proved to be, however savvy a player of the 
market, we must remember that we can only gain a complete picture of the impact of Pope’s 
legacy upon Tully’s Head if we view him also as one of the literati himself, not least since 
developments evident in the publishing lists and projects of Tully’s Head can also be traced 
in Dodsley’s own literary writings during the 1740s.  This brings us to the intellectual 
dimension of Pope’s legacy to Dodsley.  This arises from three important aspects of Pope’s 
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career that were prominent in the last four years of his life, when he was detaching himself 
from political opposition but still fashioning a response to Lyttelton’s challenge.  They 
include: Pope’s plans to write an epic poem on the subject of Brutus; the growing breach 
between two of Pope’s closest confidants, Lord Bolingbroke and William Warburton; and the 
powerful but generally unstated influence of another of those confidants, Joseph Spence, on 
the poet’s understanding of the use of allegory in conveying religious and political truths.   
 Pope’s treatment of the story of Brutus, the mythical founder of Britain whose arrival 
from Troy was related in the medieval chronicles of Geoffrey of Monmouth, was intended to 
form the third book of a four-part “Essay on Man,” which was itself an ambitious expansion 
of the original poem of that title.46  “Brutus” would develop the theme treated in the third 
book of the Essay, which Pope himself summarized as, “Civil Regimen, or the Science of 
Politics, in which the several forms of a Republic were to have been examined and explained; 
together with the several Modes of Religious Worship, as far forth as they affect Society; 
between which the author always supposed there was the most interesting relation and closest 
connection.”47   The most detailed plan for the project is to be found in Owen Ruffhead’s 
1769 biography of Pope.  Ruffhead relied heavily upon material supplied by his patron, 
Warburton, and appears to have had access to an original draft of Pope’s that is now lost.  
Though Pope told Joseph Spence shortly before his death that his epic was “planned 
already,” we have virtually nothing in the poet’s own hand but a brief sketch of the work, and 
it is not therefore possible to be sure whether or how far Ruffhead or Warburton embellished 
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Pope’s original.48  Johnson records that the executors of Pope’s unpublished writings—that 
is, Bolingbroke—burned them on his death, probably out of disapproval of its contents. 
 What can we deduce from the fragments of the “Brutus” project that we do have to 
hand?  Brutus, driven by the ruling passion of benevolence and by the affirmation of 
Hercules, who visits him in a dream, sets out to redeem the remnants of the Trojans by 
journeying West to establish an uncorrupted society devoted to “freedom and felicity on a 
just form of Civil Government” and ruled according to manners, “true religion,” and the 
“useful arts.”  In his wanderings toward his new Troy, the hero’s understanding of 
government is deepened by reflection upon the fate of his homeland, and by his wanderings 
in Greece and Rome, while his knowledge of true religion is awakened by a sojourn in Egypt, 
where he “learned the unity of the Deity, and the other purer doctrines, afterwards kept up in 
the mysteries.”49  Fortified by these principles and driven by his ruling passion, benevolence, 
he finds in the island of Britain a promising environment for his redemptive plan, with ideal 
climate, mild inhabitants, and “ye Druids Doctrine tending to a nobler Religion, & better 
Morall suited to His Purposes.”50  First, though, he must secure the native population from 
the encircling threats of priest-craft, tyranny, and anarchy, before “ye whole Island submits to 
good Government wch ends ye Poem.” 
The picture we are given of a salvific “Patriot” king from over the water presents an 
implied contrast to the sovereign from Hanover who presides over the kingdom of Dullness 
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in The Dunciad.  To that extent, and in its treatment of the threat of priest-craft to felicity and 
true religion, “Brutus” is clearly in keeping with the dominant themes of Lord Bolingbroke’s 
writings.  Important aspects of the project, however, are suggestive of a significant shift of 
emphasis, not least in the choice of epic poetry itself as the medium of communication—a 
medium that Pope had up to that point preferred to employ as a vehicle of ridicule in the 
tradition of Boileau’s highly popular Le Lutrin.  Now, apparently, Pope had decided that the 
treatment of man in his social, political, and religious capacity might, in Warburton’s words, 
“be best executed in an EPIC POEM; as the Action would make it more animated, and the 
Fable less invidious; in which all the great Principles of true and false Governments and 
Religions should be chiefly delivered in feigned examples.”51  Owen Ruffhead’s extended 
version of the original “Brutus” draft, and marginal comments from Pope’s own notes, show 
the elaboration of a travel narrative in which good and evil contend over the human passions, 
which are exemplified in different character types in a way that draws strongly from Spenser 
and Tasso.  As Miriam Leranbaum has pointed out, “The creation of multiple points of view 
relieves Pope of the need to impose his ‘moral’ from without; instead he can weave it into the 
very fabric of the epic story.”52  This strategy highlights an important stage in the recovery of 
allegorical writing as supportive of the principles of truth, nature, and simplicity, rather than 
as a device of esoteric obfuscation.  This marks a significant shift from the critical method of 
Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke, who believed that truth in the simplicity of its first principles 
could be apprehended only through the application of philosophical skepticism and empirical 
reasoning.  Pope’s “Brutus” appeared destined to invert those pillars of Patriot rhetoric. 
                                                 
51
 Warburton’s introduction to the “death-bed” edition of the Epistles to Several Persons (London, 
1744). 
 
52
 Leranbaum, Pope’s ‘Opus Magnum,’ 168. 
 56 
Furthermore, in embracing blank verse as the style of communication—that is, poetry 
released from the “gothick shackles of rhyme”—“Brutus” also signifies Pope’s acceptance of 
a Miltonic legacy that had previously been associated, in its sublime imagery, with the 
political upheavals of the seventeenth century and with the ludicrous imitations of the style 
pilloried in Peri Bathous (1728).  In a conversation with Spence in 1739, Pope had argued 
that the high-style of blank verse required “strange out-of-the-world things” and could not 
support itself “unless it be stiffened with such strange words as are like to destroy our 
language itself.”  By 1741, he had been persuaded, perhaps by Spence’s own dislike of 
rhyme, to use that very “high-style” in facing Lyttelton’s latest challenge to “draw something 
like History out of the Rubbish of Monkish Annals” and “out of these Gothick Ruins, such as 
they are, Raise a new Edifice, that would be fitt to Enshrine the Greatest of our English 
Kings, and Last to Eternity.”53  Remarkable also is Pope’s willingness to grapple with the 
“Rubbish of Monkish Annals,” since it contrasts starkly with his earlier criticism of Aaron 
Thompson’s translation of Geoffrey of Monmouth, with its stated goal of popularizing “that 
Heroick Beginning which this History ascribes to the British Nation…”54  The allegorical 
mode was essential to any such endeavor, since only it could convey the underlying order 
and universality of human nature through the particularities of historical circumstances and 
bridge the historical gap that separated the truths buried in the “Monkish Annals” from the 
direct experience of readers in the cosmopolitan world of eighteenth-century Britain.   
The central points at issue here are perhaps best illustrated in the way that Brutus’s 
devotion to “true religion” is presented in the draft of the poem.  Natural in its simplicity, its 
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monotheism, and its practical emphasis on benevolence, “true religion” involves a syncretic 
approach to ancient religious practice, and to druidic rituals in particular, that was popular in 
historical and theological works of the time.  Egypt is the source of the mysteries of “true 
religion,” as it is also the birthplace of the priestly class; but the benign intervention of 
Providence, or the hand of God, in Brutus’s travels—again presented syncretically in the 
form of Hercules and of angels—satisfies us that Brutus’s induction into the Egyptian 
mysteries was religious in the fullest sense, and not an initiation into an esoteric, secularized 
philosophical naturalism—the suspicion that dogged deists such as Bolingbroke himself.55  
Brutus “prays to God” when faced with incomprehensible perils such as hurricanes and 
volcanoes, and God “answers by sending a guardian angel who explains the phenomena, and 
directs him to the south-west parts of England.”56  In Pope’s allegorical rendition, then, 
theologia prisca, as understood and upheld by Brutus, actually exposes the dangers of 
associating “true religion” with “natural philosophy” and of secularizing or dismissing the 
realm of the providential.  In so doing, “Brutus” reinforces Pope’s sensitivity about questions 
over the orthodoxy of his Essay on Man and, therefore, fuels the rivalry between Warburton 
and Bolingbroke.  It is this rivalry, and more particularly Warburton’s ascendancy, that forms 
the second of the defining themes of Pope’s intellectual legacy to Dodsley and Tully’s Head. 
William Warburton’s rise in the circles of Pope’s friends was astonishingly swift, but 
its significance has largely been confined by commentators to Warburton’s editorial 
influence over Pope’s literary legacy—an influence generally regarded as intrusive and 
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negative.57  Pope had diligently patronized this assertive autodidact after the latter’s 
Vindication of Mr. Pope’s Essay on Man “Christianized” a work pronounced atheistic by de 
Crousaz, and whether through genuine admiration or professional calculation, the poet was 
prepared to go on record as judging Warburton “the greatest general critic I ever knew.”58  In 
1740, most likely through Pope’s influence, Warburton was appointed chaplain to Frederick, 
Prince of Wales.59  Within months he had become a rival to Bolingbroke and a check on the 
latter’s deistic and philosophical influences on Pope.  His intellectual ascendancy appears 
emphatically in the shaping of the new version of The Dunciad, which appeared in 1742, and 
he made a significant contribution—as “Ricardus Aristarchus of the Hero of the Poem”—to 
the Dunciad in Four Books, which was published by Mary Cooper in 1743.  Warburton’s 
first acclaimed work had been The Alliance between Church and State, or, The Necessity and 
Equity of an Established Religion and a Test-law demonstrated, from the Essence and End of 
Civil Society, upon the fundamental Principles of the Law of Nature and Nations (1736), a 
spirited argument, post hoc facto, that Britons enjoyed, “under our present happy 
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Constitution in Church and State…an Established Church with a free Toleration, by the 
medium of a Test Law.”60  In his Divine Legation of Moses (1738-41), Warburton took up his 
cudgel against deists and “free-thinkers” such as Spinoza, Collins, and Toland, whose works, 
he argued, were pernicious and socially corrosive because they drove a wedge between 
philosophical method and faith, and aspired to undermine the providential authority of the 
Old Testament prophets and lawgivers such as Moses.  The historical thrust of these deistical 
views, as Warburton considered them, was that the Old Testament Jewish dispensation had 
been superseded (rather than transformed) by the teachings (rather than the resurrection) of 
Christ, which had then become instantiated in, and perverted by, a new clerical power 
structure.  While staunchly anti-Catholic and hardly a rigid dogmatist, Warburton saw this 
perspective as dangerously secular in its understanding of “natural” religion, philosophically 
hubristic in its arrogant rejection of the “unnatural” intervention of providence, and 
destructive of order in its over-zealous critique of the clergy and church establishment.  
According to Warburton, Pope, in his Essay on Man, had given “direct Answers to those 
Objections which libertine Men, on a View of the Disorders arising from the Perversity of the 
human Will, have intended against Providence: And…obviates all those Objections, by a true 
Delineation of human Nature, or a general but exact Map of Man; which these Objectors 
either not knowing, or mistaking, or else leaving (for the mad Pursuit of metaphysical 
Entities) have lost and bewildered themselves in a thousand foolish Complaints against 
Providence.”61  The problem of “natural” religion here, as understood by Shaftesbury, 
Bolingbroke and their disciples, was that it was unnatural.  It was therefore also an entirely 
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unsuitable basis upon which to build an oppositional or Patriot critique of society.  In this, 
Warburton’s insights provide an interesting foretaste of Burke’s ironic vindication of natural 
society later.62   
While Warburton’s arrogant polemical style and intellectual hubris have severely 
dented his intellectual reputation over time, there is much to admire in his critical method, 
which ranged far beyond his defense of “true religion” and providence.63  In particular, he 
was an important figure in moves to reassess Lord Shaftesbury’s legacy to natural 
philosophy, pointedly claiming after the poet’s death that Pope had “told me, that to his 
knowledge, the Characteristicks had done more harm to Revealed Religion in England than 
all the works of Infidelity put together.”64  In his pointed dedication to Free-thinkers at the 
beginning of his Divine Legation, Warburton defends John Locke against the criticisms and 
personal slights of Shaftesbury, who had sneered at Locke’s belief in the afterlife as confided 
by Locke to his friend Collins shortly before his death.  This dishonorable behavior 
Warburton attributes to Shaftesbury’s desperate attempt to defend his concept of a moral 
sense against Locke’s refutation of innate ideas: “In vain did Mr. Locke incessantly repeat, 
that the Divine Law is the only true Touchstone of moral Rectitude.  This did but increase his 
Pupil’s [Shaftesbury’s] resentment…”  In a further assault on Shaftesbury, Warburton goes 
on to deplore the use of ridicule in attacking sacred subjects, regarding it as a pathway to 
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disorder: “[I]t is inconceivable what Havoc false Wit makes in a foolish Head: The Rabble of 
Mankind, as an excellent Writer well observes, being very apt to think, that every thing which 
is laughed at, with any mixture of Wit, is ridiculous in itself.  Few reflect on what a great Wit 
has so ingenuously owned, That Wit is generally false Reasoning.”65  In opening up this 
breach with Shaftesbury, Warburton exposed differences—or created polemical 
opportunities—within Tully’s Head, too.  William Whitehead’s Essay on Ridicule (1743) 
stated the case against Shaftesbury’s position eloquently: “We oft, ’tis true, mistake the 
Sat’rist’s Aim…”; while Mark Akenside’s The Pleasures of Imagination, published by 
Dodsley the following year, contained a lengthy footnote defending Shaftesbury and “our 
natural Sense or Feeling of the Ridiculous” and expressing astonishment at “those Men, who 
imagine it for the Service of True Religion to vilify and blacken it without Distinction.”66   
In both these polemical issues of natural religion and ridicule, in its defense of Locke 
against the more extreme imputations of Shaftesbury, and in its caution against the 
misapplication by critics of Wit and Sophistry, Warburton’s “Dedication” is intriguingly 
reminiscent of Burke’s later Preface to the second edition of the Vindication of Natural 
Society.  This is a point that has passed unnoticed by Burke scholars; but it is actually 
Warburton’s contribution to historical method that remains most underappreciated and that 
ties his work most closely to Dodsley, to Tully’s Head, and thence to Burke himself.  In 
1750, Warburton published Julian, an analysis of the historical evidence for the “miraculous” 
intervention that destroyed the emperor Julian’s plans to rebuild the temple of Jerusalem.  
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After reading this work, Montesquieu was prompted to “make a further acquaintance with 
Dr. Warburton, and take a nearer view of his great talents.”  To Warburton himself, 
Montesquieu sent congratulations on refuting Bolingbroke so comprehensively in the Divine 
Legation and Julian, both of which books, he said, deserved wider dissemination in French 
translation.67  Warburton’s history is syncretic in the sense that it draws coherence from those 
incorporative and transformative aspects of political and cultural development often best 
explored in the evolution of literary forms.  It is this that helps to explain Robert Ryley’s 
judgment that, in Julian, Warburton displays an unusually “sophisticated historical sense, and 
awareness that the reliability of ancient sources must often be judged in the light of alien 
habits of thought.”68  Underpinning the whole of Warburton’s method is a belief that a 
common human nature has been providentially oriented to the social and economic 
engagements that have driven the progress of civilizations through history, and that allegory 
had often been understood as the most appropriate channel of this intelligence from 
generation to generation.  Thus, in an eclectic string of historical studies—on chivalric 
romances, mystery and morality plays, fiction—and commentaries on texts as diverse as the 
Aeneid of Virgil, the writings of the Church Fathers, Medieval chronicles, and Apuleius’s 
Golden Ass, Warburton carries out a tenacious search for consistency through historicization 
and contextualization, a feature that reflects Pope’s own awakening to the conceptual links 
between Classical Epic poetry and monkish annals in his “Brutus.”69 
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 The intellectual differences between Warburton and Bolingbroke, then, were 
considerable and fundamental, and the stakes—the posthumous interpretation and 
guardianship of the “authentic” Pope—were considerable.  It is hardly surprising that the 
rivalry was also an intensely personal one.  Each figure was possessed of an enormous ego, 
and Pope himself had failed to designate one or other as the supreme guardian of his 
reputation by the time of his death.  Indeed, though there is no evidence that Warburton and 
Bolingbroke ever met in person, Spence’s Anecdotes show how they jostled for position over 
the poet’s deathbed in the spring of 1744.  Warburton was at Pope’s house in early April that 
year, pontificating on the immortality of the soul as a staple of the mysteries and arguing that 
the Greeks, “when [they] grew wicked,” came to associate Momus, complainer against 
Providence and son of “Ignorance and Disorder,” with “Wit.”  At the end of May, it was 
Bolingbroke’s turn to attend the dying poet, and Spence records how he flew into a rage 
when he heard that Pope had received the Sacraments.  For some years after Pope’s passing, 
the struggle was low-key.  In 1749, however, recriminations broke out in earnest over 
Bolingbroke’s public exposure of Pope’s breach of faith in secretly printing 1,500 copies of 
the Idea of a Patriot King.70  Bolingbroke’s withering assault on Warburton, A Familiar 
Epistle to the Most Impudent Man Living (1751) might be described as the antithesis of the 
Letter to a Noble Lord genre in its social conceit.71  But the author’s death the year it was 
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published allowed Warburton the leisure of awaiting the arrival of Bolingbroke’s 
posthumous works in 1752-54 before landing his reply.  This was his gleefully unanswerable 
View of Lord Bolingbroke’s Philosophy (1754-55). 
Dividing his copyright as he did, Pope could almost be thought to have deliberately 
fuelled the contest between his beneficiaries.72  And while he must have rued his own 
exclusion from those valuable copyrights, Dodsley was quick to see how he could exploit 
their increasingly vitriolic disputes, while raising himself above the fray, by building a 
lucrative and titillating business in Popeiana and Pope criticism.  We have already seen an 
instance of this in Dodsley’s concurrent patronage of Shaftesburians and Lockeans.  He was, 
for example, willing to publish John Cooper’s Life of Socrates (1749), which was critical of 
Warburton’s Greek scholarship, and he followed that up two years later with Cooper’s attack 
on Warburton’s edition of Pope’s works (though this time the piece was prudently channeled 
through Mary Cooper).  Indeed, Dodsley was never able to achieve, or interested in securing, 
a comfortable relationship with Warburton, who duly followed Pope’s advice to publish 
future editions of his work through John Knapton’s bookselling business.  Eventually, 
Warburton paid Dodsley back for his evenhandedness by closing him out of the copyright of 
Pope’s published works when Knapton was forced into bankruptcy in 1755.73  And yet the 
dominant intellectual tone in Tully’s Head after 1744 fitted more snugly with Warburton’s 
critical apparatus, his interpretation of Pope, and of history, providence, allegory and “true 
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religion,” than with Bolingbroke’s philosophy.  In part, this is explicable in terms of 
Dodsley’s business acumen.  While Dodsley was “astonished” at Pope’s admiration for 
Warburton, it was clear that Warburton’s reputation was in the ascendancy and that his 
powers of patronage would be considerable.  If the bookseller could do nothing else he could 
identify the way the current was moving.  Yet there was another factor at play: this was the 
quiet but profound influence of Joseph Spence upon both Pope and Dodsley.  Spence’s 
writings have generally received only cursory notice by historians, but they dovetail tightly 
with Warburton’s own and form a vital component of Pope’s intellectual legacy to Dodsley 
and his circle at Tully’s Head.74   
The clergyman and academic Joseph Spence (1699-1768) was arguably the most 
intimate link between Pope and the Tully’s Head circle after 1744.  An acquaintance of the 
poet from 1727 until the latter’s death, Spence occupied the chairs, successively, of poetry 
and of history at Oxford, but he is most famous today for his posthumously published 
Observations, Anecdotes and Characters of Books and Men (1820), which immediately 
became a respected source for information on Pope’s personal life and relationships.  He was 
also, in Tierney’s words, “one of [Robert Dodsley’s] closest friends,” performing a variety of 
roles in Dodsley’s enterprise, including reading and editing manuscripts and, doubtless, 
serving as an informal adviser during the walking vacations that the two men took together.75  
Besides numerous contributions to collections and journals such as The Trifler, The Museum, 
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and the Collection of Poems, Tully’s Head published at least seven works written or 
introduced by Spence.  Dodsley secured the copyright for the Essay on Mr. Pope’s Odyssey 
by 1745, and reissued the work in 1753.  A short essay, “Some Account of the Lord 
Buckhurst and his Writings,” was prefaced to a publication of Buckhurst’s tragedy 
Gorboduc, which appeared in 1736—in Spence’s own words, “a task imposed upon me by 
Mr. Pope.”76   Polymetis, a study of the relationship between poetry and the plastic arts in 
ancient Rome, inspired by Addison’s celebrated Dialogues upon the Usefulness of Ancient 
Medals, finally saw the light of day after several delays in 1747, and was really the work that 
established its author’s reputation.  Then, in quick succession and under the pseudonym “Sir 
Harry Beaumont,” came: Crito (1752), a dialogue on beauty; a translation of Jean-Dennis 
Attiret’s Particular Account of the Emperor of China’s Garden near Peking (1752); and 
Moralities (1753), a collection of essays the majority of which had appeared in Dodsley’s 
periodical The Museum the previous decade.  Spence’s Account of the Life, Character, and 
Poems of Mr. Blacklock was published in 1754, with a second edition of Polymetis appearing 
the following year.  At the same time, Spence was providing considerable assistance to 
Joseph Warton with his volumes on Virgil and Pope, which are discussed in the next chapter.  
For a while, he was cited as an authority on aesthetics in his own right:  Burke inserted a 
critical reference to his introduction to the works of the blind poet Blacklock into his 
Philosophical Enquiry in 1757, and G.E. Lessing’s Laokoön contains an extensive refutation 
of Spence’s position on the relationship between poetry and art.77 
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The similarities between Spence’s scholarship and that of Warburton have been 
overlooked, possibly as a result of wide differences in personality and style.  Spence may not 
have taken to Warburton as a friend (and Warburton, in the 1750s, was privately disparaging 
about Spence’s abilities as an editor), but Spence did furnish a large amount of personal 
material on Pope for Warburton’s 1751 edition of Pope’s Works and for Owen Ruffhead’s 
later biography.  The two also consulted over Spence’s Polymetis, and it is almost certain that 
Spence’s respect for Warburton was increased by the latter’s spirited and lonely defense of 
Pope against Bolingbroke’s charges of betrayal in 1749. 
Central to Spence’s researches was the reenergizing of allegorical thought.  Spence 
aimed to achieve this by showing how allegory was, properly understood, entirely compatible 
with the translation and cross-generational transmission of simple or natural truths about 
religion and society.  This thesis was brought to fruition, after many years’ gestation, in 
Polymetis, which the author states was intended “to give our artists and poets more regular 
and sensible ideas, in treating all sorts of allegorical subjects.”78  Polymetis is a statesman 
and patron of the arts.  In a series of conversations with two of his friends, inspired by his 
impressive collection of Classical statuary, he defends rhetorical orthodoxy in stating that the 
enemy of truth, and therefore of nature, is whatever violates natural simplicity.  He advances 
from this position, however, to explore the much-misunderstood role of allegory in rhetoric 
through aesthetic parallels between poetry, painting, and sculpture.  Statues show the power 
of simplicity and propriety in the personification of complex abstractions, and thereby point 
to ways in which allegory can facilitate the moral labor of poetry.  Sadly, Polymetis notes, in 
the modern world both the visual and the poetic arts have become prey to excessive 
                                                 
78
 The Museum, or Literary and Historical Register, 26th April, 1746.  Spence’s draft for this 
advertisement can be found in the Osborn Manuscript collection at the Beinecke Rare Books Library, Yale 
University, OSB MSS 4, box 5, f.144.    
 68 
ornamentation and obfuscation.  The modern imagination must therefore be re-educated in 
the allegorical method.   
In the closing dialogues of the book, Polymetis turns his critical attention to the work 
of two great Englishmen, Edmund Spenser and John Dryden, considered respectively as a 
poet and as a translator of epic verse.  While he acknowledges the genius of Spenser, “the 
best allegorist” the moderns can offer, Polymetis highlights the poet’s misuse of allegory.  
Spenser mixes “the fables of heathenism with the truths of Christianity”; he misrepresents the 
allegories of the ancients; he over-gilds or overextends description, introducing unnecessarily 
“filthy” images; and he produces inappropriate physical parallels.  The cause of these failings 
is situated chiefly in the poet’s imitation of fashion.  Insufficient attention to the Classical 
artists on their own terms, or to the historical context of his more recent sources, means that 
Spenser has upset the natural balance of permanence and change that, ironically, constitutes 
the central moral of his greatest achievement, the Fairie Queene itself—that is, the triumph 
of Nature against mutability and corruption.79  “Had Spenser formed his allegories on the 
plan of the antient poets and artists,” we are told, “as much as he did from Ariosto and the 
Italian allegorists, he might have followed nature much more closely; and would not have 
wandered so often, in such strange and inconsistent imaginations.”80  Of Dryden’s 
weaknesses as a translator of Virgil, the chief, we are told, was judging the machinery of 
Classical allegory to be little more than a device for amusement and ornamentation.  Dryden 
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had failed to appreciate the “real intent and design of the allegories,” rooted in the divine 
economy as the term was understood at the time, and had confused them, instead, with 
metaphor.81  Again, this betrayed a lack of mastery of the details of Classical mythology, and 
of the signification of certain symbols embedded in the literature and artifacts of the period.  
Dryden’s errors, at root, are errors of historical contextualization that hamper the imitative 
functions of his allegories and bind them too closely to immediate or fashionable causes.  
They also signify an excessively programmatic intent in his critical work, in other words, the 
smothering of genius by politics and patronage. 
In Spence’s thinking, a reformed approach to allegory could not only cleanse rhetoric 
of the crusts of fashion, but it would also inspire a transformation in our conceptualization of 
historical evidence.  Here, his thoughts reflect a wider resurgence of interest in the 
relationship between history and literature along the lines that writers such as Sir Philip 
Sidney and Spenser himself had discussed during the period known as the “Elizabethan 
Renaissance.”  Indeed, in its sophisticated pursuit of truth in the imitation of nature, Spence’s 
was an Elizabethanism shorn of the shallow symbolism and parallels employed in nostalgic 
or propagandistic histories of the time.82  In challenging the perception of allegory as artful 
obscurity or lies, Spence along with Warburton also found himself confronting the 
implications of growing skepticism over the validity of ancient sources of sacred or secular 
history.  Both responded by arguing that only an imaginative combination of history and 
literature could unlock in such sources truths about the perennial, conflicted nature of man 
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and translate them into compelling modern idioms.  This, in turn, involved a nuanced and 
syncretic evaluative technique that emphasized the universality of human nature within the 
complexity of diverse historical circumstances, and a resituating of the providential, religious 
element of history to the forefront of intellectual debate. 
These intellectual and methodological developments were drawn together 
interestingly several years ago by Albert J. Kuhn, who argued that Spence, in “elucidating 
the myths of the ancients and thereby ‘settling’ their allegorical meanings…hoped to make it 
possible for modern writers of the epic to readapt the old machinery in accordance with the 
doctrinal truths of Christianity and the discoveries of the Newtonian philosophy.”83  Kuhn’s 
insight appears within a broader description of a syncretic movement in the eighteenth 
century that insistently probed the relationship between heathenism and Christianity. This 
involved, in particular, tracing the development of monotheism and its relationship to 
polytheistic religious rituals in the Classical age, with Heathen religious mythology 
interpreted in a way that was consistent with, and therefore affirmed, later Christian 
revelation.  Such an interpretation is nowhere better shown than in Spence’s linking of 
allegory to the popularization of Classical concepts of Fate, whereby the actions of one 
central divinity are artfully broken up into personifications of minor deities, passions and 
appetites in a way that parallels similar movements in philosophy.  Warburton and 
Bolingbroke were at the same time contending over the political and theological issues 
involved here: whether it was more natural to understand polytheism as emerging from the 
popularization of a monotheistic power, or of monotheism evolving as a more mature 
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understanding of nature than that encompassed by polytheistic mythology.84  Kuhn’s thesis 
certainly accords with Spence’s Latitudinarian stance and the wider interest in diverse 
religious systems that is evidenced in his private notes and published work.  It should also 
remind us that scholars such as Spence and Warburton displayed, in their historical 
imagination, an openness to widely different expressions of moral truth while nevertheless—
indeed necessarily—retaining a faith in the truth of the Christian revelation and a 
commitment to the social importance of Christian religious practice for the stability and order 
of a liberal society.  A syncretic methodology, then, might actually deepen faith and loyalty 
to existing modes of spiritual worship as those modes lead to a particular appreciation of the 
normalizing orientation of nature.  This may explain the popularity and continuing 
significance of Warburton’s efforts, pace Bolingbroke, to make a Christian out of Pope.   
Seen in its specifically British context, this syncretism served to validate the Anglican 
settlement as the recovery of the prisca theologia, since Anglicanism could be seen to 
combine the natural simplicity of the Apostolic religion with the civilized appurtenances of 
the modern commercial state.  It was also, in a sense, the foundation of a Latitudinarian 
historiography, proud of its historic mission against superstition and priest-craft, but now 
determined to transcend either the atavistic theories of the seventeenth-century 
commonwealthmen and their successors or the blind Whiggish confidence of the 
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“Robinocracy.”85  More important to this argument, it diverged from the philosophically-
driven methodology to be found in the writings of Toland and Boulainvilliers on 
Mohammed, which could themselves be seen as positing a religious syncretism of a different 
form in their emphasis upon the historical recurrence of movements back to a pure 
monotheism.86  Neither stadial nor mechanistic in its approach, and distinct from the 
philosophical history of Hume and Gibbon, it posited, rather, a more complex, on-going act 
of historical purgation in which universal moral truths are summoned and transmitted from 
specific historical circumstances to the present.    
In matching the allegorical imagination with the simple truths of “natural” religion, 
this Latitudinarian history also brought with it rhetorical implications.  Spence, in the Essay 
on Mr. Pope’s Odyssey, had pointedly denied to the irreligious the capacity to produce truly 
sublime literature, folding this statement into a partial rehabilitation of enthusiasm, as John 
Dennis would have understood it, against Shaftesbury’s denigration of the term.87  By the 
same token, he reaffirmed the necessity of religion in detecting the “false” sublime, or 
rhetorical fraud and insincerity.  Set against this position, the opinion of Longinus, who had 
left such detection to anyone “who has a competent share of natural and acquired taste,” and 
of Shaftesbury, who had left it to an innate moral sense, were designed to appear shallow and 
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recklessly complacent.88  Spence’s position was reinforced by Robert Lowth in his highly 
influential lectures on Hebrew poetry, where he argued that the irreligious mind, according 
preeminence to philosophy over literature and history, could never scale the rhetorical or 
historical heights of allegory since it was incapable of apprehending or truly articulating the 
sublime and transcendent in human experience.89   
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III:  Pope’s Guardian 
 
This discussion of Pope’s personal and intellectual legacy would not be complete, for 
our purposes, without evidence of the practical impact it had upon Tully’s Head in the decade 
or so after the poet’s death.  Such evidence can be found where no historian has really looked 
to date—that is, in the writings of Dodsley himself, including those Tully’s Head 
publications in which he had a direct hand.  None of the above should be taken as suggesting 
that Tully’s Head failed to embrace a variety of perspectives on Pope’s legacy and on the 
direction of Patriotic critical writing in the new environment of mid-eighteenth-century 
Britain.  Certainly, the evidence does not show that Dodsley attempted to impose an 
ideological consistency upon his publishing lists, beyond the broad parameters that have been 
sketched above.  But Dodsley did aspire to be seen as a member of the Republic of Letters in 
much more than an operational and commercial sense, and the influence of Spence and 
Warburton can be detected in his own literary output, particularly in relation to the 
application of allegory and religion.  By overlooking this aspect of Dodsley’s life, we risk 
gathering only an incomplete sense of the Republic of Letters to which Burke was drawn, 
and by which he was, in some significant degree, molded.   
Dodsley’s interest in the critical function of allegory reaches its most explicit form in 
his Essay on Fable, prefixed to his four-volume Select Fables of Aesop and other Fabulists 
and published in 1761.  Here the businessman and litterateur combine to assess the value of 
fable, or “simple” allegory:  “It pleases in order to convince; and it imprints its moral so 
much the deeper, in proportion as it entertains; so that we may be said to feel our duties at the 
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very instant we comprehend them.”90  In this important essay, Dodsley reconfigures the 
famous Horatian dictum that poetry should delight, move, and teach its audience.  In contrast 
to the art of satire, which has descended into “wit” and “ridicule,” allegory facilitates 
instruction and improvement by building its regenerative moral case through a gentler and 
more reflective imagination.  Where wit and ridicule linger, they are tempered by the 
ambiguity that surrounds the target, a characteristic of allegory that addresses John Brown’s 
observation, voiced in his poetic eulogy to Pope, that: “Satire displeases none, though sharp 
the strains: / For ’tis our neighbour, not ourselves, it means.”91  This is not to say that 
Dodsley eschewed satire entirely.  His early works, after all, like The Toy-Shop and the King 
and the Miller of Mansfield, were centered upon it, as was his facetious response to the 
“Walpolean” histories of that time, The Chronicles of the Kings of England; but he was, like 
the Toy-Shop owner, “a general Satyrist, yet not rude nor ill-natured,” and he appears to have 
become increasingly sensitive to the disorderly and subversive impact of the genre.92  By the 
early 1750s, allegory had come to infuse his poetic approach and redirect his dramatic efforts 
toward tragedy.  He worked and reworked his tragedy Cleone for several years before its 
successful staging at Covent Garden in 1758, and his correspondence indicates that behind 
his determined efforts to get the piece staged lay a genuine commitment to the art of tragic 
drama as a popular source of moral education: “Cleone,” he stresses in a letter to one of his 
revisers, is a “domestic distress” and the language therefore “should be as far remov’d from 
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all pomp of expression as elegance will permit, and the versification to contain “a natural 
ease and simplicity of language, as might flow without harshness and inelegance from the 
lips of the Speaker.”93   The composition of his tragedy was complemented by the appearance 
of his ode Melpomene: or the Regions of Terror and Pity, which is laden with Spenserian 
personification, and by a draft of an unpublished but substantial history of drama.94   
With respect to religion, both Tierney and Solomon have stated simply that Dodsley 
was a deist throughout his life.  He certainly nursed an antipathy toward ritual and 
sacramentalism, as we see in an uncharacteristically unguarded letter to his friend Solomon 
Mendes, written in 1744, where he refers to “the solemn foolery of a Christening,” and 
observes wryly that, “’Tis very wisely done, to tye us down so early to believe, what 
otherwise, perhaps, might never enter into our heads.”  In his early poem Religion: A Simile, 
which appeared in the collection entitled A Muse in Livery (1732), Dodsley had bemoaned 
the misuse of “true religion” by an axis of atheists and puritans.  These extreme positions, 
which share the conspiratorial intent to blur the simplicities of religious truth, bear the 
imprint of Bolingbroke’s conspiracy of atheists and priests, and they appear again in 
Dodsley’s Epistle to Mr. Pope, where, the “Great Bard…in whom united we admire / The 
Sage’s Wisdom, and the Poet’s Fire” confounds both “Wits and Fools…Libertines and 
Saints” with his “Doctrine sound” that man is “a Part of that stupendous Whole, / ‘Whose 
Body Nature is, and God the Soul.’”95    
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Yet there is a sense in which labeling Dodsley a deist creates the same problems as 
calling him a satirist.  After 1744, deism, like satire, became increasingly associated in the 
circles of Tully’s Head with a potential for disorder and misplaced zeal.  Consequently, by 
1750 we encounter a more earnest, didactic tone in Dodsley’s own projects in which the 
Christian moral code is validated through its conformity with diverse religious traditions, and 
the saints and puritans cede the stage of foolery entirely to the libertines, atheists, and anyone 
else who would push philosophical enquiry to excess in matters of nature and religion.  In 
Dodsley’s tremendously popular Oeconomy of Human Nature (1750), which ran to almost 
two hundred editions by 1800 (forty-eight in America alone), the imaginary text of an ancient 
Brahmin, leads the reader by its moral universalism to an appreciation of how Christianity 
mediates timeless truths through a time-bound system of language and symbolism.  In this 
way Dodsley shows how “natural religion,” far from undermining Christianity, authorizes its 
artificial but socially cohesive function through the very fact of its providential 
historicization.  
By this time, then, calling Dodsley’s religious position “deistic” obscures as much as 
it reveals.  In particular, it is insufficient for clarifying the increasingly important distinction 
between “anti-priestcraft” (from anti-Catholicism to Quakerism) on the one hand, and, on the 
other, religious skepticism that was emerging through a series of scholarly and political 
issues in the 1740s and 1750s.  Fear of enthusiasm and priest-craft had diminished with the 
ecclesiastical patronage of Walpole and the failure of Jacobitism, and was replaced by a 
resurgent concern over the socially disintegrative threat of intellectual irreligion from deists 
and free-thinkers.  This shift provided the crucible for a revivified mid-century 
Latitudinarianism which was doctrinally elusive but committed to upholding the providential 
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truth of Christianity as evidenced in history and in the aesthetic compass of human nature.  It 
is well illustrated in a cluster of theological works that Dodsley published or sold under the 
Tully’s Head sign mid-century, including: Gilbert West’s Observations on the History and 
Evidence of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ (1747)—which ran to five editions in eight 
years—and Education (1751); Lyttelton’s Observations on the Conversion and Apostleship 
of St. Paul (1747): A Summary of Natural Religion (1749), attributed to John Barr; 
Christopher Smart’s On the Eternity of the Supreme Being (1750), and On the Omniscience 
of the Supreme Being (1752); and William Hay’s Religio Philosophi (1753, 2nd edition 1754).  
While it is true that Warburton’s bête noir, John Gilbert Cooper, had more publications pass 
through Tully’s Head in this period than any of these authors individually, the cumulative 
evidence of these works reinforces the sense of Dodsley’s concern to superimpose a 
Latitudinarian face on his tenaciously anticlerical religious output.  Historians with a late-
eighteenth-century eye to the secularizing influence of the Enlightenment are prone to 
exaggerate the homogeneity of deism, or predate its popularity among the intellectual elites, 
and, consequently, the Anglican Latitudinarianism of figures such as Spence is seen more as 
a pragmatic compromise than a vigorous intellectual position.  But James Noggle is more 
insightful when he comments that, within the broad definition of deism, “Radical skepticism 
is just what the constructive variety sets out to mitigate.”96  Such a “constructive” recovery of 
the simple truths of natural religion and natural society lay at the heart of Tully’s Head and of 
the professional identity that Dodsley forged for himself and attempted to bestow upon his 
critics in his corner of the mid-century Republic of Letters. 
We might bring this chapter to an appropriate close with a practical illustration of the 
convergence of these influences, legacies and themes within Tully’s Head.  In 1748, Dodsley 
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published an innovative and highly successful educative project entitled The Preceptor.  
Marking a considerable investment of Dodsley’s resources, this two-volume anthology of 
didactic writings promised to reward “curiosity through variety, diligence by its facility, and 
to reward application by its usefulness.”  The “Preface” grounded the origins of the project in 
the marked expansion of educational institutions that had taken place in the early eighteenth 
century, noting that “every Age, Sex, and Profession is invited to an Acquaintance with those 
Studies, which were formerly supposed accessible only to such as had devoted themselves to 
literary Leisure, and dedicated their Powers to philosophical Enquiries.”97  The Preceptor 
contained chapters on geometry, chronology, rhetoric, logic, trade and commerce, ethics, and 
human life and manners among others, and, in that characteristically collaborative spirit 
mentioned above, contained new or reprinted materials from such authors as Samuel 
Johnson, Robert Lowth, David Fordyce, William Duncan, and Dodsley himself.   The 
philosophical and educative commitment to providing clear and accessible means of 
transmitting “natural” moral truths to as wide an audience as possible in a way that was 
incisively critical yet supportive of social order was pursued by closing up the tired 
ancient/modern dichotomy through the promotion of modern translations of the Classics and 
by the development of expanded canons of modern classics.  Entirely within the Patriot 
program of civic regeneration, and couched in the spirit of Spence’s Republic of Letters, we 
should nevertheless not miss here the advisory note that such a broadening of the 
gentlemanly qualities required careful negotiation to preserve the traditional parameters of 
polite society. 
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James Tierney states that The Preceptor was conducted in “an atmosphere of deism, 
pragmatism, and common sense,” but, again, this description is too broad to capture the 
significance of the contents.98  The misconception here is well-illustrated in Dale Randall’s 
otherwise excellent, short study of Dodsley’s Preceptor, which Randall, too, is inclined to 
view as an illustration of deistic rationalism.  A cursory look at the chapter titles of this 
modern educational textbook, he states, with extensive pieces on Geography and Commerce 
but nothing on Theology or the teachings of the Church, suggests that the work “deals 
principally with matters beyond the sphere of religion,” an observation that encourages 
Randall to conclude that “the only way to make religion of great importance in Dodsley’s 
work is to equate it with ethics, and, while this is not an impossible sleight of hand, it 
scarcely seems advisable or necessary.”99   But Randall’s position is unsupportable.  It was 
Samuel Johnson, after all, (who can hardly be said to have left “religion” out of anything,) 
whom Dodsley selected to write a lengthy introduction to the work and who contributed for 
the final chapter, “On Human Life and Manners,” a “modern allegory” entitled “The Vision 
of Thoedore, the Hermit of Teneriffe, found in his Cell.” The most striking purpose of the 
latter essay, which Johnson is reported to have considered one of his finest pieces, is 
precisely to emphasize the insufficiency of reason to provide contentment and the necessity 
of religion for leading man to the temple of happiness, which is situated beyond “a Mist by 
which [Reason’s] Prospect is terminated, and which is pierced only by the Eyes of Religion.”  
Indeed, in Johnson’s allegory Reason herself is at pains to warn passing travelers of her own 
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inadequacies: “counsel[ing] them at their first entrance upon her Province, to inlist 
themselves among the Votaries of Religion; and inform[ing] them, that if they trusted to her 
alone, they would find the same Fate with her other Admirers…who having been seized by 
Habits in the Regions of Desire, had been dragged away to the Caverns of Despair”100 
   
Closing thus with the Preceptor, our survey of the personal and intellectual legacy 
that Pope left to Dodsley and his enterprise at Tully’s Head has revealed a vibrancy and 
diversity in the British Republic of Letters that is often overlooked when broader paradigms 
of the Enlightenment and early nationalist literature are applied to the evidence.  In 
particular, we can trace significant shifts in the critical language of Patriot writers that 
accompanied political and social developments in the 1730s and 1740s, and these shifts 
complicate the nature of the religious, literary, and historical debates that informed critics’ 
understanding of their role in society at that time.  Within Tully’s Head, the influence of 
figures such as Joseph Spence and William Warburton can be seen edging out Bolingbroke’s 
philosophical skepticism, his deistic reductionism or principles of “natural religion,” and his 
carefully constructed world of court factions, political cabals, and shadowy religious elites, 
replacing it with a more sophisticated blend of historical contextualization, syncretism, and 
providence.  This alternative perspective, pulled into focus by a revived conception of the 
allegorical imagination, was deemed capable both of disclosing the “natural” order that 
underlay the artifices of human society, and exposing the false order that masqueraded as 
“natural” religion or its concomitant “natural” society.  In so doing, it showed how 
philosophical skepticism opened the way to the betrayal of Patriotism rightly understood by 
inverting the qualities of nature and artifice.  And it is here that we get a true grip upon the 
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crucial, and to date unexplored, personal and intellectual nexus that received Edmund Burke 
into London literary life, that reinforced the beliefs and predilections that he had acquired as 
a student in Dublin, and that shaped his first successful publication, A Vindication of Natural 
Society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Unraveling the Threads in Edmund Burke’s Vindication of Natural Society. 
 
So spins the silk-worm small its slender store, 
And labours till it clouds itself all o’er.1  
 
 
I:  Recovering Burke’s Vindication. 
 
On May 18, 1756, Edmund Burke’s first book, A Vindication of Natural Society: or, 
A View of the Miseries and Evils arising to Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society 
went on sale in London under the imprint of “M. Cooper in Pater-noster Row.”  This short 
work, a little over one hundred pages octavo, purported to advance the claims of the state of 
nature against those of “artificial,” or political, society in the style of the statesman Henry St. 
John, Viscount Bolingbroke.  Bolingbroke had died five years earlier, and his works had 
appeared in a cluster of volumes over the period from 1752 to 1754.2  As was normal for the 
times, the author of this debut performance remained anonymous, hidden behind the title of 
“a late Noble Writer.”  The Vindication itself, it was claimed in the publisher’s 
advertisement, was the text of a letter written about the year 1748 but evidently not intended 
by the writer for general circulation:  “By what means it came into the hands of the editor, is 
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 Alexander Pope, The Dunciad, IV, 253-54. 
 
2
 These included: Letters of Lord Bolingbroke to Dr. Jonathan Swift (1752); Letters on the Spirit of 
Patriotism (1752); Letters on the Study and Use of History, 2 vols. (1752); Reflections concerning Innate Moral 
Principles (1752); Remarks on the History of England (1752); Memoirs secrets and Testament politique (both 
1754); A Dissertation on Parties (1754); The Philosophical Works of Lord Bolingbroke, 5 vols. (1754); Works 
of the Late Rt. Hon. Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke, 5 vols. (1754).  The list is not exhaustive.  The editor 
of the collected volumes was the poet David Mallet, and the publisher A. Millar, in London. 
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not at all material to the publick, any farther than as such an account might tend to 
authenticate the genuineness of it, and for this it was thought it might safely rely on it’s [sic] 
own internal evidence.”3  That device, also, was not an unusual practice among publishers, 
although in this case it was surely designed to remind the reader of the circumstances of 
Pope’s illicit printing of the manuscript of Bolingbroke’s Idea of a Patriot King. 
A diversion wrapped in a deception, the Vindication was a success on a number of 
levels.  With an initial print run of 500 copies, it amused the market sufficiently to warrant a 
second edition in 1757, and this time it carried Dodsley’s own imprint, rather than Mary 
Cooper’s, on its title page.  The identity of the author had also become generally known.  
Edmund Burke, the young Irish immigrant, had evidently been an ideal choice for the 
project, since his touch was almost too exquisite.  Bolingbroke’s own editor, David Mallet 
felt obliged to deny the authenticity of the text in front of Dodsley himself; Warburton was 
initially inclined to accept it as the work of his former antagonist; and, when the imposture 
became evident, Richard Hurd stated dryly that a piece of satire is hardly good satire when it 
cannot readily be perceived as such.  In a move, perhaps, to address this confusion, but also, 
surely, as a smart marketing ploy, the second edition included a preface in which the 
argument of the work is briefly stated: “The Design was, to shew that, without the Exertion 
of any considerable Forces, the same Engines which were employed for the Destruction of 
Religion, might be employed with equal Success for the Subversion of Government; and that 
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 Edmund Burke, A Vindication of Natural Society: or, A View of the Miseries and Evils arising to 
Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society.  In a Letter to Lord **** By a late Noble Writer (London, 
1756).  All references are to the first edition, unless otherwise stated. 
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specious Arguments might be used against those Things which they, who doubt of everything 
else, will never permit to be questioned.”4 
Burke’s Irish background had helped equip him to carry out such a design.  He had 
grown up in a Dublin where issues of public order and public spirit, religious toleration and 
irreligion, and the use of history for partisan politics existed in concentrated form, and, as 
will be shown in the next chapter, a perusal of his surviving youthful writings and journalism 
shows that he was deeply engaged by such subjects.  But Burke also delved into history 
during his college days, an interest that was to develop into a search for an impartial and 
genuine historical narrative capable of incorporating both the Anglo-Norman and Gaelic 
traditions within his own ancestry.  Furthermore, his parents’ mixed marriage brought him 
face to face with the realities of an Irish Patriot historical tradition that was closely linked to 
the methodology of Lord Bolingbroke.  This contained within it a tension between loyal 
agitation for greater civic independence and anxiety over the potentially explosive social and 
political pressures posed by a disenfranchised Catholic majority.  Finally, a fortuitously 
preserved collection of short, unpublished essays by Burke, contained in a “Note-book” 
found among his remains and dating from his early years in London, confirms that he 
continued to experiment with certain styles that stand out in his Dublin writings: a bent to 
satire drawn particularly from Pope and from Addison’s Spectator, a fascination with the 
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representation of moral order and disorder in dramatic and poetic literature, and a religious 
distaste for the intellectual liberties of “free-thinkers.”5  How proactive Burke was in 
suggesting a short satire on Bolingbroke we will never know; but, with such a background, it 
is not difficult to imagine how Dodsley would have found the proposal attractive and its 
proponent qualified to undertake it.  Mutatis mutandis, Dodsley’s Irishman had the air of 
Pope’s footman.  
We have considered above a number of reasons why Burke’s debut on the London 
literary scene has not yet been understood in terms of the crucial overlap between the 
personal and intellectual backgrounds of writer and bookseller.  To these, we need now to 
add the fact that the question of the purpose of the Vindication remains dominated by the 
teleological concern to plunder the text for evidence either of a “Jacobin flame” of repressed 
indignation that is assumed to have driven Burke as an Irish immigrant or for early 
intimations of his later anti-Jacobin stance.  In this chapter, precisely by acknowledging the 
various explicit and implicit motivations that comprise the act of publishing a text, we will 
consider a reading of the Vindication that escapes such historiographical limitations and 
opens the way for a more authentic appreciation of Burke’s position in the field of literary 
and political criticism.  In so doing, it will also serve to emphasize Burke’s value as a case-
study in the mid-century Republic of Letters.  First, these teleological concerns must be 
explained and addressed.  
It cannot be denied that there are passages in the Vindication that are written with 
such conviction and so little relation to anything to be found in Lord Bolingbroke’s writings 
that they suggest a concealed, personal authorial motive working well below the surface of 
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 H.V.F. Somerset, ed., A Note-book of Edmund Burke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1957).  Particularly appropriate in identifying disagreement with Bolingbroke are the essays “Religion,” and 
“Religion of No efficacy considered as a State Engine,” both attributed to Edmund.  
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the satire.  The most remarkable of these passages, and the one most frequently referenced by 
commentators since, occurs when the pseudo-Bolingbroke defends the state of nature against 
artificial society by mustering a powerful rhetorical condemnation of the social, political, and 
economic evils endemic in civilizations both ancient and modern: “The whole Business of 
the Poor is to administer to the Idleness, Folly, and Luxury of the Rich; and that of the Rich, 
in return, is to find the best Methods of confirming the Slavery and increasing the Burthens 
of the Poor.” “I suppose,” the writer continues, “that there are in Great Britain upwards of an 
hundred thousand People employed in Lead, Tin, Copper, and Coal Mines; these unhappy 
Wretches scarce ever see the Light of the Sun; they are buried in the Bowels of the Earth 
[while a]n hundred thousand more at least are tortured without Remission by the suffocating 
Smoak, intense Fires, and constant Drudgery necessary in the refining and managing the 
Products of those Mines.”6  Might Burke be serious here?  The vigor of the passage, and its 
placement immediately following a trenchant critique of the iniquities of the legal system (an 
issue with which we know Burke was sympathetic after his years studying at the Middle 
Temple), suggest that the real author had momentarily broken his parodic cover.7  But, if he 
is, how can we square this with his later defense of the status quo in ancien régime France, or 
with the laissez-faire economics to be found in his Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, penned 
in 1795?8  If he is not, what are we to make of the compelling parallels that present 
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 See, for example, Burke’s fragment of “An Essay toward an History of the Laws of England” in 
Writings and Speeches, 1:321-331.  Burke gave up his legal studies at the Middle Temple around 1755, much to 
his father’s displeasure.  (Burke, Correspondence, 1:xvii, 119.)  The influence on Burke of his early studies in 
the law is well treated in Seán Patrick Donlan, “Law and Lawyers in Edmund Burke’s Scottish Enlightenment,” 
Studies in Burke and His Time 20, no. 1 (2005), 38-65. 
 
8
 “The labouring people are only poor, because they are numerous.  Numbers in their nature imply 
poverty….That class of dependant pensioners called the rich, is so extremely small, that if all their throats were 
cut, and a distribution made of all they consume in a year, it would not give a bit of bread and cheese for one 
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themselves between the Vindication’s Swiftian bite and the youthful anger Burke is thought 
to have harbored at the social injustices associated with British rule in his native Ireland and, 
later, in India?9   
To date, scholars who have argued for the satirical consistency of the Vindication 
have done so from the position of defending Burke’s reputation as an undeviating 
conservative thinker in the natural-law tradition, taking such rhetoric as a sign of Burke’s 
prescience in exposing the disorderly mischief underlying the state-of-nature metaphysics of 
the philosophes.  Carl B. Cone read the Vindication as the first salvo in Burke’s “lifelong 
struggle against the rationalism of his century.”  Peter Stanlis, in similar vein, argued that the 
author, “With characteristic insight, even at age twenty-seven…perceived the revolutionary 
tendency of the state of nature theory, which in his last years was to help to destroy the 
established order.”10  These interpretations at least recognize the complexity introduced into 
the question of Bolingbroke’s intellectual legacy by the influence that French thinkers had 
upon the philosopher statesman in exile.  Consequently, they place Burke’s project within the 
wider debate that was emerging from Rousseau’s recently published Discourse on Inequality 
without having awkwardly to invert Burke’s own assertions that Bolingbroke’s thought was, 
indeed, his chief target.  But in their desire to trace a straight line between the Vindication 
and various of Burke’s later writings, these scholars also pass over the true source of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
night’s supper to those who labour, and who in reality feed both the pensioners and themselves.”  (Burke, 
Writings and Speeches, 9:121.) 
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 Cone, Burke and the Nature of Politics, 1:22; Peter J. Stanlis, Edmund Burke and the Natural Law 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), 125.  See also John Morley, Burke (London, 1904), 15-17, 
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text’s satirical plot, which does not lie with the information brought to bear on the argument, 
nor with the reasoning used to interpret it, but with the ridiculous impression created when 
the former is trivialized by the abuse of the latter.   
This interpretative blind-spot is shared by the contending view that passages such as 
that quoted above reveal the Vindication to be the carefully disguised cry of a repressed 
colonial voice.  Isaac Kramnick’s The Rage of Edmund Burke, which appeared in 1976, has 
proved the most influential and enduring study to discern beneath this satirical jeu d’esprit 
the author’s seething anger at the social injustices that his Irish youth had fired.11  For 
Kramnick, following a psychoanalytical paradigm based on the work of Erik Erikson, Burke 
wrote the Vindication as he emerged from a self-imposed “moratorium” of six years (directly 
following his move from Ireland to London in 1750) in which he was “wrestling with his 
own ambivalent social views” prior to “breaking loose” and committing himself to a 
political, rather than literary, career.  By his mid-twenties, according to Kramnick, Burke had 
acquired a powerful magazine of middle-class and colonial resentment that now required 
camouflaging with the deference necessary to progress in the very seat of aristocratic 
privilege and British power.  The Vindication, then, emerged as “at one and the same time a 
radical manifesto and a conservative apologia,” with the preface to the second edition 
composed as a judiciously orthodox response to the unexpected success of the unvarnished 
piece.  
                                                 
11
 Isaac Kramnick, The Rage of Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Conservative (New York: 
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William and Mary after the final defeat of James II in 1690. 
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Kramnick’s psychological analysis has now given way to more fashionable 
nationalist and postcolonialist ones, in which tensions of sexuality and class have been fully 
replaced by the outsider identity of the Irish colonial; but much of Kramnick’s original 
evidence has been incorporated à la mode.  Michel Fuchs, for example, describes the 
Vindication as the first rhetorical outburst from “an accumulation of contradictions, political, 
historical, and personal” that constitute Burke’s process of self-fashioning.  The deficiencies 
of Bolingbroke’s style become the complacent, aristocratic betrayal of the passion for justice, 
and the purpose of the work itself “to force open the doors of the society in which Burke 
longed to be received without abjuring his loyalty to his mother country.”  Burke “entered 
those doors stealthily,” Fuchs continues, “and, as he proceeded, he placed explosive devices 
here and there that he tended to defuse as soon as he had set them.”12  Like Kramnick, Fuchs 
points to the persuasive rhetorical power of the social critique contained within the 
Vindication and considers the addition of the preface in 1757 as a prudent move to avoid the 
implications of association with such rhetoric once his identity had been disclosed.13  Unlike 
Kramnick, Fuchs’s Burkean “self” is fashioned more consciously and programmatically, with 
Erikson’s interpretive paradigm being replaced by Frantz Fanon’s study of the colonized 
mind in Peau noire, masques blancs.14 
Most recently, Carole Fabricant has revisited this material in a 2005 article, “Colonial 
Sublimities and Sublimations: Swift, Burke, and Ireland,” that expands upon elements of her 
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earlier book-length study Swift’s Landscape.  Drawing upon other works on literature and the 
colonial politics of eighteenth-century Ireland, Fabricant interprets the Vindication as a 
powerful specimen of the “colonial unconscious” or the Irish nationalist voice.15  In her 
approach to the texts, Fabricant deploys close Swiftian parallels to highlight both the sense of 
alienation experienced by talented Irishmen attempting to storm the gates of the British 
establishment, and the satirical weapon with which such an eternal outsider could safely give 
vent to that alienation from within.  Thus, the Vindication is revealed as one of Fuchs’ 
explosive devices through its textual and stylistic similarities with Swift’s own Tale of a Tub, 
Modest Proposal, and Short Description of Ireland—similarities which also offer a 
connection between Burke’s rhetorical skills and his fascination with the aesthetics of the 
sublime.16  But Fabricant’s debt to Kramnick and Fuchs is also revealed in the evidence she 
summons up from other writings by Burke, most notably his contributions to The Reformer, a 
journal that he is believed to have edited during its short existence from January to April 
1748 and which attacks the enormous disparities of the Irish economy, and, from the other 
end of his life, his Letter to a Noble Lord.17 
Such political and social psychoanalysis has certainly reinforced our understanding of 
important aspects of the background to the writing of the Vindication.  It simply cannot be 
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denied that Burke’s professional insecurities and Irish background combined in some degree 
to shape its style and content; but difficulties arise when that interpretative framework, 
reinforced by presentist assumptions and anachronistic terminology, invades all aspects of 
the complex stages by which such a text was manufactured.18  The point is, ironically, made 
by Fabricant herself, when, after declaiming against the “appropriation of [Burke] as a 
staunchly conservative, even reactionary thinker” by modern-day “Neocons,” she offers this 
conclusion: “[I]t is precisely—indeed only—by recovering the Irish context of [Swift and 
Burke] and insisting on its centrality to their thought that we can come to appreciate their 
global significance, their important impact on questions of universal values that confront us 
today.”19 
While the dangers of anachronism and ideological appropriation are evident in 
discussion over Burke’s consistency, the same approaches open up one undeniably positive 
channel of investigation:  they remind us of the sheer rhetorical accomplishment of the author 
of the Vindication.  It is a tribute to his stylistic method that, even after the cumulative 
evidence of forty years in the political spotlight, we are left unsure of Burke’s true 
relationship to observations that he incorporates into his parody.  This point has been 
developed in an interesting, because more open-ended, way by David Bromwich, who 
suggests that the language of the Vindication provides an early illustration of Burke’s 
lifelong attempt to resolve the tension between man’s natural condition and the artificiality of 
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social life, a tension that is all the greater since man naturally acts, not with rational foresight, 
but in accordance with the sympathetic inclinations and choices that emerge from persuasion 
and human passion.  What, then, if bad or deceitful reasoning gains rhetorical force through 
the sheer power of its appeal to our sentiments?  “Bad as the theory is,” Bromwich reasons, 
“the momentum of the parody [in the Vindication] seems to show that one could think about 
society like that if one chose; and if enough others were persuaded, society would have to be 
altered accordingly, with whatever effects of mayhem.”  It is a vivid reminder of how 
rhetoric always holds the potential to escape the pen, uprooting the passions and creating in 
the audience disorders unintended by the speaker.  Bromwich pushes his point further by 
linking it to Burke’s treatment of the sublime in his Philosophical Enquiry.  Here, Burke 
argues that the “sublime” has the capacity to attract us naturally toward a relationship or 
apprehension that appears to transcend or overwhelm our nature itself.  Thus, in Bromwich’s 
own words, Burke’s satire “is of that uneasy kind that turns against the party it means to 
protect; or, anyway, readily entertains the thought of what it would be like to turn against 
them.”20 
Relating the Vindication to the Philosophical Enquiry through the rhetoric of the 
sublime marks an important step toward a better understanding of Burke’s purpose, although 
this essay will point to a slightly different interpretation of that relationship, one that focuses 
much more on the “false sublime” as a means of detecting and disarming flawed, disorderly, 
and deceitful reasoning.  It is, after all, not necessary to decide whether Burke is ever in 
danger of believing his own rhetoric to appreciate the pressing concern of this topic for a 
young man brought up in the volatile atmosphere of Protestant Dublin in the 1740s, or 
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pursuing his journalistic aspirations in the burgeoning market for printed material that existed 
in London in the 1750s.  When one considers that large sections of the Vindication comprise 
rhetorical flourishes in the style of Bolingbroke that are clearly intended to jar with the 
thinness of their content and appear ridiculously pompous and overblown—in other words, 
falsely sublime—we can discern how immediate circumstances around Burke and in the 
Republic of Letters in the mid-1750s invited a satirical link between the rhetoric of the 
deistic, anti-Hanoverian Bolingbroke on the one hand and the destabilizing perversion of 
learning and the moral bankruptcy of political opposition on the other.  Such a link would 
explain much of the web of deception, tensions, and ambiguities that comprise the 
Vindication without requiring speculative recourse to internalized national or sexual 
identities; but to appreciate this it is necessary to absorb more carefully than researchers have 
done to date the nature of projects that were taking shape within Tully’s Head at the same 
time that Burke was working out this one.   
 
 
II: The Lost Patriot Epic 
 
We have gone some way to this goal in our analysis of the researches of Spence and 
Warburton.  We can draw the intellectual and personal context of Burke’s first book-length 
work tighter still by considering the publications of one more figure who was central to the 
Tully’s Head circle at this time.  This was Joseph Warton, a friend of Spence and Dodsley, 
and someone close enough to Burke to secure for the young Irishman his first political 
position, as secretary for the rising parliamentary star William Gerard Hamilton, around 
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1759.21  Warton edited and authored two important works that straddle Burke’s own debut: a 
four-volume edition of Virgil’s works, published in 1753, and the first volume of An Essay 
on the Writings and Genius of Pope, which appeared three years later, that is, at the same 
time as the Vindication, and also under Mary Cooper’s name.  They prove to be excellent 
resources for enriching our understanding of how Tully’s Head shaped Burke’s professional 
work at this crucial stage in his career. 
Joseph Warton’s researches at the heart of Tully’s Head were, as he acknowledged 
himself, heavily influenced by Spence.  Taken as a whole, they concern the application of the 
latest scholarship in Virgil, Spenser, and Lucretius to a Longinian critique of Pope’s oeuvre 
that was similar in tone to Spence’s own Essay on Pope’s Odyssey.  Warton himself was 
more than twenty years Spence’s junior, but the two shared a similar background, having 
been educated at Winchester School and Oxford and proceeding to ordination in the Church 
of England.  Warton’s first major publication, the poem Fashion, appeared in 1742, after a 
few short poetical contributions to the Gentleman’s Magazine, and was followed two years 
later by The Enthusiast, or, the Lover of Nature, a riposte to Shaftesbury’s denunciation of 
enthusiasm.  In 1746, he wrote for Dodsley’s Museum, and Dodsley published his Odes on 
Various Subjects, which included an “Ode to Fancy” that William Shenstone judged the best 
imitation of Milton’s Il Penseroso he had read.  As their titles indicate, these poems share a 
fascination with solitude and the simplicity of nature, and many rely for their effect upon a 
personification of passions that reveals a deep debt to Spenser and Milton.  In 1755, just as 
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his involvement in Tully’s Head was at its height, Warton returned to Winchester as an 
usher, and then served from 1766 to his retirement in 1793 as headmaster of the school. This 
shift in employment helps to explain the contours of his own literary output, particularly the 
barren publishing record over the twenty-six years that separated the appearance of the first 
volume of his influential Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope from the second.22  His 
significance within the Tully’s Head network, however, does not appear to have diminished 
greatly, with his status resting doubly on his position at Winchester and later, in the mid-
1760s, his membership of the famous “Club” established by Reynolds and Johnson.23  His 
brother, Thomas, a don at Trinity College, Oxford, and professor of poetry there from 1757, 
also had several works published through Tully’s Head. 
Warton’s first major work of critical commentary was his edition of The Works of 
Virgil, which was dedicated to George Lyttelton and is of particular significance for two 
reasons.  Structurally, it is a fine example of the collaborative working of the Tully’s Head 
circle and shines valuable light upon the scholarly personalities that Dodsley was drawing 
upon at the time.  Among the eclectic group of writers whose works were incorporated into 
the four volumes were William Warburton, William Whitehead, Thomas Warton (Joseph’s 
brother), Samuel Johnson, Mark Akenside, and William Benson.  Analytically, the edition as 
a whole also owes a substantial debt to Joseph Spence, whose name appears on the title page 
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below Warton’s.  Indeed, there is no better illustration of the way in which Spence performed 
his cardinal and transitional role in working through Pope’s intellectual legacy.  “I must 
inform the reader,” writes Warton in the advertisement to the first volume, “that Mr. Spence 
hath promoted this undertaking with that warmth and readiness with which he always serves 
his friends, by communicating to me a great number of manuscript notes of the late Mr. 
Holdsworth, author of Muscipula, &c:….Mr. Spence likewise obliged me with several 
excellent remarks of his own, made when he was abroad, that were never yet published, and 
with some few of Mr. Pope’s.  His Polymetis also hath greatly enriched the following 
collection.”24  Since Spence’s contributions are scattered throughout the footnotes and 
commentary, it is easier for our purposes to trace his influence thematically, in the ways that 
Warton treats Virgil as an allegorist and as an epic poet. 
According to Warton, in his “Dissertation on the Nature and Conduct of the Aeneid,” 
Virgil has a “perfect insight in to human nature.”  This is seen in the way he is able to convey 
the simple and natural through sublime rhetoric, and his unerring sense of propriety, his 
accompanying grasp of what is “proper,” means that he never descends into the false 
sublime—he never “sinks”—like authors whose “affectation of greatness often hurts the 
perspicuity of style.”  He exhibits the technical qualities of “perspicuity, purity, harmony, 
brevity, and sublimity” that constitute the genius of the composer of epic poetry.  This insight 
into human nature is also what makes Virgil’s epic poetry a supreme act of historical 
translation.  The brevity and clarity of his phrases and images are accompanied by a moral 
and historical imagination that is entirely proper in its context and consistently rises above 
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 Warton, Works of Virgil, 1:xviii, xxviii-xxx.  Wooll states that Thomas Warton “was sedulously 
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the fashionable mode.  Virgil does not mix his styles, like Tasso and Ariosto, and his 
“Strength of Imagination” is incorporative, rather than innovative:  “Almost all the little 
Facts in [the Aeneid] are built on History: and even as to particular Lines, no one perhaps 
ever borrowed more from the Poets that preceded him, than he did.”25   
Preserving an understanding of this genius through modern translation was a prime 
concern of Warton’s.  He provided his own renditions of the Eclogues and Georgics; but 
when he considered whose translation of the Aeneid he should use, he settled on a recently 
completed one by Spence’s close acquaintance, the poet and former Winchester scholar 
Christopher Pitt.26  This choice was a clear sign of the end of John Dryden’s dominance in 
that field.  Warton goes to some length to explain why, technically and stylistically, Dryden’s 
famous translation was rejected and, in so doing, he drives home Spence’s argument in the 
final dialogue of Polymetis about “how deficient or incurious our translators are, in 
representing the allegories of the antients.”27  Pitt had completed his translation of the 
Aeneid, with encouragement from Spence, in the 1720s, and Warton introduces it with 
Pope’s posthumous blessing and an apology to Dryden that is clearly indebted to Polymetis.28  
In an acute article on Warton’s Virgil, Mark Thackeray has noted the methodological 
differences between Pitt’s Aeneid and Dryden’s, and shown how they are reflected also in 
Warton’s own translations of the Georgics and Eclogues.  Both Pitt and Warton intensify the 
use of imagery and allegorical personification to tighten the association between simplicity 
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 Spence, Polymetis, 307-8. 
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 Warton, Works of Virgil, 1:xvi-xxvii. 
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and sublimity, and, at the same time, to deflect from Dryden’s political agenda through a 
more stringent historicization of Virgil’s work.29 
At this point we find ourselves again confronting the influence of William 
Warburton.  Warton includes among the essays and translations that comprise his edition an 
extract from the Divine Legation of Moses under the title “A Dissertation on the Sixth Book 
of Virgil’s Aeneis [sic].”  This weighty contribution reveals a great deal about the 
historicizing of allegory that we find in Spence, as well as about Warburton’s own polemical 
and syncretic views on the rituals of the ancient mysteries.  These mysteries, as we have seen 
in the “Brutus” plan, were understood to contain the wisdom necessary for passing on the 
truths of natural religion and natural society to successive generations—in pure or debased 
form, according to whether they were viewed as esoteric philosophy or corrupted theology.  
Warburton’s stated purpose in his essay is to show that “Aeneas’s adventure to the infernal 
shades, is no other than a figurative description of his initiation into the mysteries” and that 
Virgil uses this lengthy digression “to represent a perfect lawgiver, in the person of Aeneas.”  
In other words, the Aeneid was an extended allegory upon a “system of politics.”30  
Warburton’s interpretation, to which we will return later in this chapter, is affirmed by 
Warton in his own introductory “Life of Virgil.”  Here, the poet’s work is forcefully laid out 
as a commentary upon the negotiation between republic and empire, or liberty and order, 
under Augustus, and the genius of the artist shown most fully in the way that sublime 
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allegorical writing is used to combine a lamentation for past glories with a spirited vision of 
the prospects for civic and moral regeneration.  In this way, under Warton’s, and Tully’s 
Head’s, careful hands, Virgil is enthroned within an apostolic succession of epic poets 
running from Homer to Milton, and we are brought back to Lyttelton’s exhortation to Pope, 
conceived over the tomb of the great Mantuan, to continue that apostolate.   
But had that apostolic, Patriotic succession actually ended with Milton? And, if so, 
why had Pope been unable to carry it on into his own times?  What, in other words, explained 
the lost Patriot epic of the eighteenth century?  Warton set about answering these questions in 
his second main publication of the decade, his Essay on the Writings and Genius of Pope, 
where he strengthens and accentuates the personal and intellectual threads that were woven 
together in his Virgil.  Structurally, the Essay comprises a chronological commentary of 
Pope’s major works.  Editorial comment is highly variable in quantity and quality, but is 
given coherence through the overarching attempt to rank Pope within a pantheon of English 
poets, of which Spenser, Milton, and Shakespeare occupy the top rank.  The litmus test for 
Warton’s ranking is acer spiritus ac vis—a phrase borrowed from Quintilian that suggests a 
creative and glowing imagination tuned to a correct apprehension of the sublime and 
pathetic.  For Warton, this faculty, or genius, arises out of the proper convergence of literary, 
historical and philosophical thinking that we find in Sir Philip Sidney’s classic of the 
Elizabethan renaissance, the Defense of Poesy.31  By this measure, Warton feels obliged to 
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exclude Pope from the top rank of the “transcendently sublime [and] pathetic,” and so 
answers the great Lytteltonian counterfactual—Could Pope have ever emulated Homer and 
Virgil?—in the negative.  He justifies his opinion most succinctly when discussing Pope’s 
plans for the epic poem “on the arrival of Brutus, the supposed grandson of Aeneas, in our 
island, and the settlement of the first foundations of the British monarchy.”  Warton is 
unconvinced that “so didactic a genius” could have succeeded here, for Pope’s “close and 
constant reasoning had impaired and crushed the faculty of imagination.”  He would, Warton 
concludes, most likely have written more in the ornate and fashionable style of Voltaire’s 
Henriade or even of Tasso than with the “affecting strokes of nature” that are characteristic 
of Homer’s work.32   
A particularly striking aspect of Warton’s study is the use made of Lucretius and 
Spenser to justify his judgment of Pope.  Edmund Spenser was a statesman and critic of the 
systemic moral corruption that he observed at the “Fairy Court” of Elizabeth I, and, apart 
from his poetic muse, Bolingbroke’s exemplary historical Patriot.  Spenser earns Warton’s 
praise for his “simplicity, with elegance and propriety.”  While on one level this judgment is 
orthodox Aristotelianism, Warton, both following and departing from Spence, reconfigures 
the idea of “simplicity” to make it compatible with particularity and detail, a point raised in 
support of the genius of Spenser and validated by a lengthy passage from the eighth book of 
Quintilian’s Institutes.33  General characters and generalized descriptions fail to penetrate the 
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levels of meaning accessible to true allegory and inhibit the sublime through their lack of 
contextual or historical propriety; but Spenser’s allegorical figures, in pointed contrast to 
Pope’s youthful imitations, are “drawn with so much clearness and truth, that we behold 
them with our eyes, as plainly as we do on the cieling [sic] of the banqueting-house.  For, in 
truth, the pencil of Spenser is as powerful as that of Rubens, his brother allegorist; which two 
artists resembled each other in many respects; but Spenser had more grace, and was as warm 
a colourist.”34  Here, Warton owes a great deal to the researches of his brother Thomas, who 
had recently explained in his Observations on the Faerie Queene of Spenser how Spenser’s 
imagination had deepened the allegorical and moral-philosophical penetration of the poem:  
“Ariosto relates the adventures of Orlando, Rogero, Bradamante, &c. by which is understood 
the conquest of the passions, the excellence of virtue, and other moral doctrines; on which 
account we may term the Orlando a moral poem; but can we term the Faerie Queen upon the 
whole, a moral poem?  is it not equally an historical or political poem?  for tho’ it be 
(according to its author’s words) an allegory or dark conceit, yet that which is couched or 
understood under this allegory is the history, and intrigues of Queen Elizabeth’s courtiers; 
which however are introduc’d with a moral design.”35  Thus Thomas Warton shows, as 
Warburton did with Virgil, how it is in the very contextualization of the poet’s work that his 
allegorical skill is employed to its fullest extent and reveals its truths most clearly and 
broadly.  Only by such art can the true signification of man’s “natural” state be employed as 
a critical device to challenge the fashions, iniquities and moral excesses of civilized society, 
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since only in this way are the issues revealed in their immediate relation to the inner conflicts 
and passions that the reader will feel at work within himself.  It is crucial to note how this 
allegorical perspective on “nature,” or the plain truth of things, shifts the basis of criticism in 
a radically different direction from the imputed, philosophical or historical alienation of 
“natural” man from his “artificial” surroundings that was being developed 
contemporaneously by thinkers such as Bolingbroke and Rousseau. 
When we turn to Warton’s treatment of Lucretius, we find that his admiration for the 
Roman poet is not focused upon the subject matter of the De Rerum Natura, where there is 
much to confirm a clergyman’s fear of the attractions of “Spinozism.”36  Instead, it concerns 
the art by which Lucretius transmitted complex scientific and philosophical concepts on the 
relationship between nature and artifice, virtue and corruptibility, through the medium of 
poetry.  Regardless of its materialistic and anachronistic description, the poem conveys, 
through the sheer force of its rhetoric, a narrative of the liberation of nature from superstition, 
fear and enervation.  In his own essay on didactic poetry in the first volume of the Virgil, 
Warton had devoted seven pages to this neglected poet, “who seems to have had more fire, 
spirit and energy, more of the vivida vis animi, than any of the Roman poets.”37  Warton was 
struck particularly by Lucretius’s skill at conjuring up vivid “allegorical personages” to 
convey the competing passions of the human condition.38  This selective emphasis upon 
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Lucretius as an allegorist and epic poet permits an application of the “naturalistic” critique of 
civilization that is not analogous or metaphorical or even literalistic, but directed at the 
perennial struggle of the individual to attain moral self-discipline, to express and channel his 
nature within and through the very artifacts of civilization.  
For Warton, Pope’s Essay on Man was perhaps the closest to the Lucretian model in 
terms of intent that the eighteenth century had yet produced.  So what had held Pope back 
from equaling Lucretius and Spenser as an epic poet, and transforming his poetry into 
literature sophisticated and subtle enough, yet sufficiently broad in its affective appeal, to 
elevate the moral cause of the political Opposition?  Warton concludes that Pope lacked the 
required degree of “creative and glowing imagination”—acer spiritus ac vis—because he 
brought to his verse “more of the philosopher than of the poet,” and it is here that we reach 
the underplot of the author’s schema.39  For the person who, by Pope’s own admission, was 
the genius that taught him the philosophical analysis of nature was Henry St. John, Viscount 
Bolingbroke, the quality of whose wisdom had finally been revealed to the world in the 
posthumous works that had hit the bookshops from 1752 to 1754.40  Warton had taken great 
care in his researches to trace the textual similarities between Bolingbroke’s writings and the 
Essay on Man and he states explicitly that, “The late Lord Bathurst repeatedly assured me, 
that he had read the whole scheme of the Essay on Man, in the hand-writing of Bolingbroke, 
and drawn up in a series of propositions, which Pope was to versify and illustrate.”41  Nor 
                                                                                                                                                       
the fifth section of Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry, on words and poetry, with Warton’s treatment of Spenser 
has not yet been attempted, and might yield some valuable points of comparison. 
 
39
 Warton, Essay on Pope, 1: 281. 
 
40
 Pope’s admiration for Bolingbroke’s intellect is attested by Spence.  Warton writes that, “Pope, 
indeed, idolized him: when in company with him, he appeared with all the deference and submission of an 
affectionate scholar.”  Ibid., 2:115. 
 
 105 
was Warton slow with more pointed opinions about the late noble writer when occasion 
allowed:  “When Tully attempted poetry, he became as ridiculous as Bolingbroke when he 
attempted philosophy and divinity;  We look in vain for that genius which produced the 
Dissertation on Parties, in the tedious philosophical works; of which it is no exaggerated 
satire to say, that the reasoning of them is sophistical and inconclusive, the style diffuse and 
verbose, and the learning seemingly contained in them not drawn from the originals, but 
picked up and purloined from French critics and translations.”42  In unpublished notes that 
Warton had prepared for the conclusion to his Essay, we find a more pithy judgment still: 
“Ld. Bolingbroke led [Pope] to read the French Moralists….I think Ld. Bolingbroke a great 
hand in making Pope a moral poet—Ld. Bolingbroke himself had no Taste of true poetry & 
Pope fell into his tastes of all sorts.”43  It was, then, evident to Warton that the roots of the 
Patriots’ disappointments of the 1740s were exposed in the flaws of their founding genius. 
The first volume of Warton’s Essay provided a refreshing and innovative slant on the 
publicity that had surrounded the posthumous publication of Bolingbroke’s works—which 
smelt, to many readers, of esotericism and irreligion.  Between 1754 and 1756, a number of 
replies to Bolingbroke’s opus had been published, varying from Warburton’s gleefully 
hubristic View of Lord Bolingbroke’s Philosophy; in Four Letters to a Friend (1754) to the 
more focused Notes on the Philosophical Writings of Lord Bolingbroke (1755), by Charles 
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Bulkley.  The only direct contribution to the debate to carry the imprint of Tully’s Head 
before the second edition of the Vindication, in 1757, was an ambiguous text entitled 
Miscellaneous Observations on the Works of the late Lord Viscount Bolingbroke. Part 1.  By 
a Free-thinker (1755).44  As his private comments to Warton confirm, Dodsley was still 
cautious about the possible reaction of friends of Pope whose admiration for Bolingbroke 
remained undimmed: they still included influential figures such as Chesterfield.  But there 
was room for a lighter jeu d’esprit at the lord’s expense, or, rather, a modification of the 
academic in-fighting that might just be oblique enough to broaden the discussion and draw in 
a wider audience.  A satire on Bolingbroke, then, was a delicate but attractive prospect. 
 
 
III:  A New Patriot Satire 
 
The real key to interpreting the impact of these personal, professional, and intellectual 
contexts upon Burke’s Vindication is to acknowledge that Dodsley and Burke were not so 
much interested in fashioning a direct satire of Bolingbroke’s writings as parodying the 
position Bolingbroke had assumed within various reading markets, from the small circle 
debating his impact upon Pope’s legacy to the wide field of readers for whom he had become 
symbolic of the subversive link between free-thinking and irreligion.  An attack on the “real” 
author of the contested texts was a pointless exercise, since those texts had taken on novel 
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interpretations according to the ways and circumstances in which they had been propagated 
by Bolingbroke himself, by Pope (underhandedly), and by Bolingbroke’s editor Mallett.  
Burke’s chief task was to devise a format that could play upon these themes of fame and 
infamy simultaneously on a number of levels, linking the intellectual and the personal, in a 
form appropriate for the market at the moment, and in a spirit that conformed to the wider 
schemes of Dodsley and of the Tully’s Head circle.  Commentators who approach this text as 
if it stands or falls by the accuracy of its imitation of the “authentic” Bolingbroke are missing 
the point.   
Burke’s strategy rests upon a “pseudo-Bolingbroke” whose defective rhetorical style, 
unimaginative historical analysis, and inflexible reasoning lead him to follow a distorted 
view of “natural” society, posited upon a fallacious sense of the “simple truths” of human 
nature.  The consequence of this distortion is that the pseudo-Bolingbroke is transformed in 
the presentation of his argument precisely and ironically into the very metaphysical 
obscurantist and privileged elitist that he sets out to expose as the source of society’s woes.  
The intended moral is not that the real Bolingbroke lacked learning or erudition, but that: 
first, his dangerously irreligious, deistic esotericism and his social elitism have rendered him 
void of the literary and historical imagination necessary to perceive the real source of natural 
order; second, when this deficiency is brought to bear on politics and moral philosophy, the 
result is a “false sublime” discourse that is bombastic, ridiculous, and dangerously 
subversive.  The noble lord becomes the antithesis of the public spirit and public order for 
which he claimed to be the country’s principal advocate. 
The stages by which the pseudo-Bolingbroke argues his case are as follows.  First, we 
are given an historical catalog of wars and invasions, charting the millions slaughtered for 
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imperial or national profit in the ancient and Classical world.  The author then passes to an 
examination of the inner workings of political society, including a critique of all 
constitutional forms, a topical rant against the iniquities of the legal system, with its 
“Injustice, Delay, Puerility, false Refinement, and affected Mystery,” and a passionate attack 
on the divisions between rich and poor that render both parties slaves to their 
circumstances.45  Finally, there is a personal testament by the author to his youthful 
correspondent explaining his own world-weary initiation into the truths of political society—
truths that, while offering no solution to the miseries of the human condition, at least provide 
consolation in death. 
In his appropriation of the character of Lord Bolingbroke, Burke’s stylistic 
borrowings from the Letters on the Study and Use of History (1752) and the Philosophical 
Works (1754) are evident.  The imitative format of a “private” letter to a young lord lets us 
into an intimate world of esoteric knowledge and mysteries of statecraft, and sets up the 
coming historical evidence as an initiation into the real, hidden dynamics of continuity and 
change, where nothing is as it appears.  At the same time, a recognizably ornate and 
overworked literary style alerts us to the self-referential emptiness of the writer’s 
philosophical history in a way that strips even compelling material of the genuinely pathetic, 
and therefore of its capacity for moral edification.  In the introductory section of the tract, 
then, instead of leading us to the truths of nature through simplicity, clarity, and propriety 
(for, as the author himself says, “Life is simple [in the state of nature], and therefore it is 
happy”), the pseudo-Bolingbroke offers arguments that are repetitious and long-winded.46  
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Any inclination to self-examination is obviated by an overemphasis upon conspiracies of 
elites, which leads the author himself into “[t]he great Error of our Nature…not to know 
where to stop.”47  Thus, in matters of style, the satirical effect of the Vindication relies 
heavily on the emptiness of the pseudo-Bolingbroke’s conviction that the true nature of 
things can only be perceived once the veil of superstition, imposed by lawgivers, priests, and 
politicians, and kept in place by the ignorance of the multitude, is rent by the remorseless and 
courageous exercise of natural reason.   
As to matters of substance: in the Letters, Bolingbroke had attempted to liberate the 
study of history from the obscurantist activities of antiquarians, pedants, bigots and 
enthusiasts by applying a simple, rational philosophical method to the evaluation of historical 
sources.  A man who wishes to gain true moral and civic education from the study of history 
should apply himself “early to the study of history as the study of philosophy, with the 
intention of being wiser and better, without the affectation of being more learned” [emphasis 
added].48  In the Philosophical Works, the same liberation was offered in respect of theology 
and “artificial” religion, with the roots of moral and civic principles being comprehended 
within the accessible bounds of natural religion.  Now, in the Vindication, the same method is 
applied to political philosophy: “I have defended Natural Religion against a confederacy of 
Atheists and Divines,” states the pseudo-Bolingbroke, “I now plead for Natural Society 
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against Politicians, and for Natural Reason against all three.”49  Natural reason alone can lead 
the enquirer out of the Serbonian bogs of scholasticism or popular prejudice to “truth,” the 
providential result of nature in simple contemplation of itself.  But by this point, the audience 
is already on its guard that the pseudo-Bolingbroke’s concept of natural society is, precisely, 
artificial, that his conception of the plain truth is elaborate falsehood, and that what he allows 
to pass as natural religion, or deism, is, in reality, an artificial, institutionalized system of 
obfuscation.   
For the pretended author of the Vindication, the contemplation of what is “true” or 
“natural” must begin with the state of nature, or “Natural Society,” where man stands an 
object stripped of the accretions, encumbrances, superstitions, fears, customs, and 
animosities of society.  In the first few pages of the piece, the pseudo-Bolingbroke offers his 
understanding of this primitive condition, “founded in natural Appetites and Instincts, and 
not in any positive Institution.”  It is a description closely reminiscent of Lucretius’s in De 
Rerum Natura.50  If it is true, as has been suggested, that it was Rousseau’s Second Discourse 
rather than Bolingbroke’s works that was the intended target of the Vindication (an enticing 
theory, given Joseph Warton’s aside about “French Moralists” and Burke’s later assault upon 
Rousseau and the radical philosophes), it is only a part of the context.51  In fact, Burke’s 
treatment of the subject falls neatly within the parameters of a discussion that had been going 
on for a number of years over the relationship of natural law and natural right theory to moral 
and civic order, particularly in respect of religious toleration.  The chief issues here were 
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spun out of comparisons between Hobbes and Locke, but they were given added vigor by the 
popularity of the natural-law thinkers Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, and their 
absorption into early-eighteenth-century political thought through the works of writers such 
as Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson.  It is by looking backward into this intellectual 
context, rather than forward to the eruption of Jacobinism or Rousseauian political radicalism 
that we will understand best the critical configurations that make up this Burkean satire. 
Hobbes, in his relentlessly logical balancing of civil order with the anarchy of the 
state of nature, was generally considered to have undermined any religious and moral 
foundations for that order.  Attempts by writers such as Shaftesbury to replace man’s 
anarchic tendencies with innate social affections may have softened Leviathan, but they did 
little to recover those religious and moral foundations and were eventually hollowed out by 
Hume’s demolition of the concept of innate moral or aesthetic senses.  Such a recovery, 
however, could be found in Jean Barbeyrac’s popular commentaries on the works of Samuel 
Pufendorf, which began to accompany English translations of those works from 1710 
onwards.  Barbeyrac propounded a reading of the author that recovered the spiritual 
dimension of the transition from the state of nature to society by showing how it was 
precisely man’s conflicted or “fallen” nature—a nature both sociable and antisocial—that 
drove mankind to impose a civic order upon itself in the interest of security.  The breadth of 
the transmission and popularization of Pufendorf’s work in France and Britain remains 
generally underappreciated by historians; but it had a considerable influence on Montesquieu, 
and the Whole Duty of Man and the “small Pufendorf” (an epitome of the De jure naturae et 
gentium) were soon staples on the university curricula in Britain and Ireland—including at 
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Trinity College, Dublin, when Burke was a student there.52  Indeed, one could almost 
imagine passages such as the following from the Whole Duty of Man being plundered to 
provide the motto of Patriotism: “From What has been said, it appears, that this is a 
fundamental Law of Nature, That EVERY MAN OUGHT, AS MUCH AS IN HIM LIES, 
TO PRESERVE AND PROMOTE SOCIETY: That is, the Welfare of Mankind.”53  In 
Dodsley’s Preceptor, Pufendorf is highly recommended for teaching “the Obligations of 
Morality” in conformity with “the Sanctions of Christianity.”54   
Barbeyrac’s Pufendorf opened the door, as it were, for Hutcheson’s “Christian 
Utilitarianism,” for a Latitudinarian understanding of religious toleration, and for 
Warburton’s conception of the relationship between secular and religious authority.  It 
argued, in contrast to Hobbes and, later, Rousseau, that the reconciliation of man’s bellum 
intestinum of social and individualistic inclinations lay in apprehending and accepting the 
providential naturalness of the artifices of society.  In so doing, it reconfigured the 
relationship of the critic both to society and to the individual hearer; but, further, since the 
seamlessness of this conflict meant that each individual at any time was poised on the edge of 
that reconciliation, it showed how the truths of the relationship between simple nature and 
artificial society are better understood through allegory than by rational philosophizing or 
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historical causality.  This distinction was the foundation upon which Burke constructed his 
Bolingbrokian satire in the Vindication, and it relates directly to the issues and debates raised 
by Warton, Spence, and Warburton in their own publications.55    
The pseudo-Bolingbroke, precisely because of his reliance upon rationalism and 
philosophical history to expose the truth of man’s nature, cannot encompass the paradoxes 
and conflicts that are absorbed into Barbeyrac’s Pufendorfian schema.  As a result, from its 
promising Lucretian beginnings—Warton, after all, had recognized this epic poet and 
philosopher as a genius in the art of allegory—the argument of the Vindication shortly takes 
what will strike the modern reader as a Rousseauistic twist, as the loss of this state of 
primitive innocence is forced into a rationally-driven, speculative narrative and imputed to 
the growing, restless curiosity of its inhabitants.  Lucretius’s natural man emerges from the 
state of nature through a sort of pre-Wagnerian impulse to bodily security and the consequent 
submission of natural strength and genius to the possessors of gold.  The pseudo-
Bolingbroke’s savage, however, is more a victim of physiology: “the Mind of Man itself is 
too active and restless a Principle ever to settle on the true Point of Quiet.  It discovers every 
Day some craving Want in a Body, which really wants but little.”  As a result, local familial 
groupings cluster into civil societies that are increasingly shaped by the drive for illusory 
necessities and authorized through artificial religions propounded by lawgivers and 
                                                 
55
 In The Allegory of Love, C.S. Lewis traces the relationship between allegory and the emergence of a 
consciousness of the bellum intestinum: “We cannot speak, perhaps we can hardly think, of an ‘inner conflict’ 
without a metaphor; and every metaphor is an allegory in little.  And as the conflict becomes more and more 
important, it is inevitable that these metaphors should expand and coalesce, and finally turn into the fully-
fledged allegorical poem.” The Allegory of Love (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958), 60-61.  My reading of 
Burke’s Pufendorfian inclinations may be seen to be reinforced by David Bromwich’s recent, highly persuasive 
description of Burke’s lifelong fascination with this “subliminal” impulse, and its relationship to his horror at 
the revolutionary’s or enthusiast’s self-destructive urge to fracture the social and moral order.  See David 
Bromwich, “Burke and the Argument from Human Nature” in Ian Crowe, ed., An Imaginative Whig: 
Reassessing the Life and Thought of Edmund Burke (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2005), 37-58.  I 
would contend that it is possible to read Burke’s “sublime” and “beautiful” as the aestheticizing of Barbeyrac’s 
Pufendorf.   
 114 
perpetuated by the mechanisms of monarchical tyranny.  At the end of this process, the 
natural passions have subverted reason in an act of self-alienation, and “Natural Society” has 
been successfully, but artfully, placed in stark contrast to “Political Society,” or, the “States, 
civil Societies, or Governments; into some Form of which, more extended or restrained, all 
Mankind have gradually fallen.”56 
The pseudo-Bolingbroke next surveys the humanitarian record of “Political Society” 
and illustrates the deleterious effects of the move from nature to artifice through a catalog of 
wars rifled from ancient historical sources.  “War,” he opines solemnly, “is the Matter which 
fills all History.”  He computes that governments have been directly responsible for the death 
of some eighty thousand million souls in the world’s four-thousand-year existence.57  Here, 
the pseudo-Bolingbroke sails very close in spirit to his original, who had written that 
“Societies become in all respects individuals….Like the philosopher of Malmesbury’s wild 
men, they act as if they had a right to all they can acquire by fraud or force: and a state of 
war, so far from being the cause, has been the effect of forming distinct societies….”58  In 
certain respects, the text here is in conformity also with the dramatic requirements of the 
Preceptor, since it makes us aware of the miseries as well as the glories associated with 
figures such as Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great.  It is, in fact, not so much the 
argument as the rhetorical style of this investigation that rapidly undermines the content.  
Although the pseudo-Bolingbroke has professed that he has “purposely avoided a Parade of 
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Eloquence” on such a subject, the labored repetition of statistics and the continuous straining 
for more extreme language that he then employs gradually desensitize the reader.59  In this 
way, Burke cleverly conveys an impression of Bolingbroke’s multi-volume verbosity in little 
over twenty pages; but he also exposes the limitations of Bolingbroke’s philosophical 
history.  The much vaunted evidence of “history and experience” is soon hi-jacked by 
received opinions rifled from philosophers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli.  A posteriori 
analytical techniques become a priori assumptions as historical material is applied so 
selectively that, to take just one example, the whole history of the Athenian republic is 
treated as “but one Tissue of Rashness, Folly, Ingratitude, Injustice, Tumult, Violence, and 
Tyranny, and indeed of every Species of Wickedness that can well be imagined.”60  
Necessarily, written sources are evaluated according to their suitability to the argument rather 
than in their own right, and gaps in the evidence are confidently interpreted at the same time 
that the untrustworthiness of the material that does exist is emphasized.  Thus, “we have no 
Particulars of Ninus, but that he made immense and rapid Conquests, which doubtless were 
not compassed without the usual carnage….” In one particularly delightful passage, after 
warning that “[w]e know little of Sesostris,” the author proceeds to six consecutive 
speculations on that reign, all introduced by the phrases “must have…” or “must know….”  
Twice in this section, the pseudo-Bolingbroke confesses that he does not have to hand “the 
Books necessary to make very exact calculations,” and at other times he professes the 
unreliability of his sources only then to use them uncritically as the basis of his computation 
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of the number of persons killed directly as a result of the belligerence of political society, 
calculating that number to be eighty thousand millions.  There is sweet irony then, when, in 
bringing his historical chronicle to an end, he takes for granted the persuasive force of “so 
fair an Examen, wherein nothing has been exaggerated; no Fact produced which cannot be 
proved, and none which has been produced in any wise forced or strained, while thousands 
have, for Brevity, been omitted…”61  The point to be stressed here—and it will be central to 
the argument of the fourth chapter below—is that Burke is not merely taking cheap shots at 
Bolingbroke’s professional pretensions or erudition as an historian: that point had been 
happily conceded by Bolingbroke himself, in his Letters, where he stressed the importance of 
history as “prudential instruction” rather than accurate record.  Burke’s parody takes the 
noble lord at his word and applies it instead to the more serious point that, in the words of 
Justin Champion, “History was a means of creating assurance in an audience.”62  Given the 
noble lord’s gravitas and rhetorical skills, this is precisely why Bolingbroke the historian was 
no laughing matter. 
For Burke, a recent initiate into the Republic of Letters, the pseudo-Bolingbroke’s 
florid but flawed historical reasoning boils down to a matter of authority betrayed.  On one 
level, as we have seen above, this betrayal is signified by the false tone with which the 
rhetoric strikes the educated ear.  On another level, Burke associates it with a central 
intellectual theme in the armory of the deist and free-thinker: that is, the deliberate closing of 
any distinction between the sacred and the profane in the material of historical interpretation.  
This device opens up the way to expose the historical artifices of institutionalized religion 
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and their validating providential claims, to all the rigors of Bayle’s historiographical 
skepticism, and, naturally, to find them wanting.  In the context of Tully’s Head, that leveling 
of the sacred and profane was a blunt and ready-loaded device that stood in stark and inferior 
contrast to the syncretic and allegorical experiments of a Spence or a Warburton.  While the 
issues concerned had already been played out in the pages of writers such as Thomas Burnet, 
John Toland, and Patrick Delany, the appearance of Bolingbroke’s Letters in 1752, with their 
brittle evaluation of ancient and medieval histories, temporarily gave the debate fresh 
impetus, not least as a revelation of the degree to which radical deism had apparently infected 
the British political and intellectual elites.  This time, a powerful counterattack was launched 
by Robert Clayton, bishop of Clogher in Ireland, whose Vindication of the Histories of the 
Old and New Testament was sold by Mary Cooper, also in 1752.  Significantly, Clayton’s 
argument presages Burke’s Vindication in many ways.  Not least, its early focus is fixed on 
ridiculing the double standards at play in Bolingbroke’s own evaluative techniques:  “That 
there were pious Frauds committed in, and before the Days of Eusebius, is not to be denied,” 
Clayton avers smartly, “but it is the Business of Criticism, as his Lordship justly expresseth 
it, ‘to separate the Ore from the Dross’.”  He traces the inconsistencies in Bolingbroke’s 
thought to the very insensitivity brought about by compounding “sacred” and “profane” 
history and leveling contexts with a mechanical philosophical method.  It is a fault that 
Clayton goes on to attribute to the more sinister motivation of the noble lord’s concealed 
campaign against Christianity.  Clayton’s book appears to echo other aspects of the Tully’s 
Head circle’s critiques of Bolingbroke: in the weight it attaches to John Locke’s approach to 
the source evaluation against that of David Hume; in its emphasis that one of Bolingbroke’s 
chief faults is his association of Christianity with Popery, on account of his having 
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“conversed so long with the Divines in Paris”; and in its use of the reign of Julian the 
Apostate (two years after the appearance of Warburton’s Julian) as proof of the persistence 
of providential events in history well beyond the age of the Apostles.63  Finally, Clayton 
summarizes the theme of his Vindication, and the best approach for dealing with the ideas of 
thinkers such as Bolingbroke, in a way that strikingly prefigures Burke’s own Preface of 
1757:  “[I]f any one attempted to establish Mystery, Revelation, or Matters of Fact on such 
Foundations [metaphysics, philosophy, and abstract reasoning], it would certainly be absurd, 
and their Pains would be silly.  But when some Scepticks have made Use of Metaphysicks, 
either in Opposition to Mystery, or to give a wrong explanation of it; and of Philosophy to 
overturn Revelation; and of abstract Reasoning to confound Matters of Fact; is it not proper 
that such Persons should be answered, their Objections obviated, and Mystery, Revelation, 
and Matters of Fact, vindicated from all the silly Cavils that have been raised against them?  
Or in short, is it not fitting that, suitably to the Advice of Solomon, A Fool should be 
answered according to his Folly, lest he be wise in his own Conceit?”64 
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To this point in the Vindication, the pseudo-Bolingbroke has dealt with the crimes of 
political society only in its external aspects, as one society confronts another on the 
international stage.  Now our guide asks us to look inwards to the framework of artificial 
society.  Gravely, he reveals that all constitutional systems, being born out of the esoteric 
conspiracies of Moses and other lawgivers, are able to engender nothing but the enslavement 
of all who live under them, both rich and poor alike.  The former settle into a struggle for 
status or for unrelieved luxury, the latter become content with their ignorance, and 
consequently each party slips into a process of moral degeneration by which liberty is lost.  
We are not surprised to see how the pseudo-Bolingbroke deploys the histories of Athens, 
Sparta, Rome, Venice and Florence to demonstrate that “the three simple Forms of Artificial 
Society…however they may differ in Name, or in some slight Circumstances, [are] all 
Tyrannies”; so much will be familiar from the Craftsman and other of Bolingbroke’s 
writings.  But we are surprised to discover that this catalog of political illusions is actually 
only preparatory to a deeper truth that the writer will confide to the noble reader, which is 
that even the much vaunted “mixed Form of Government” is nothing more than “an 
inconsistent Chimaera and Jumble of Philosophy and vulgar Prejudice, that hardly any thing 
more ridiculous can be conceived.”  Since nothing in Bolingbroke’s actual works had 
prepared the reader for this, the pseudo-Bolingbroke is compelled to confess his earlier belief 
in such a system, and to explain this away as youthful ignorance or, later, “Sacrifices I have 
made to Truth.”  We are astonished to discover the point to which we have now arrived, and 
confused by the heightened esoteric or conspiratorial tone of the Vindication, since it 
reinforces the sense of a static, elitist and closed reality of power that is supposedly to be 
dispelled.65    
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To drive home his theme of systemic governmental corruption, the pseudo-
Bolingbroke does not return to his historical catalog but shifts, instead, to an argument from 
analogy.  Here, as a parallel illustration, he selects the legal profession, explaining how initial 
attempts to curb the iniquities of political associations had resulted in the “Miseries derived 
to us from Artificial Law”—obfuscation, delay, partiality, inequality and a false veneer of 
order, or “due process.”  Burke, something of a fugitive from legal studies himself, is on 
home ground here, and his authorial pen weaves an impressive list of complaints to hit home 
with his audience.  The real sting in the tail, though, comes with the pseudo-Bolingbroke’s 
clinching argument, when he draws a further parallel between the legal and the clerical 
hierarchies, painting them as co-conspirators in the perpetuation of injustice and the 
destruction of liberty: “The Professors of Artificial Law have always walked hand in hand 
with the Professors of Artificial Theology.  As their End, in confounding the Reason of Man 
and abridging his natural freedom, is exactly the same, they have adjusted the means to that 
End in a Way entirely similar….A good Parson once said, that where Mystery begins, 
Religion ends.  Cannot I say, as truly at least, of human Laws, that where Mystery begins, 
Justice ends?”66   
Now at this point the author has overreached himself, since the parallel works both 
ways and the astute reader becomes aware that he has been whisked up into a circular 
argument.  It is not that the pseudo-Bolingbroke’s criticisms against the law are false, any 
more than his complaints against the prevalence of clerical abuses might be false.  Indeed, he 
speaks through Burke and borrows the conviction of someone who has experienced such 
abuses first hand.  But religion and justice are not creations of society: they are factors in the 
creation of society itself and, as such, their mysteries can only arise out of the conflicted 
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nature of social man, not out of any split between the natural and the artificial.  The pseudo-
Bolingbroke knows this to the extent that it is in the name of “natural” religion and “natural” 
justice that he condemns all civil society.  His ignis fatuus, however, his confidence in the 
analytical powers of pure philosophical rationalism and his dismissal of the allegorical 
dimension of man’s condition, leads him—like Rousseau later—to a flat, inelastic, and 
polarized (rather than conflicted) individual.  The criticisms that the pseudo-Bolingbroke 
presents in such passionate language may be true in themselves, but that is precisely the 
problem—they are true only in themselves.  They are altogether incapable of incorporating 
the wider context within which the natural and the artificial exist symbiotically, and where a 
more authentically religious, historical and literary imagination will develop its critiques 
from a position that sees public spirit and public order as providentially oriented toward a 
state of civic harmony.   
The ironic result of this one-dimensional approach is that compelling criticisms of 
these initiates into “the Mysteries of the blindfold Goddess” are taken to such extreme that 
the reader becomes uncomfortable with the comprehensiveness of the attack.  The audience 
experiences a sort of reverse enthusiasm, thoroughly exhausted and discomforted by the 
author’s meteors of style, and unable to hold their bearings between what is ordered and what 
is disordered.  So, when the pseudo-Bolingbroke then reveals to us in a final crescendo 
society’s greatest injustices—the “Millions [of poor workers] daily bathed in the poisonous 
Damps and destructive Effluvia of Lead, Silver, Copper, and Arsenick” for nothing better 
than the artificial pleasures of their masters—we remain awkwardly unmoved.  Even if “the 
Blindness of one Part of Mankind co-operating with the Frenzy and Villainy of the other, has 
been the real Builder of this respectable Fabrick of Political Society,” we feel only too much 
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sympathy for the blind, since natural reason appears to have brought us nothing but a sterile 
picture of systemic oppression over which we have no real purchase.67  The pseudo-
Bolingbroke may intend his style to rouse our passions against artificial order, but the 
irreligious and constricting philosophical foundation of his reasoning inverts the truth and 
works against natural order in the very act of advocating it.  Indeed, in rousing the critical 
spirit of his public without providing any practical program for action, he has also subverted 
the benevolent will to reform in the act of demanding it.  He reveals himself, consequently, 
as a traitor to the moral purpose of rhetoric and a betrayer of the Republic of Letters.  
Our guide, however, oblivious to the workings of this ignis fatuus, brings his assault 
upon artificial society to a close in a fashion that is both phlegmatic and personal.  Having 
reasoned himself out of “Civil Usurpation” and the “Dreams of Society” indulged in by the 
vulgar, “together with their Visions of Religion,” he confides to his young disciple that he 
has by this vindication of “perfect Liberty,” acquired the wisdom with which the initiated 
may be consoled as death approaches.68  Perhaps Burke’s intention here is to take us back to 
Lucretius and his Epicurean philosophy, a system of ethics that would fit the tenor of 
Bolingbroke’s life rather well:  certainly, both moral philosophers are antagonistic toward 
revealed religion and equate wisdom with the dispelling of superstition.69  But, if this is his 
design, the contrast between the two is even more instructive.  As Joseph Warton argued, 
Lucretius’s sublime rhetoric draws the reader toward the consolation of enlightened self-
examination through the exercise of an allegorical imagination, using poetry to broaden the 
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appeal of a pathetic history and uncover a “deeper” truth beneath the particularities of 
circumstances.70  By comparison, all one can say about the pseudo-Bolingbroke’s opus is that 
it falls into the type of scholarship that so offended Samuel Johnson, where the reader is left 
to reflect on “the disparity between the enormity of the subject and the shallowness of [the 
author’s] treatment of it.”71 
There is one final point of significance to the closing of the Vindication which has 
remained unexplored by editors and commentators to date, but which takes us to the core of 
the satire and shows how closely the work is entwined with the unfolding of Pope’s legacy.  
The pseudo-Bolingbroke’s style, as we have seen, is carefully crafted around the ritual of 
initiation into an elite Truth— or, that “perfect liberty” which is the triumph over imagined 
necessity.  This esoteric dimension is not just implicit in the epistolary form, or in scattered 
allusions.  The pseudo-Bolingbroke states on the first page of the Vindication that when, in 
“our late conversation,” he had “laid open the Foundations of Society,” his pupil had 
“allowed my Principle, but…dreaded the Consequences.”  Now, he intends to unveil the 
“sober mysteries of Truth and Reason” for “such men as are fit to be initiated in [them],” and 
the leitmotif of bold investigation recurs strongly midway through the book, where the 
teacher, about to embark on his demolition of mixed constitutions, pointedly reminds his 
pupil of the similarity between truth and liquor: only the strong head can endure either.72  If 
the real Bolingbroke considered allegory an atavistic device used by the clergy to hold 
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 Johnson was reviewing Soame Jenyns’ Free Enquiry in Literary Magazine, II: 13, 14, 15 (May-July, 
1757).  See O.M. Brack, Jr.’s  Introduction to Samuel Johnson, A Commentary on Mr. Pope’s Principles of 
Morality, or Essay on Man, Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vol. XVII (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), 393.  
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 Burke, Vindication, 1, 67, 69. 
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together the inconsistencies of latitudinarian and “rational” Anglicanism, the pseudo-
Bolingbroke secularizes the mysteries entirely by converting them from matters of faith and 
reverence into simple but heady principles of “natural” philosophy.73  In so doing, he turns 
his back on the scholarship of the most prominent contemporary commentator on the 
historical mysteries:  none other than William Warburton, who, as we have seen, had issued 
his own Vindication in defense of Pope’s Essay on Man some years earlier, and had 
proceeded to absorb the ancient mysteries of the Egyptian priesthood into his popular attempt 
to explain the historical truth of revealed religion and of Moses’ divine legation.  For Pope’s 
Anglican defender, it was simply crucial to find an historical conformity of Egyptian, Mosaic 
and Christian Mysteries that could deliver a syncretic consistency to the relationship between 
religious revelation and political and moral wisdom.  This conceptual bridge between natural 
society and the contrivances of civil government, shared by all the great civilizations, was, in 
Warburton’s mind, held in place by an allegorical understanding of the truths locked up in 
unfamiliar modes of historical communication and could be seen to infuse Pope’s Essay, 
making it a sublime restatement of the mysteries for the eighteenth-century mind.  The 
pseudo-Bolingbroke’s Vindication was therefore a direct challenge to Warburton’s own. 
As we have seen, Burke was playing here on the latest stage of a periodically reheated 
controversy; but whereas Clayton had tackled Bolingbroke directly (if posthumously), 
Burke’s satire, by ridiculing the mysteries of “natural philosophy,” took a more circuitous 
route to the same position.  Indeed, Warburton had most recently felt driven to defend his 
position against William Cooper, whose Life of Socrates (1749) had challenged his 
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 “The whole system of mythology and pagan theology was so absurd, that it could not have been 
introduced into common belief, if it had not begun to be so, like other absurd systems of religion, in times of the 
darkest ignorance.”  And such absurdities could not have endured without the deliberate misuse of allegory over 
the ages “to puzzle and perplex the understanding, or to hold out nothing to us but itself.” Bolingbroke, 
Philosophical Works, 1: 339, 340. 
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interpretation of the Hellenic mysteries.  Given that Cooper was one of Tully’s Head’s 
“staple” writers in the early 1750s, and that Dodsley also published an attack on Clayton and 
Warburton entitled Miscellaneous Observations on the Works of the late Lord Viscount 
Bolingbroke, by “A Free-thinker,” in 1755, it cannot be said that the bookseller was fighting 
Warburton’s corner—he was too sharp a businessman for that.  Burke’s Vindication, rather, 
with its satirical ambiguities and mirrors, may have been intended as a way of holding the 
balance between the sides and averting any escalation in partisanship—although it is only 
fair to mention that, despite Warburton’s reputation today, Burke appears genuinely to have 
been impressed by the bishop’s scholarship.  In any event, Burke executed his task superbly, 
and the satire in the final pages of the Vindication increases in sharpness as our world-weary 
statesman shuffles offstage toward death. While this curtain-call is drawn directly from the 
Letter on the Spirit of Patriotism, it is also, surely, a reminder to the reader of a familiar 
Classical allegory: the descent into the underworld where the mysteries of nature and 
statecraft are unveiled to the novice (Orpheus and Aeneas most famously, or the ritual 
symbolism of temple cults in ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome).74  For this is the moment 
when the aging mentor is reborn in the figure of his young lord.  The former’s simple, secular 
wisdom is passed on through a sort of double irony, where the pretended recovery of 
intellectual simplicity and lack of art is actually pursued through labyrinthine passages of 
innuendo and conspiratorial esotericism entirely at odds with the “natural reason” that is 
meant to provide enlightenment.75   Playing off Bolingbroke’s own reputation with 
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 Bolingbroke, Works, 2:352, and see Davis, The Good Lord Lyttelton, 75. 
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 Bolingbroke, Philosophical Works, 4:1.  Bolingbroke’s sense of privileged wisdom is not an 
invention of Burke’s.  In the first of his Letters on History, Bolingbroke points out that a man “must be as 
indifferent as I am to common censure or approbation, to avow a thorough contempt for the whole business of 
these learned lives…” (p. 6) 
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considerable aplomb, Burke has slyly painted him, at the end, as precisely the Moses-like 
lawgiver the noble lord spent much of his life condemning.76 
Such a picture of the pseudo-Bolingbroke pontificating on his retirement from public 
life, blissfully ignorant of the spurious initiation that he has received and is passing on, would 
have provided a bitingly topical cap on Burke’s joke, and would have done no harm with the 
famously touchy but influential bishop.  The pseudo-Bolingbroke’s claim to be able to 
penetrate the veil sola philosophia is revealed as the conceit that it is;  but, by the false 
sublime tone in which this spurious initiation is communicated, we are also reminded that his 
faults are, at root, character faults—a result of his intellectual pride and irreligion, 
masquerading as skepticism and deism.  If we recall Johnson’s “modern allegory” in The 
Preceptor, our statesman-philosopher appears a perfect example of the man who places a 
faith in reason that Reason herself would reject.  How ironic that someone who saw the reign 
of Elizabeth I at the center of his Patriotic agenda was so deficient in his understanding of 
Sidney, Spenser, and the intellectual foundations of the renaissance that the Virgin Queen 
had inspired. 
More to the point, though, this was the sage who had presumed to educate Pope in his 
own initiation, and here Burke makes a particularly astute move that must have delighted his 
publisher.  In one of the few direct references to the poet in the Vindication, again at the point 
where he is commencing his critique of mixed government, the pseudo-Bolingbroke 
distances himself from—better, raises himself pompously above—his “pupil”:  “There are 
few with whom I can communicate so freely as with Pope,” he states, “But Pope cannot bear 
every Truth.  He has a timidity which hinders the full expression of his faculties, almost as 
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 There are periodic, thinly-disguised references to Bolingbroke’s career throughout the piece.  This 
author writes in exile, and he appears to have direct experience of the iniquities of court politics and legal 
chicanery of attainder and treason. 
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effectually as Bigotry cramps those of the general herd of Mankind.”  Teacher and pupil part 
ways, the latter redeemed by a desertion of which he was unaware.77  Yet Bolingbroke’s lack 
of that “greatness of mind,” of the sublime and pathetic genius, had already taken its toll.  
The source of the teacher’s failings—an arrogant philosophical self-sufficiency—had 
seduced the pupil into striving to be more a philosopher than a poet, with the result that the 
supreme mark of Lucretius, Virgil, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton, that “creative and 
glowing imagination,” had been denied him.78  Now Bolingbroke’s patronizing praise of his 
pupil can be read in all its bitter irony:  “You give us philosophy in a poetical dress.”79 
In one of his posthumously published letters to Pope, Bolingbroke made approving 
reference to the inscription carved on the statue of Athena at Saïs, in Egypt:  “I am all that 
has been, is, and shall be, and my robe no mortal has yet uncovered.”  The words were there 
to remind the initiate of two powerful human instincts: ambition, or the desire to possess the 
truth, and humility, the truth that possesses us when we are confronted with the deepest 
mysteries of life.  Contemporaries could reasonably have inferred, from his writings and 
from his political career, that the lord himself had allowed the former passion to overwhelm 
the latter.  The high priest of a secularized religion, he had stormed the temple and rent the 
veil, to his own temporary advantage, perhaps, but to the detriment of his understanding and 
that of his acolytes.  The errors to which his methods of “natural” enquiry gave rise rested on 
his elevation of rational philosophy above poetry and history, in defiance of both Classical 
and Elizabethan learning.  The danger here was neatly stated by Montesquieu, in a letter to 
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 Warton, Essay on Pope, 1:iii. 
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Warburton: “It is not impossible to attack a revealed Religion, seeing it depends on particular 
facts, and facts are, in their own nature, liable to be controverted: but that is not the case with 
Natural Religion; for it is to draw from the Nature of Man, which cannot be disputed, and 
from the internal Sentiments of mankind, which are equally indisputable.”80  To controvert 
those internal sentiments, even for the sake of spirited critical analysis, would be to release 
what manner of religious or social chaos under the guise of natural order?  
 
Bolingbroke’s intellectual hubris, as revealed in his posthumous works, lent itself 
fully to satire, since it embraced the topical amusement of an academic catfight at one end, 
and the problem of the rhetoric of social and political criticism at the other.  It also fitted 
perfectly the short and long term, intellectual and commercial concerns that Pope bequeathed 
to Tully’s Head, and that formed the backdrop to Burke’s Vindication.  For Burke scholars, it 
is therefore crucial to integrate such factors with any of Burke’s own personal ideas and 
prejudices that we might care to extrapolate from his later works, and this chapter has been 
an essay in reconstructing their trajectories by drawing us away from the straight, diachronic 
lines of the usual author-centered approaches to the Vindication.   
When we consider the same text in relation to the wider history of the British 
Republic of Letters, and as a mirror reflecting the self-perception of critics mid-century, it is 
useful to retrace the similarities with the Vindication of Robert Clayton—and all the more so 
since Clayton’s work is little regarded now, and was contentious in his own time for its 
heterodox Arianism.  Clayton himself was a strange combination of inclinations:  growing up 
in Ireland, he was a consummate place seeker who gained the bishopric of the second richest 
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 Montesquieu to Warburton, May 26, 1754.  Reproduced in Richard Hurd (ed.), Works of the Right 
Reverend William Warburton, Lord Bishop of Gloucester.  In seven volumes (London, 1788), 7:554. 
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Irish diocese, Clogher, in 1745, and yet was, at the time of his death, about to be dethroned 
for persistently petitioning to remove the Nicene Creed from services.  His apparent 
recklessness may be explained by the fact that the impulse of his writings, as C.D.A. 
Leighton has indicated in a thoughtful article, comes rather from an early-eighteenth-century 
rejection of the mechanics of religious intolerance than from a committed theological 
stance.81  As such, Clayton’s religiosity was shaped by a belief in the social and polite 
impulses that he saw working within the individual conscience, rather than by a priori 
assumptions about the spiritual nature of the human individual.  It was an outlook well within 
the latitudinarian orbit, a point illustrated by the nature of his defense of Locke’s 
epistemology, and from this position he was quicker than most to appreciate how the 
intellectual war against priest-craft and superstition might easily lend itself to a new type of 
secularized priest-craft based on secular mysteries, rational enthusiasm, and a new type of 
intolerance.  In his native Ireland, for example, he need only have observed the growing 
union between the advocates of liberty and the supporters of penal legislation against the 
Catholic church.82  In its goal to promote a more authentic toleration and stay the hand of 
secularism, Clayton’s Arianism removed the more extreme claims of sacerdotal authority 
without denying the possibility of the Creator’s providential disclosure in history.  While we 
do not know the processes by which Clayton placed his work with Mary Cooper, this 
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 “To embrace Arianism in the eighteenth century did…mean to call for a more thoroughgoing 
reformation, in the usual early modern sense of calling for a return to the pristine; to a situation in which, with 
the fetters of creeds and confessions removed, Christian doctrine could be made anew.” C.D.A. Leighton, “The 
Enlightened Religion of Robert Clayton,” Studia Hibernica 29 (1995-97), 167.  I agree entirely with Leighton’s 
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period and it is that which is the primary concern of the historian.”  Ibid., 158.  Clayton drew from the 
Cambridge Platonists, whose writings also had a deep influence upon Burke’s religious vocabulary as shown by 
F.P. Lock, “Burke’s Religion,” in Crowe, ed., An Imaginative Whig, 36. 
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 This extremism in the defense of liberty was professed by Toland among others.  See Chapter Three 
below. 
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approach fits very well with the orderly balance of revelation and enlightenment, providence 
and reason, anticlericalism and piety, that propped up the self-perception of the citizens of 
the Republic of Letters around Dodsley.  It was a balance designed also to show how a 
correct understanding of natural and artificial man could produce an effective critical rhetoric 
that strengthened rather than jeopardized the union of public spirit and public order.  This 
self-perception is much more the intellectual milieu of Burke than the suppressed 
resentments of a closet papist or Hibernian nationalist—a point that will be affirmed as we 
consider in the following chapter the historical, literary and rhetorical influences of Burke’s 
Irish youth.  These are influences that place him in a context of critical Patriot thought that, 
like the milieu of Clayton and Dodsley, has largely escaped the focus of research to date. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Dodsley’s Irishman: Edmund Burke’s Ireland, and the British Republic of Letters. 
Patria est ubicunque est bene.1   
 
I:  The Irish Question 
 
The aim of this chapter is to place Burke’s association with Robert Dodsley and Tully’s Head 
in the context of his Irish background and upbringing before his arrival at the Middle Temple 
in London in 1750.  A reassessment of the significance of Burke’s “Irishness” is necessary 
because the predominant historical approaches to the subject today, influenced by current 
ideological and disciplinary preoccupations, almost unanimously convey a slanted and 
negative picture of that background.  They assume that his ethnicity (“Old English” in 
Ireland), and the Roman Catholicism of his maternal family, the Nagles, was a source of 
bitterness to him in his youth and a hindrance to him when he arrived in London, where he 
was forced to contend with persistent, negative stereotypes of “the Irish.” They conclude, 
therefore, that his critical rhetoric must be read in a way that accommodates a concealed 
anger at the injustices perpetrated against his nation, his compatriots and his mother’s 
coreligionists.  The picture presented here will modify that view in a number of ways.  It will 
show how Burke worked imaginatively within an increasingly diverse and contested Irish 
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 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, V.37.  “A man’s country is wherever he lives at ease.”  Cicero is 
quoting from the Roman poet Pacuvius’s tragedy Teucer. 
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Patriot tradition and was able to work his Irish background to his advantage in the British 
Republic of Letters.  This was the case since political developments in Ireland in the 1740s 
shared with Britain a common rhetoric of political liberty and common threats of dynastic 
and religious disorder, arising from the expulsion of the Catholic king James II in 1690 and 
the subsequent imposition of the Revolution Settlement.  Indeed, the existence of a 
disfranchised and defeated Catholic majority in Ireland added a sharpness to the imported, 
British Patriot vocabulary of civic participation, religious toleration, and the inheritance of 
constitutional liberty.  A talented writer of Burke’s background, then, enjoyed many potential 
advantages when it came to accommodating himself to the intellectual and professional 
preoccupations of Tully’s Head in the 1750s.   
Burke was born into a well-to-do but religiously mixed family of “Anglo-Irish” 
ancestry, that is, an ancestry stretching back to the Norman settlers.  His father was a Dublin 
attorney, most likely a recent convert to the Church of Ireland: his mother was from an 
established Catholic landowning family in County Cork, some of whose members had been, 
and were to be, implicated in anti-government activities.2  Considering, then, the vehemence 
of his later campaigns against the injustices of British imperial rule in the American colonies 
and India, it has been all too tempting to co-opt Burke himself into wider narratives about 
imperialism, nationalism, and postcolonialism that have been read back into the British 
empire of the mid eighteenth century.3  But inasmuch as these lines of enquiry are intended 
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 The most comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of Burke’s family can be found in F.P. Lock, 
Edmund Burke, 1: 3-15.  More stress upon the formative influences of the Nagles on Burke (a stress that 
remains largely speculative), can be found in Lambert, Edmund Burke of Beaconsfield, 24-25, where Lambert 
refers to Burke’s uncle Patrick Nagle as a “surrogate father.”  See also Elizabeth Lambert, “The Law, the Nun, 
and Edmund Burke” in Crowe, ed., An Imaginative Whig, 158-174. 
 
3
 My position here rests on the need to recognize the significant developments in the conceptions of 
“empire” and “nation” that took place in the later eighteenth century and early nineteenth century in response to 
factors such as the persistence of global Anglo-French rivalry, the establishment of slavery in an independent 
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to help us understand national resistance movements in the modern world, they generally fail 
to engage sufficiently with the subtleties of the language and complexity of the political 
issues of the time.  As a result, they load eighteenth-century debates with anachronistic 
terminology and misrepresent the very principles that attracted Burke to the Tully’s Head 
circle and that grew to define key aspects of his political thought later in life.4  It is these 
perspectives that have prevented us from appreciating the real significance of “Patriotism” in 
Burke’s early intellectual formation in Ireland, particularly since the concept itself was under 
renegotiation as vigorously in Ireland as in England.  In Burke’s Irish biography, 
“Patriotism,” erroneously presented in modern literature as, at best, a precursor of 
nationalism, and, at worst, a cover for cynical political opportunism, has been interpreted as 
proto-nationalism, exclusionary Protestant bigotry, or both, depending upon whether Burke is 
considered as an “enlightened” Protestant or a crypto-Catholic.5  It is the goal of this chapter 
to redress these distortions by situating Burke within the Irish Patriot discourse, but outside 
                                                                                                                                                       
United States of America, and the growth of scientific anthropology.  In defiance of these complicating factors, 
and driven by contemporary movements such as the breakdown of British and French imperial power after the 
Second World War and the movement toward a united European citizenship in an expanded European Union, 
historians have succumbed to the temptation of tracing the “origins” of imperialism, nationalism, and 
postcolonialism further and further back in time.  Works that illustrate this trend with regard to mid-eighteenth-
century Britain and Ireland include: Gerald Newman, The Rise of English Nationalism. A Cultural History, 
1740-1830 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); and Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).  
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 For the broader historiographical background to these terminological issues, see J.C.D. Clark, English 
Society and Our Shadowed Present. 
 
5
 In their studies of the growth of English and British nationalism, neither Newman nor Colley deals 
with this term with sufficient sensitivity to its shifting intellectual and political contexts.  “Zeal for one’s 
country” (Johnson’s Dictionary, attributed to Bishop Berkeley) suggests a reorientation of enthusiasm toward 
the social, rather than religious, affections, which is in line with contemporary critiques of religious extremism.  
Johnson’s famous comment that “Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel” perpetuates the association of the 
term with a careless incitement of public spirit; but it was uttered in 1775, at the height of debate over the 
government’s response to the growing rebelliousness in the American colonies, and after Pitt the Elder’s revival 
of the term.  See, Boswell, Life of Johnson, 615. 
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any movement, Catholic or Protestant, that could be regarded as proto-nationalist or 
anticolonialist in any sense recognizable today. 
Historiographical misconceptions have dogged analysis of the Irish Burke ever since 
Patriotism, Irish Nationalism, and British Imperialism were brought together in conflict in the 
late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century to take a form still familiar to us.  One year 
after Burke’s death, an unsuccessful Irish rebellion brought about the dissolution of the 
parliament in Dublin and Ireland’s complete constitutional subordination to Westminster.  
Precisely because of the subsequent emergence of a violent, Catholic-centered Irish 
nationalism, Burke’s Anglocentric attachment to his homeland became almost immediately a 
delicate matter, since it appeared to condone constitutional subservience.  Judiciously 
understated by his earlier biographers, it gained brief consideration in the years of Gladstone 
and the Home Rule question, but remained problematic for Protestant and Catholic Home-
Rulers alike, since Burke at no time furnished an unambiguous defense of Irish independence 
or supra-constitutional resistance.6  In 1923, however, in the fraught early days of the Irish 
Republic, Arthur Warren Samuels, former M.P. for Dublin University and Judge of the High 
Court of Justice in Ireland, published the unfinished researches of his late son, Arthur P.I. 
Samuels, under the title The Early Life Correspondence and Writings of The Rt. Hon. 
Edmund Burke LL.D.  This volume has become significant in Burke scholarship in part 
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 The Liberal politician and historian John Morley gives some space to Ireland in his biography of 
Burke, where the “virulent opposition of the tyrannical Protestant faction in Ireland, and the disgraceful but 
deep-rooted antipathies of the English nation” are marked out as the chief obstacles to the removal of 
commercial restrictions and the gradual emancipation of the Catholic majority—“the two processes to which 
every consideration of good government manifestly pointed.”  (Morley, Burke, 25.)  Such policies, of course, 
promoted industriously by Burke during his parliamentary career, would have been implemented by a 
Gladstonian government avant la lettre.  In this way, Burke is volunteered for Home Rule rather as an example 
of the prudent British statesman than as a passionate Irish exile.  Matthew Arnold published a collection of 
Burke’s writings on Ireland entitled Edmund Burke: Letters, Speeches and Tracts on Irish Affairs, by which he 
attempted to “set [people] on thinking” about Gladstone’s plans for Home Rule.  See Conor Cruise O’Brien, 
“‘Setting People on Thinking’: Burke’s Legacy in the Debate on Irish Affairs” in Crowe, ed., Edmund Burke: 
His Life and Legacy, 94-103.  
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because it contains transcriptions of a number of scarce documents and publications related 
to Burke’s student days, including information from material lost in the fire that engulfed the 
Dublin Record Office during the Easter Rising of 1916.  But Samuels also used that material 
to describe a Burke closely identified with the Protestant nationalist wing of Irish Patriotism 
in the 1740s—a Burke, in other words, highly suited to the new Republic.7  Samuels’s 
interpretation of the texts gained little purchase among Burke scholars, and the soil for an 
Irish Nationalist Protestant Member of the British Parliament became increasingly barren 
thereafter, at least until denominational and nationalist tensions decreased in the 1990s. 
The wide-ranging Burke revival that occurred in the 1950s was spurred by two 
factors: the opening of the massive Fitzwilliam archive, with its wealth of Burke papers, in 
1949, and a Catholic-driven intellectual response to the threat of Soviet Communism in the 
postwar United States.8  Neither indicated a prominent position for Ireland in the 
reconsideration of Burke’s political thought.  The opening of the archives fueled the debate 
on the praxis of government procedure and Burke’s relationship with Rockingham: neo-
Thomist and New Conservative scholars focused upon Burke’s antipathy toward the 
revolutionary ideology in France.9  As late as 1992, Conor Cruise O’Brien, in an influential, 
“thematic” biography of Burke, focused more on Burke’s Irish Catholicism than his Irish-
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 Arthur P.I. Samuels, The Early Life Correspondence and Writings of The Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke 
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 See Ross J. S. Hoffman and Paul Levack (eds.), Burke’s Politics.  Selected Writings and Speeches of 
Edmund Burke on Reform, Revolution, and War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), xi-xxxvii. 
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 One exception to this is Thomas H.D. Mahoney, Edmund Burke and Ireland (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1960).   
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ness, taking it this time as a source of his imputed progressive liberalism in social and 
political affairs.10   
As the Cold War era receded, commentators on Burke’s life folded their researches 
increasingly into the burgeoning study of the history of nationalism and the debate over Irish 
historical revisionism, reconfiguring the significance of Burke’s early life and producing 
powerful, incisive analyses both of the tensions passed on through his ancestry and the 
cultural influences of his ethnicity.11  Initially political in focus, these influences have 
recently taken a literary turn in which Burke’s aesthetic writings have been interpreted 
through his imputed experiences of social injustice and colonial violence.12  At the same 
time, each of these interpretative variants has adhered to certain evidential and analytical 
constants:  the repressed tension of the outsider or subaltern, the primary influence of the 
marginalized in Burke’s early life and consciousness (whether nationalist or Catholic), the 
rhetoric of the unspoken agenda, and the centrality of certain “canonical” documents.  The 
last, which were once almost exclusively focused on Burke’s American speeches and the 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, now include: The Reformer, a student publication in 
which Burke was involved from January to April, 1748; the “Tracts relative to the laws 
against popery in Ireland” (c.1761-64), notes unpublished in Burke’s lifetime and highly 
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 Conor Cruise O’Brien, The Great Melody (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992).  This work is 
largely a development of O’Brien’s introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, in which O’Brien tackles both those whom he inaccurately terms the “cold war warriors” 
of American Burke scholarship, and the claimed ambivalence of Burke’s position on social issues—restoring a 
coherent and principled political stance contra Namier and his disciples. 
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 For a useful survey of the historiography, see Michael Brown, “The National Identity of Edmund 
Burke,” in Edmund Burke’s Irish Identities, ed. Seán Donlan (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 201-25. 
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 Luke Gibbons, Edmund Burke and Ireland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
Gibbons is following upon broader couplings of Burke’s aesthetic and political thought to be found, for 
example, in Tom Furniss, Edmund Burke’s Aesthetic Ideology: Language, Gender and Political Economy in 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and Stephen K. White, Edmund Burke: Modernity, 
Politics, and Aesthetics (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1994). 
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critical of the philosophy underpinning what later became known as the Protestant 
Ascendancy; A Vindication of Natural Society, particularly the section on the wide social 
inequalities of artificial life mentioned in Chapter Two above; A Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Burke’s challenge to orthodox 
thinking on the aesthetics of sublimity, which it is generally claimed he began writing while a 
student at Trinity College, Dublin; and A Letter to a Noble Lord (1796).  While 
postcolonialist and aesthetic readings of these texts create as much distortion as the earlier 
“history of ideas” approach that they have supplanted, they have acquired considerable 
purchase in Burke studies and so we need to look briefly at some recent examples of the 
genre. 
We have mentioned above Michel Fuchs’s attempt to incorporate the Vindication into 
a pattern of repressed Burkean identities.  His impressively researched bicentennial study of 
Burke hid nothing of its underlying thesis in its choice of title, Edmund Burke, Ireland, and 
the Fashioning of Self, and built upon two earlier biographies, Isaac Kramnick’s The Rage of 
Edmund Burke and Conor Cruise O’Brien’s The Great Melody, to construct a “hidden,” 
perpetually-alienated subject whose political and rhetorical passions were driven by the 
resentment of the colonized and marginalized Irishman in England.  The covert Burke of 
Kramnick’s and O’Brien’s researches fitted into the socio-economic and psychological 
interpretations popular at the time they were published.  In the first we find Burke dogged by 
sexual ambivalence; in the latter, as we have seen, by a repressed but potentially explosive 
sense of injustice.  Fuchs traveled to Ireland, as it were, to update these readings with the 
language of the “New Cultural History” and, like Kramnick, who had earlier stressed Burke’s 
anger at the economic iniquities he had witnessed as a child, he points to the persuasive 
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rhetorical power of the social criticism contained within Burke’s early writings as evidence 
of the depth of his antipathy to the colonial attitudes of his new masters.   
In Edmund Burke and Ireland: Aesthetics, Politics, and the Colonial Sublime, Luke 
Gibbons eschews the narrative of self-construction and erects, instead, a conceptual bridge 
linking the suppressed anger of the Reformer’s youthful critique of economic inequality with 
Burke’s withering attack on the dull progeny of England’s hereditary aristocracy in his Letter 
to a Noble Lord, which was almost the last piece Burke penned.  Gibbons achieves this by 
making sense of his subject’s “anxious aesthetics” in terms of deeply ingrained feelings of 
colonial oppression and violence.13  Following the work of Sara Suleri and Uday Singh 
Mehta, he brings together the young and old Burke by binding Ireland to India as a paradigm 
of colonialism, where a surface order and calm is spread thinly and tightly over economic 
exploitation, cultural oppression, and simmering native discontent.14  From this vantage-
point, Burke’s great aesthetic tract, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), can be seen to mark the inception of a novel aesthetic 
concept of “sublimity” by which the terror-inducing qualities of war, death, and famine can 
be related directly to experiences that Burke may have shared in his youth in Dublin and 
County Cork.15  Gibbons’s chief aim is to show how Burke, like Swift, was determined to 
“reinstate the wounds of history into the public sphere, and, by extension, ‘obsolete’ or 
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‘tradtional’ societies into the course of history;” but his attempt to show how, ironically, the 
“cultural logic” of this sublimated colonial discourse “led ultimately to the political project of 
the United Irishmen,” depends upon a cross-referencing of texts from Burke’s youth and old 
age that militates against any sense of development in the contexts that shaped his thought.16    
In opposition to these dominant analytical currents, I wish to argue that, for Burke, 
the Irish context of his early writings was shaped primarily by the debate within Irish Patriot 
groups about how public spirit could best be promoted for the greater prosperity of Ireland 
without reigniting religious and ethnic tensions rooted deeply in the history, language, and 
culture of the land.  For an aspiring member of his country’s Republic of Letters, this 
involved balancing a number of factors: the origin of Patriotic rhetorical modes in London—
even, of course, for the doyen of Hibernian Patriotism, Jonathan Swift; the desire for an 
orderly broadening of civic involvement in a period of expanding public markets; the need to 
nurture local civic affections while recognizing the stability generated by the union with 
Britain.  The key to this balance appeared to be separating religious identity from civic 
identity without endangering the religious pillars of society.  A contextualization of Burke’s 
private and early public writings as an adolescent and undergraduate in Dublin in the 1740s 
will show how Burke attempted to negotiate these issues from the position of a young Patriot 
for whom the rhetoric of an older generation of Patriots was no longer entirely appropriate.  
This was particularly the case with the sectional histories that were being promoted to 
provide authority for matters of public order and constitutional policy.  What will emerge 
from this treatment is a writer committed to a cosmopolitan rhetoric of Patriot affections, 
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sympathetic to Catholicism only in the sense that he refused to see ecclesiology as a basis for 
constitutional policy, convinced that the prosperity of the little platoon depended upon the 
wider union of Ireland and Britain, influenced much less by colonial resentments or imperial 
disaffection than by writers such as Pope, Clayton, and Sir Richard Cox, and, consequently 
(despite undoubted anti-Irish prejudice in Britain) highly marketable among the Patriot 
circles of literary and political London.  
 
 
II: An Irish Republic of Letters 
 
The Ireland in which Burke grew up and was educated, and which he left in 1750, was not 
the Ireland of the agrarian disturbances of the 1760s or of those organized Patriot political 
campaigns of Henry Grattan and Henry Flood that led to greater constitutional independence 
between 1779 and 1783.  This is an obvious point that nevertheless requires emphasis at the 
outset, since nineteenth- and twentieth-century critiques of British imperial rule have 
stretched an artificially cohesive narrative of systemic oppression right across the varied 
features of eighteenth-century Ireland.  In fact, the political and social issues that surrounded 
Burke in his youth had their strongest referents pointing not forward to independence but 
back to a shared constitutional history with England.  It was the Glorious Revolution and 
subsequent Revolution Settlement that had established the meaning of liberty in the two 
islands and of liberty’s relationship to religious tolerance.  The same revolutionary upheaval 
had also highlighted the threat posed by liberty’s enemy, servitude, either from foreign 
invasion or through corruption from within.  It was upon this ground that Patriot writers in 
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London and Dublin shared modes of critical literary and political rhetoric, and the literature 
of a Bolingbroke or Pope resounded in Dublin as it did in London.  Furthermore, Jacqueline 
Hill has stressed how the positive aspirations embodied in the Scottish union of 1707 
represented an ideal for emulation among many Irish Protestants through much of the 
eighteenth century, since Patriotism was seen as a way of resolving the inevitable attendant 
tension between subordination and equality.17  Hill proceeds to identify a number of areas in 
which English Patriot thought contributed to this dialogue through its own historical 
understanding of the nature of the liberties enshrined in the ancient constitution, preserved 
through vibrant civic republicanism, and bolstered by Anglican political theory.  She 
concludes that, “The Dublin civic Patriots saw themselves as engaged in an identical 
campaign with their London counterparts.”18    
At the same time, in the aftermath of Catholic resistance to the Glorious Revolution, 
Patriots in Ireland had to negotiate particular complications that made this rhetoric even more 
raw and urgent.  William III’s triumph over James II, and the resulting Treaty of Limerick, 
had seen the salvation of the existing Protestant classes, but only at the price of their 
incorporation into a highly ambiguous liberal inheritance.  While those liberties were now 
identified more clearly than ever with the rights enshrined in Magna Carta and its successors, 
their exercise rested upon a constitutional subservience to England implied in the Revolution 
Settlement and upon the oppressive institution of anti-popery laws in their own country.  Did 
the struggle of the Irish Protestant elites against the return of servitude, then, depend upon the 
constitutional enforcement of servitude? 
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 Grappling with such political, philosophical, theological, and, increasingly, historical 
ambiguities were a number of Irish-born intellectuals who might be said to have constituted 
the kernel of an Irish Republic of Letters, and who were prominent in the Patriot discussions 
that surrounded Burke as he grew to intellectual maturity.  Of these, the following (besides 
Jonathan Swift) achieved particular significance.  William Molyneux, founder of the Dublin 
Philosophical Society (which he envisioned on the model of the Royal Society in London), 
laid down the historical case for Irish constitutional independence most firmly in his seminal 
tract The Case of Ireland’s Being Bound by Acts of Parliament in England, Stated (1698), 
which was dedicated to William III and owed a great deal to the author’s close friendship 
with John Locke.  The occasion was the passing at Westminster of commercial restraints on 
the Irish woolen manufacture that provided a lightning rod for constitutional debate for the 
next several decades.  Robert Molesworth, in his Account of Denmark as it was in the Year 
1692 (1696) and his edited translation of François Hotman’s Franco-Gallia (1711), stressed 
the role of a virtuous and independent noble class in preserving political liberty against the 
encroachments of monarchical tyranny.  As Michael Brown has shown, Molesworth 
developed that concept of liberty culturally and philosophically by connecting 
commonwealth principles, aesthetic philosophy and moral improvement, and he became 
something of a living paradigm, both through his patronage of Francis Hutcheson during the 
latter’s time in Dublin and by his own example in cultivating his estate at Brackdenstown.19  
Hutcheson himself reached the peak of his influence in Ireland in the years 1724-28.  In An 
Inquiry Concerning the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1724), he presented a 
philosophical and moral system for the preservation of civil liberty that rejected the amoral, 
rationalist mechanism of Hobbes and Mandeville in favor of the theory of an innate “moral 
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sense,” a concept that was intended to ground the natural human sociability of Lord 
Shaftesbury’s moral philosophy more firmly in science and religion.  Out on the periphery, 
John Toland, a friend of both Molyneux and Molesworth, offered a philosophical, rationalist 
alternative to denominational divisions within the Irish social classes through a powerful 
critique of priest-craft and superstition to which Bolingbroke appears to have been indebted.  
Most famous for his Christianity not Mysterious, which occasioned his flight from Dublin in 
1697, he later explored in Tetradymus (1720) the tension between the pursuit of philosophy 
and civil order and the esoteric/exoteric division first mentioned by Parmenides and 
popularized in the works of Plato.  His references here to the Egyptian temple of Saïs, his 
interest in secret societies, and his historical jibes at Moses the Lawgiver all put one in mind 
of Bolingbroke’s later philosophical and historical essays. 
While none of these intellectuals resided or pursued their careers exclusively, or even 
primarily, in their native country, their works and literary networks should remind us that 
Ireland was not an isolated country, either politically or intellectually.  Before he moved to 
Glasgow in 1730, Hutcheson was patronized by John Carteret, a leading Patriot politician 
who was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from 1724-5—that is, in the period of the crisis over 
“Wood’s Halfpenny” and Swift’s immensely powerful Drapier’s Letters.  John Toland (né 
Seán Eoghain) after a short and somewhat fraught period in his native land, traveled 
extensively in Europe and, as a result, gathered an eclectic and cosmopolitan group of 
acquaintances included Leibnitz, Bayle, Robert Harley, and Lord Shaftesbury himself.  
Molesworth and Molyneux graduated from Trinity College, Dublin, to the Inns of Court in 
London to pursue legal training, and both experienced a brief exile from their homes during 
the Stuart invasion of Ireland in 1689.  Molesworth became a diplomat in the service of 
 144 
William III and wrote pamphlets against stockjobbers during the South Sea Bubble crisis, a 
commercial upheaval that had serious repercussions on the Irish economy in the 1720s.  
Jonathan Swift’s personal, emotional, and professional ties across the Irish Sea are too well 
known to be repeated here; but in the relatively restricted geographical area of Dublin, he 
was a key focal point for the Scriblerian world of the 1720s and for Dublin’s own home-
grown polemicists such as Thomas Sheridan Sr. and Patrick Delany.20 
Within the wider post-Revolution context mentioned above, what were the immediate 
practical issues to which this Republic of Letters applied its historical and cultural 
perspectives?  The two chief recurrent themes were the effects of the popery laws upon 
Roman Catholics and the impact of British trade restrictions upon the Irish economy.  While 
both issues continue to drive perceptions of mid-eighteenth-century Ireland, neither is 
necessarily perceived today in the way it was by contemporaries.  In each case, driven by the 
ideological perspectives we have already identified, the nature of the source material has 
tended to privilege legislative intent above practical effect and, as a result, commentators 
have taken the burden of the latter too much for granted and, in respect of the former, passed 
too lightly over the inconsistencies of Ireland’s political, social and economic development.  
The more penetrating findings of revisionist historiography over the past twenty years have 
introduced some welcome complications to the orthodox narratives about the practical effects 
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of Catholic legal penalties, the rise of Irish nationalism, and the unrelieved desolation of the 
Pax Britannia.21 
The actual impact of the legislation passed against popery in the years following the 
revolution remains a matter of considerable uncertainty and contention.22  Burke would 
certainly have had some first-hand experience of the effect of these laws through his 
relationship with the Catholic Nagles, his mother’s landowning family in County Cork, 
although their experiences could equally be drawn upon to argue the continuing vibrancy of 
entrepreneurial opportunities open to such families.  For example, although the legal bars 
upon Catholic education in Ireland may have driven young Catholic Irishmen abroad to 
colleges in France or Spain, it should not be forgotten that this could also lead to the 
strengthening of commercial ties that Catholics were still at liberty to exploit.23  Such ties 
helped to establish Cork as one of the more prosperous ports in the British sphere of 
influence, and the Nagles of the Blackwater Valley, while they owed their security to the 
conversion of Burke’s father to the Church of Ireland, were neither impoverished nor 
stultified.  So, while Elizabeth Lambert has followed the received line of argument in stating 
recently that Burke’s home was “an Ireland that was divided in essential ways between the 
Roman Catholics, who were impoverished and stultified by law, and their Church of Ireland 
countrymen who, in contrast, could be described as ‘flourishing,’”  Kevin Whelan has shown 
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the Nagles themselves to be a part of an established rural Catholic class that was 
“[p]rosperous, self-confident, well-educated, well-connected, aware of external ideas and 
motivations.”24   
  More broadly, L. M. Cullen has argued persuasively for the relative stability of the 
Irish economy during the period of Burke’s youth.  In times of dearth, agriculture, while 
dangerously inflexible in its yield, benefited from buoyant overseas demand or impetus from 
the revival of the linen trade in the 1730s and 1740s, an event that helped to moderate the 
rhetoric over British trade restrictions.  It also served to shift the attention of some reformers 
to the less contentious or constitutionally-fraught issue of absentee landlords, where attention 
to the draining of Irish currency and issues of neglect, character, and dereliction of public 
spirit, formed a perspective well suited to Patriot rhetoric.  Cullen, indeed, paints a picture of 
“decisive improvement in economic conditions in the late 1740s and early 1750s,” a period 
marked by increasingly ambitious schemes of civic renovation and estate planning, fuelled 
by upturns in landlord income.  Such conditions were to contribute to widespread social 
unrest only when a change in fortunes led to retrenchment and tightening of leaseholds early 
on in the next half century, by which time Burke had moved to England.  Consequentially, 
Cullen’s researches also suggest that levels of smuggling and tenant-landlord hostility have 
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been overestimated by historians anxious to read back into the eighteenth century the 
problems of landownership that drove political division in post-Famine Ireland.25 
One uncontestable fact about the popery laws, and about British commercial policy 
toward Ireland, is that they had not produced any open Catholic resistance during the first 
half of the eighteenth century.  Indeed, Burke’s youth spanned a period that saw no wide-
scale, sustained political or social unrest apart from perennial and sporadic outbreaks of 
urban disorder.  Those protests that did occur—the famous Drapier’s Letters crisis of 1723-
24, over the proposed introduction of a new halfpenny coin, and the Lucas affair of 1748-49, 
considered below—were indicative of divisions within the politically enfranchised, rather 
than of systemic or chronic economic conditions.  Indeed, it was the very lack of widespread 
disorder in the 1730s and 1740s that provided an opportunity for Irish commentators and 
public critics to revisit assumptions about the advisable limits of religious toleration in the 
kingdom, since it appeared to diminish the negative threat of popery understood primarily as 
the slavery of a superstitious loyalty to a foreign temporal power, the pope.  Instead, borne in 
by the tide of Shaftesburian and Hutchesonian philosophy, there developed a more positive 
sense that dogmatic Catholicism, detached from its European network, could be depoliticized 
and absorbed into a strain of active citizenship through a mixture of legal incentives and the 
example of industrious Protestant settlers.  Fresh opportunities for civic participation would 
offer a way out of superstition much more effective, and more likely to promote social order 
and prosperity, than legal coercion.  In Cork, Sir Richard Cox, without ever suggesting a 
repeal of the penal laws, could describe his promotion of the linen industry on his estates as a 
way of making popery wither from the root.  The chief requirement was public-spirited, 
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resident landowners.  Even trade restrictions were tangential concerns, since the strength and 
interests of the mother country were precisely the safeguard against Irish Catholics being 
reabsorbed into the secular orbit of the bishop of Rome.  In other words, the constitutional 
independency demanded by some Irish Patriots, in the tradition of Molyneux, could be 
interpreted by others as precisely the solvent to the Patriot program that would bring disorder 
and slavery back to Hibernia.  
In Dublin in particular there was a further, social dimension to these considerations.  
While it was recognized widely in Ireland and Britain that the nurturing of a politically 
responsible citizenship was a prerequisite for the preservation and strengthening of liberty, 
there remained many Protestants for whom Irish history showed incontestably that a hasty 
repeal of the laws against popery would open the door to Catholic-fomented disorder within 
the corridors of power.  Consequently, civic “inclusivity” could be interpreted as the prising 
open of doors to political power that had been sealed by closed cabals of corrupt politicians, 
and such a move seemed possible only by mobilizing the Protestant citizenry in its widest 
sense.  Since this included people whose credentials to the status of gentleman were hardly 
established, it was open to interpretation as, potentially, an act of social subversion.  Yet how 
could the achievements of the Orange settlement be secured otherwise, without relying upon 
a perpetual constitutional subservience to London?  As Helen Burke has shown recently, this 
mobilization of an allegedly disenfranchised citizen electorate was not confined to printed 
broadsheets and journals, but took place prominently upon the stage and through 
developments in the organization of the theater in Dublin—a situation made more volatile by 
the fact that the constitutional remit of Walpole’s 1737 Licensing Act in Dublin was 
uncertain.  It is not so much in an unverifiable and repressed yearning for justice, but within 
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this intellectual and cultural nexus, and the tensions that shaped the Hibernian Patriot legacy 
in the 1740s, that we need to understand the early writings of Edmund Burke. 
 
 
III:  Juvenilia 
 
Burke’s childhood was undoubtedly one of divided experiences.  It was stretched 
between his father’s house on Arran Quay, on the banks of the Liffey in Dublin, and the rural 
settings of the Nagles’ homes in the Blackwater Valley in County Cork, where Burke is 
thought to have spent some extended periods of time on account of ill-health.26  This might 
well be seen to represent the stark contrasts of early-eighteenth-century Ireland: the young 
Burke would have been brought up in the religion of his Protestant father, while the Nagles 
were Catholics, and there is a persistent rumor that he was educated for a while at a hedge 
school by a priest.  At the same time, beyond the geographical and denominational contrasts, 
a young mind might as easily have absorbed the similarities between his parents’ 
backgrounds, and it may have been these, rather than the differences, that set the young 
Burke thinking critically about the religious, legal and constitutional anomalies of his native 
land.   
Burke spent his first three years of formal schooling under an English-born Quaker, 
Abraham Shackleton, at Ballytore, just thirty miles, or a day’s ride, from Dublin.  The school 
was non-sectarian, and the detailed documentation left by the Shackleton family suggests 
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strongly that the experience, which Burke found highly congenial, would have strengthened 
in him a sense of religious toleration and of denominational differences rightly subordinated 
to the higher goals of learning and sociability.  “I am sure,” Burke wrote to his 
schoolmaster’s son, Richard, in October 1744, “I should not be displeased at hearing all the 
praises you could possibly bestow on a belief which you profess and which you believe to be 
the true and pure Doctrine of Christ, we take different Roads tis true and since our intention 
is to please him who suffered the punishment of our sins to justifie us, He will I believe 
consider us accordingly, and receive us into that glory which was not merited by our own 
good Deeds but by his sufferings which attone for our Crimes.  Far be it from me to exclude 
from Salvation such as beleive [sic] not as I do, but indeed it is a melancholy thing to 
consider the Diversities of Sects and opinions amongst us…”27  What better preparation for 
the Latitudinarian religiosity of Dodsley’s Tully’s Head enterprise? 
Dublin, Burke’s home during his teenage years, was, like the country generally, a 
society in controlled and gradual transition, experiencing significant but short-term economic 
crises cushioned by a broad and general increase in economic activity, and we know that 
Catholic families such as the Nagles were fully involved in civic projects such as support for 
educational establishments (taught in English) and societies for cultural and agricultural 
betterment.28  Rather than the legal oppression of an ideological system yet to be labeled as 
“Protestant Ascendancy,” Burke was more likely to see in the Dublin around him, 
instantiated in its architecture, a vibrant sense of the potentialities of economic, commercial, 
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and social progress offered by a sort of “Enlightened” Imperialism.  In this light, and in that 
of the recent Union of Scotland and England in 1707, his experiences would have opened up 
to him the possibilities that a civic-centered religious toleration held out for the reconciliation 
of religious conscience and civic duty, or of public spirit and public order, in his native 
country.29  This was a hope that was only dashed after he had moved to London, with a 
renewal of constitutional conflict over the Money Bill of 1753, and of an economic downturn 
that stirred the infamous “Whiteboys” disturbances of the early 1760s.    
When he entered Trinity College, Dublin, on April 14, 1744, Burke is unlikely to 
have encountered any serious challenges to such perspectives.  Trinity College was a center 
of Irish Protestant sentiment, and also, under its long-serving, English-born provost Richard 
Baldwin, increasingly focused on the raising of virtuous, civic-minded gentlemen.30  Baldwin 
appears to have been an indifferent scholar, but he was a loyal Whig placeman who worked 
hard to impose discipline among the students after years in which they had gained a 
reputation for laxity and disorder.  The thrust of the college’s pedagogic priorities is a subject 
that commentators on Burke’s Irish background have glossed over, but it conformed closely 
to the mixture of Christianized Shaftesburianism and Lockean empiricism that was helping to 
redefine debate within Irish Protestant “Patriotism” in the first half of the century.31   Those 
(admittedly few) members of the teaching staff at Trinity College who published in this 
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period were united in their support for the various institutes of civic renewal that were to 
become, by mid-century, exempla of the Patriot program of self-help in the cause of liberty.  
Patrick Delany, for example, a Tory, a close associate of Jonathan Swift’s, and the college’s 
first professor of oratory and history, wrote many pamphlets in support of new enterprises 
such as the Incorporated Society in Dublin for promoting English Protestant Working-
Schools in Ireland, on trade reform with Britain, and on broader themes of educational 
reform.32  John Lawson, one of Delany’s successors in the chair of oratory and history, 
published numerous charity sermons on behalf of local schools and hospitals.  This growing 
confidence in the duty of the homegrown Patriot had a material parallel in the building 
enterprises that took place in the college under Baldwin’s rule.  A magnificent new library 
building was opened in 1732, and the Printing House, designed by the German immigrant 
architect Richard Cassell, was completed two years later.   
Contemporary records of the undergraduate curriculum, which is described by Webb 
and McDowell as “cosmopolitan and conservative,” reveal examination exercises that 
contain a broad and predictable list of loyal Protestant themes, from “Queen Elizabeth” to 
“Death of the Queen” (1737): from “Commerce” (1748) to “Death of the Prince of Wales” 
(1751).33  The lists of set texts for the period suggest that Burke enjoyed a fairly conventional 
curricular fare in Greek, Latin, logic, natural science and ethics and metaphysics.34  In his 
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surviving private correspondence as an undergraduate, though, certain particular interests and 
recommendations reveal a more discriminating picture: enthralled, early on, by the pseudo-
Platonic Table of Cebes, by his third year he was enthusing to Shackleton (now a 
schoolmaster at his father’s school) over Xenophon’s Cyropaedia—“I don’t know any Book 
fitter for Boys who are beginning to Comprehend what they read”—and recommending 
Sallust as “indisputably one of the best Historians among the romans, both for the purity of 
his Language and Elegance of his Stile.”35   
But woven through the successive furores— logicus, historicus,  poeticus—that he 
charted in his private letters to his old school friend were also extracurricular works, most 
markedly a recurring interest in Pope’s writings, from a mock-heroic poem penned in June 
1744 with reference to the Dunciad (the fourth book of which had been published in Dublin 
that year), and his recording of the purchase of a copy of the Ethick Epistles in July 1744, 
“which…I assure you they are very fine,” through criticism of his own Latin style as “prose 
on Stilts or poetry falln [sic] lame,” to a quotation from the Essay on Criticism built into his 
letter of 5, March 1747—“Each bad author is as bad a friend.”  This interest only grows 
through his remaining years in Dublin, and, as is argued below, serves almost as a template 
for the literary and political criticism to be found in his early journalism.  He was familiar 
with other writers from Pope’s literary circle:  Swift, of course, but also George Lyttelton, the 
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pennames of whose characters in the Persian Letters he appropriates for a letter of his own in 
November 1744.36   
A selection of Burke’s youthful poetry, the composition of which we can also trace in 
part from the private letters, has been collected in the first volume of The Writings and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke, where it is described by the editors as “satiric, complimentary, 
imitative in the Augustan sense; but present, too, is that critical intelligence so evident in the 
final part of the Philosophical Enquiry, during the subtle and sensitive investigation of 
affective language.”37  The pervasive influence of Pope, again, is apparent in each piece.  In 
his early months at Trinity College, Burke appeared more inclined to imitate Pope’s mock-
heroic style, an affectation of modesty, perhaps, but indicative of a persistent sensitivity to 
the pitfalls of the “dunces.”  Besides these Popeian references, we find a couple of 
borrowings from Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene.  Spenser, the growing fascination of 
literary Patriots, had lived and composed at Kilcolmon Castle, not far from the Nagles’ lands, 
and his son, Sylvanus, had later married into the Nagle family.38  Scattered archival evidence 
also yields a lengthy “Ode on the Birth-day of his Majesty King George the Second,” entirely 
in spirit, as one might expect, with the loyal Protestant college topics mentioned above.39   
Above all, perhaps, these poetic efforts reflect a highly social and collaborative 
process of composition.  Burke is both poet and critic in his personal letters to Shackleton, 
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and revisions of each other’s verse drafts evidently continued sometimes for months.40  We 
can trace, for example, the production of a panegyric on a prominent Dublin businessman 
and family friend, John Damer, from its inception in July 1744 to its completion three years 
later.41  Perhaps this collegiate spirit helps to explain the prominence of one particular theme 
across the years—that of friendship in absentia.  It speaks of a social and mental rootedness 
that might suit an aspiring citizen of the Republic of Letters but should not be associated too 
quickly with the physicality of one’s native soil.42   
Alongside his enduring friendship with Richard Shackleton, Burke developed two 
important new relationships with contemporaries in Dublin during his undergraduate years.  
One was with Beaumont Brenan, who, it appears from the surviving correspondence, helped 
to draw him away from poetry to an interest in the theater in his final year at college.  
Brenan’s influence will be considered in more detail below.  The other, more dominant, 
relationship was with William Dennis, Burke’s college roommate.  In a natural extension of 
collegiality, Dennis and Burke founded a debating club in April 1747, the first minute book 
for which has fortuitously survived and is now housed in the Trinity College archives.  The 
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entries are largely in Burke’s hand.43  This club, comprising six members at its height—
Burke and Dennis, Andrew Buck, Richard Shackleton, Joseph Hamilton and Abraham 
Ardesoif—met at least twice weekly, and ran on a formal set of fundamental laws designed 
to regulate the various activities of speech-making, paper presentation, recitation, and formal 
debate.44  There was a president, a secretary, a censor, a budget, and an elaborate set of 
penalties for absence or failure to submit assigned materials.  Clearly, these minutes present 
an opportunity to uncover formative aspects of Burke’s thinking, or, at least, the early 
context of that formation; but they are also open to the historiographical distortions outlined 
above and in the Introduction to this dissertation. 
The most prevalent of these distortions is the assumption that Burke was the 
intellectual and organizing genius behind the project.  Samuels, for example, who first 
published the text of the minute book in his Early Life Correspondence and Writings of The 
Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke, is characteristically overzealous in, first, ascribing to Burke the 
motivation for the establishment of the Club and, second, interpreting Burke’s contributions 
as displaying “the germs of his career and character.”45  Following a similar line of thinking, 
Thomas Mahoney asserts that, “The numerous speeches which membership in the ‘Club’ 
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enabled [Burke] to make were notable for their contents rather than for their delivery.”46  In 
fact, the truth of the matter is probably the reverse.  It is evident, and sometimes recorded 
explicitly, that members often adopted positions contrary to their persuasions or inclinations.  
The “Club” was, in large part, role-play, and an exercise in the recovery of “the plain truth of 
things” within a framework of rhetorical order and historical imagination.  Thus, issues under 
debate ranged from the fate of Scipio, Hannibal, or Philipoemon to the expulsion of 
Coriolanus, from the great earthquake in Peru in 1746 to clemency for the Jacobites or the 
Prince of Orange haranguing his troops, and from atheism to Mahomet’s banning of alcohol.  
It is no surprise to see how closely these subjects shadow the college curriculum, and they 
can also be discerned, to some degree, in the lists of Dublin booksellers and newspaper 
advertisements.47  Presidential judgments on the debates, whoever was in the chair, were 
almost always scrupulously moderate. 
Having said this, the minutes do offer valuable insight into the context of Burke’s 
developing thought when they are interpreted in the light of formal procedure and patterns of 
characterization.  First, as F.P. Lock points out, there is as yet no sign of interest in theatrical 
matters, but rather a stress upon the need for purity in “language,” which, in the preamble to 
the laws of the “Club,” or “Academy of Belles Lettres,” is described as “the tye of Society.”  
“[A]s language is the cement of Society,” the text continues, “so is the perfection thereof 
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perhaps its greatest ornament, and not the least of its Blessings.”48  Second, occasional heated 
debates over the regulations and laws informing the procedures of the Club were evidently 
stoked by the common recognition that, since passion mattered in rhetoric, rhetoric required a 
regulatory structure that could be defined in some sense as “natural” in its style.  This 
perceived need to balance the spirit kindled by rhetoric with an implicit orientation to order 
meant that excessive or disorderly rhetoric was challenged by members on occasion as a sign 
of disloyalty or false Patriotism.  Katherine O’Donnell has drawn out the immediate 
topicality of this issue by identifying a divergence between a group of scholars she terms “the 
Trinity rhetoricians” or “Trinity school,” including Thomas Leland and John Lawson, and the 
disciples of John Locke, with the former supporting Bishop Berkeley’s defense of eloquence 
in rejection of Locke’s apparently reductionist semantics.49  Third, there is some evidence of 
repeated differences of opinion that may be read as symptomatic of more ingrained attitudes 
or character traits among the club members.  In particular, Dennis appears willing to pursue a 
distinctly “protectionist” position on Irish economic and cultural issues to an extent that 
discomfited Burke.  More than once Burke censures his friend for heat and disloyalty (to the 
crown).  On May 26, 1747, we find Dennis writing, in a joint letter with his accuser, Burke, 
that: “I’m now accused of a design of destroying the Club, (thus modern patriots urge every 
thing an introduction to popery and slavery, which they don’t like,) when, alas! No one has a 
greater desire to preserve it…The approbation I met with in the character of Cato has made 
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me so much the more a stickler for liberty, that not bearing any encroachment on it in our 
assembly I am deemed a criminal…”  Burke, as censor of this rhetorical “exclaiming for his 
liberty,” plays a consistent role in defense of a few, but rigorously enforced, laws.50  On one 
occasion, Dennis is pointedly made to orate upon dissuading the students from rioting (at a 
time when the student body had been embroiled in the so-called Black Dog riots in Dublin), 
and, on another, Burke cannot believe Dennis speaks in earnest when he adopts a position 
against the taxing of absentee landlords.51  
We hear nothing more of the Club after the minute book records break off on July 10, 
1747.  Burke is quite explicit in his private letters about the enduring power of his furor 
poeticus, and he, together with Shackleton, did, indeed, have some verse published the 
following year, in a collection by Mary Goddard entitled Poems for Several Occasions.52  As 
Gaetano Vincitorio has emphasized, Burke’s preoccupations at the end of his time at Trinity 
remained literary rather than overtly political.53  But they were also turning, more practically, 
to the opportunities that Dublin might offer to satisfy his own publishing ambitions and those 
of his confederates.  By the time he graduated, in January 1748, Dublin appears already to 
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have become too provincial for him, and he could see more attractive prospects awaiting him 
as a writer in London where, in conformity with his father’s plans, he had been registered to 
study law at the Middle Temple.  Ironically, it was the shattering of that very provincial 
dullness over the next year, by a powerful combination of cultural and political Patriotism, 
that provided a perfect opportunity for this aspiring critic to sharpen up his professional skills 
for his escape.54   
  
 
IV:  Journalism 
 
The early stages of this Patriot furor concerned the role of the Dublin stage in the 
politics of the city.  It was, in fact, as part of a campaign against Thomas Sheridan, manager 
of the Theatre Royal in Smock Alley, and Sheridan’s alliance with Charles Lucas, Dublin’s 
leading Patriot demagogue, that Burke had his journalistic career launched, in the same 
month that he graduated.   
Thomas Sheridan was a former student at Trinity College and the son of Jonathan 
Swift’s literary acquaintance Dr. Thomas Sheridan.  In a decision that was to haunt him 
through his career, however, he had decided to risk his inherited social status as a 
“gentleman” by entering the acting profession.  In 1745, two years after a highly successful 
debut at Smock Alley, he was appointed manager of the theater there.  Immediately, he 
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introduced a series of procedural, financial, and technical reforms in the staging of 
performances designed to establish firmer order among theater audiences and elevate the 
perception of the theatrical profession in the cultural life of the city.  These ranged from 
reorganizing the flow of street traffic outside the theater to pacifying the traditionally 
disorderly gallery audience, abolishing cheap tickets for late arrivals (who were often drunk 
and disruptive), cutting back the number of spectators allowed on the stage, and prohibiting 
public access backstage.   
Such artistic and managerial concerns could not be detached from wider political and 
social currents, and Sheridan’s innovations, however much driven by the demands of budgets 
and practical concerns, were interpreted in the context of wider movements for the 
reformation of mores and government in Dublin, and the elevation of city’s social and 
cultural status.  The theater, after all, as Simon Davies reminds us, was “a public space where 
people not only came to see but to be seen, a potential site of collective celebration or 
factional disapproval.”55  It was also a field in which there was considerable movement and 
interaction between Dublin and London.  Sheridan’s programs, indeed, had their parallels in 
London, where we have already noted the prominent, disruptive role that footmen could play 
in and around the capital’s theaters.  David Garrick, whom Sheridan met and acted under on 
a visit to London in 1745 and who performed at Smock Alley during the 1745-46 season, 
was to institute similar reforms at Drury Lane mid-century.  Sheridan was initially rewarded 
for his reformist agenda with the approval of the king’s ministers in Dublin, during the tense 
period of the Jacobite rising in 1745-46, and of early Patriot politicians such as Lucas, who 
saw it as a positive example of, and inspiration to, native Protestant leadership.   
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Sheridan also drew support from the students of Trinity College, who had first backed 
him in a trivial but salacious spat with Theophilus Cibber (son of the actor and poet laureate, 
and Pope’s bête noire, Colly Cibber) in 1743.56  In February 1747, as we learn from Burke’s 
private correspondence, they lent practical support to him during the so-called “Kelly Riots,” 
when the Smock Alley theater was sacked by a group of “gentlemen” from Connaught, a 
predominantly Catholic area.  The destruction was an act of vengeance on behalf of a certain 
“Kelly,” the group’s leader, who had been publicly reprimanded by Sheridan for sexually 
accosting one of his actresses backstage during an earlier performance.  The flashpoint for 
the contretemps, significantly, had been Sheridan’s reported claim to be addressing Kelly 
“gentleman to gentleman,” an assertion of social equality that had rankled with the group, 
who vainly demanded a public apology.  Burke himself was involved in the next episode of 
retribution directed against Sheridan’s tormentors: after they had halted business at Smock 
Alley for several nights, the ringleaders were sought out by Trinity students and led forcibly 
to College Green where they were made to pay public penance for their lawlessness.57   
The “Kelly Riots” spawned a rash of publications, including a pro-Sheridan tract 
entitled Brutus’ Letter to the Town which was written by William Dennis.  Perhaps 
emboldened by Sheridan’s perceived debt to the student body, Burke and Dennis also started 
agitating for Smock Alley to stage “The Lawsuit,” a play written by their friend Beaumont 
Brenan.  Brenan who appears first in Burke’s correspondence in 1746, was perhaps, among 
his companions, the closest to achieving a wider public recognition.  While we know little of 
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his rather peripheral, and short, literary career, Brenan authored A Congratulatory Letter 
from One Poet to Another, on the Divorcement of His Wife in 1747, and Burke’s private 
correspondence attests that he was well known in publishing circles in Dublin.58  Burke, at 
least, appears to have been committed to his friend’s success: among his unpublished works 
can be found a fragmentary “Hints for an Essay on the Drama,” composed around 1761, 
where “The Lawsuit” is used as a model of propriety in the comedic style.59 
As 1747 drew to a close, though, the “Reformer of the Stage,” as Sheridan was happy 
to be styled, appeared to be hesitating in his Patriotic duty to foster the native talent of 
Burke’s friend.  In all likelihood, his indecision was based on strong, practical and 
commercial grounds.  He had not been long in his managerial post, his reforms were 
producing some financial dislocation, and he was now facing serious competition from a 
theater company that had been established nearby in Capel Street, in 1745.  Confronted with 
such challenges, Sheridan turned his popular credentials into populist ones and ostentatiously 
consulted his market on the selection of plays for his seasons’ programs, a tactic that 
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naturally increased the representation of traditional, familiar, tried-and-tested pieces in the 
repertoire.60  It was no time for taking chances on little-known writers.   
In the face of such frustrating prevarication, Burke’s associates decided on a new 
strategy to force the issue: a press war was to be waged against the theater manager until he 
should relent and stage the play.  The scheme is outlined in a surviving letter of William 
Dennis to Richard Shackleton, dated January 14, 1748.  The letter, headed by the famous 
martial opening of the Aeneid, closes with a mock heroic couplet swearing hatred toward 
“The mighty Tom, and all his mimic state.”  Dennis outlines a scheme for forming “an 
association in defense of Irish wit; then charging the town with a heap of papers on Sheridan, 
proving him an arrogant ass, and displaying his faults in the management of the theatre till 
having weakened his party so as not to fear opposition.”  This Grub Street project was to be 
coordinated with the activities of unspecified friends, who would “spread a favourable report 
of [“The Lawsuit”] to prepare the town for its reception when they call for it in the 
playhouse…”  Dennis urged Shackleton to join the group by “throw[ing] some hints together 
likewise immediately for the press and send[ing] them up.  Talk how trivial it is to keep a 
stage well swept and painted, and the candles well snuffed, when teaching the actors and 
choosing good plays should be his employment, and hint at his indifferent performance.”  As 
one last prong of the attack, Brenan himself was to produce a more substantial tract or “grave 
enquiry” into the behavior of the manager, “and thus we will persecute [Sheridan] daily from 
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different printers till the plot is ripe, and we have established liberty on the stage, and taste 
among the people.”61   
It is unclear whether the Club formed an integral part of this “association in defense 
of Irish wit,” (Shackleton had been admitted and retained as a member even though he could 
rarely attend meetings in person), or even whether it was now still in existence; but one of the 
“heap of papers” was shortly to be realized in the publication of a weekly journal that 
appeared later in January 1748 under the title The Reformer.  Significantly, this paper 
complemented another anti-Sheridan weekly, The Tickler, which was written by Dr. Paul 
Hiffernan, a Catholic Irish writer who was already a fierce enemy of Sheridan’s ally Charles 
Lucas.  While Dennis may claim his share in the shaping of this anti-Sheridan strategy (the 
letter has all the vigor of his contributions to the Club earlier), it is possible that the driving 
force was, actually, Hiffernan, to whom Dennis refers in his letter as “a poet, philosopher, 
and play-wright in this town, who stirred up by hatred to Sheridan as manager, and as we 
suspect by the rejection of a play he offered to the stage, is purposed to oppose and pull down 
that tyrant’s pride.”  The point is significant since Hiffernan, who had spent time in France 
training first for the priesthood and then in medicine, was a friend of the bookseller Samuel 
Cotter and his daughter Sally and probably the person who introduced Burke to the Cotters.  
Like Burke and Brenan, he was eventually to seek success in London, where he eked out a 
writing career until his death in1777.62   
                                                 
61
 The text of this letter can be found in James Prior, Life of Goldsmith, 2 vols. (London, 1837), 2:315-
18. 
 
62
 Helen Burke makes a claim for Burke’s admiration for Hiffernan, but she is surely wrong in 
suggesting that Burke’s poem “Ode to Dr. H---n,” admittedly highly ambiguous in its construction, is dedicated 
to him.  Instead, I agree with the editors of the Writings and Speeches, who identify “H----n” as Francis 
Hutcheson.  See Burke, “Speaking from behind the Scenes: Edmund Burke and the Lucasians, 1748-49,” in 
Edmund Burke’s Irish Identities, ed. Seán Patrick Donlan, (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 36, 43n42; 
Burke, Writings and Speeches, 1: 30-38. 
 166 
This, then, was the “association in defense of Irish wit,” comprising Burke, Dennis, 
Brenan, Shackleton, and Hiffernan, that forms the context for Burke’s early journalistic and 
critical works, and the immediate purposes that shaped that association should not be 
overlooked when interpreting their contents in a longer perspective.   
Dennis also mentions in his letter a “paper,” or broadsheet, written by Burke, that had 
recently “paved the Way” for the “heap of papers” by selling 300 copies in its first day.  This 
was actually Burke’s publishing debut: a tract signed by “Punchinello” and entitled Punch’s 
Petition to Mr. S------n, to be admitted into the Theatre Royal.  Dennis records that Hiffernan 
persuaded Cotter to publish it, “telling him he thought it a humorous, sharp piece.”  Punch’s 
Petition purports to be an appeal by the fictitious author for admittance into the Smock Alley 
repertory, now that Sheridan’s “excellent Design for the Improvement of the Stage, and your 
happy Executions of it…have effected what has been so long Wish’d for by all who love the 
Stage, namely, the bringing it to as near a resemblance of your Petitioner’s as may be, which 
has always been look’d upon by the judicious as the Standard of Perfection in that way.”63   
F.P. Lock is the first commentator to have incorporated this text into a survey of 
Burke’s Irish writings, linking the style and subject matter to the burlesque satire evident in 
Burke’s letters and in the famous literary examples of Swift.  This is surely correct.   The 
ironic praise of the comedies that had been performed recently at Smock Alley, and of the 
“Reformation you have made in the Morality of the Stage” establish a key theme in Burke’s 
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youthful journalism, as will be seen below, and identify the piece as a promotion of Brenan’s 
“more wholesome Comedic” achievement.  Recently, Helen Burke has provided a more 
extensive and illuminating stylistic contextualization of the work by drawing attention to the 
traditionally subversive harlequin genre within which Punch’s Petition gains its layered 
appeal.  “Punch” figures were utilized by Patriot writers of the 1720s, by Sheridan’s own 
father (protesting at the popularity of Stretch’s puppet show, which was established in Dublin 
in 1721), and also, significantly, by Paul Hiffernan in The Tickler, which started its run in 
March 1748.64   She is also probably correct in concluding, from Hiffernan’s influence, that 
Charles Lucas was as much the target of Punchinello’s satire as Sheridan, and that the source 
of Burke’s antipathy to the theater manager was the threat that he believed a Lucas-Sheridan 
alliance posed to cultural standards in Dublin.  Just as that alliance exacerbated the confusion 
between politics and entertainment, so it drew out increasingly antagonistic themes within 
Irish Patriotism, touched upon earlier in this chapter, that focused on the potential impact of 
broadening the sphere of public participation—and of the term “gentleman”—on social and 
civic order.  Who was now to be admitted into the political audience, and how were they to 
be instructed in the proper channels of public duty?  In this respect, it is worth noting, with 
Helen Burke, that Swift satirized the Irish Whig politician Richard Tighe as a “Punchinello” 
in his poem “Mad Mullinix and Timothy,” which appeared in a short-lived journal that he co-
wrote with Sheridan’s father, in 1728.  By using that term, Swift meant to pillory Tighe’s 
form of anti-Jacobite populism as nothing better than the performance of an outdated and 
manipulated puppet, holding to party and denominational hatreds long after the leaders he 
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had served decades earlier had laid down their arms and made off with the prizes.  It would 
not be strange for Burke to see Sheridan and Lucas in a similar light, remembering all the 
time that Punch is a violent as well as a ridiculous figure, a source of subversion in his 
pantomimic chaos as well as of entertainment.65   
When she attempts to turn Punch’s Petition into a bitter religio-social critique of the 
“Protestant Ascendancy,” however, Helen Burke delivers a fair illustration of the analytical 
pitfalls of replacing close historical contextualization with speculative presentist concerns.  
Posing at the outset the anachronistic question of whether Burke’s hostility to the Sheridan-
Lucas reforms displayed in Punch’s Petition made him “a conservative or a radical in his 
early days,” she discovers the key to this juvenile text by relating its content to the mature 
Reflections on the Revolution in France.  In so doing, she discloses in Burke “a politically 
unstable kind of conservatism,” by which he harbored suppressed loyalties to a persecuted 
and marginalized Catholic nobility while abhorring the rise of Lucas’s “proto-Jacobin” 
demagoguery:  “This Punchinello act of ventriloquism, it could be said, allows Burke to 
complain of the ascendancy of the new elite and the marginalization of the old gentry while 
simultaneously concealing his Catholic sympathies.”  Constrained by her own interpretative 
structure, Burke then forces a number of other issues into the pattern: the Kelly riots become 
symptomatic of a deeper structural crisis—a “veiled protest at...broader humiliations” 
suffered by Catholic gentlemen at the hands of thrusting Protestant arrivistes; Sheridan’s 
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reforms become “neocolonialist theater”; and Burke is co-opted into Kelly’s marginalized 
social group, coming, apparently, from “much the same socio-religious ‘border zone’.”66   
Apart from the circularity of the arguments about Burke’s Catholic proclivities and 
social alienation, this move to uncover a psychological subplot to Punch’s Petition displays 
the same contextual leveling that we have seen with the Vindication: a simplified 
understanding of the text’s production (as opposed to its “reading”), and the assumption that 
Burke exerted more autonomy over his writings than we have reason to expect.  As a result, 
we fail to apprehend the complexity of the debates within which Burke was positioning 
himself.  In particular, the satire in Punch’s Petition, as we have seen, is entirely explicable 
in terms of critical techniques familiar to the Patriot mainstream—a mainstream clearly 
signaled by Burke in his own hand as fully in the tradition of the “Hibernian Patriot” 
Jonathan Swift.  If “Punch” or his harlequins had a more loaded religious symbolism, it 
might strengthen Helen Burke’s argument, but none has been found to date.  What Punch 
says of himself is that he is “an ingenious native…descended from the Antient British 
Harlequins, who have had Possession of the Stage long before these Italian Performers were 
heard of.”67  While an Ancient British identity might just point to a breach between the 
Anglo-Irish and the Cromwellian settlers (among whom Lucas, but not Sheridan, proudly 
counted himself), the explicit contrast with “Italian Performers” should indicate the broader 
national, and yet more narrowly Scriblerian, tradition within which the petitioner is making 
his plea.  
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Just five days after the appearance of Punch’s Petition, on January 28, The Reformer 
began its run.  It was a weekly four-page journal, and lasted for thirteen issues, the final issue 
appearing on April 21, 1748.  Each number comprised, in the main, one central essay and 
occasional advertisements and correspondence, both genuine and contrived.  Textual and 
circumstantial evidence suggest that the main essays were written by Burke, Brenan, Dennis, 
and Shackleton, although no certain identification is available for the four monikers “B,” 
“AE,” “U,” and “S.”  In some ways, attribution is not important—Burke’s involvement in the 
project as a whole is evident and deep, but the project was, just as evidently, a collaborative 
effort.68  Consequently, problems only arise when the contents of specific essays are fitted 
into a longer-term analytical perspective.  This is most famously the case with the seventh 
essay, on social and economic inequalities in Ireland, which has become central to the 
lineage of the repressed, radical or unstable conservative Burke, and which is considered in 
more detail below.  Samuels transcends any such authorial complications by attributing all 
but “S” to Burke: the one piece by “S” being a religiously self-conscious piece judged to be 
more in the character of the Quaker Shackleton.69  But Samuels is almost certainly incorrect.  
F.P. Lock, while he agrees that the essay by “S” is too “earnest” for Burke, is surely closer to 
the mark in giving a share of the essays to each of the four members of the group.70  In this 
scheme, Burke is “AE,” credited with pieces on acting and the vicious tastes of contemporary 
audiences, “spirit” in writing and its inauthentic imitation in the false sublime style, the 
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relationship between poetry and the prosperity of the state (illustrated with references to 
Spenser and Roscommon), and the famous seventh issue. 
Stylistically, the Reformer project contains all the ingredients of smart, presumptuous, 
self-promoting students just graduated from college: it shows signs both of the energy 
generated by the immediate, personal goals of the enterprise, and a lack of any mature 
awareness of the commercial restraints that necessarily acted upon theater managers.  As 
such, it may be seen as a natural development for aspiring critics from the activities of the 
Club, a youthful imitation of the Scriblerian Republic of Letters.  In addition to internal 
textual borrowings from that literary tradition—open references to works such as the 
Dunciad, the Essay on Criticism, and echoes of Swift’s satire, Peri Bathous, and the Ode on 
Solitude—there are more circumstantial parallels:  the anonymity that the writers appear to 
revel in (as when the author of the fifth essay passes from coffee house to coffee house, 
incognito, “to see how the Town stood affected to my Labour”); the attempt to manipulate 
the publisher, Samuel Cotter’s, publishing list through advertisements for book subscriptions; 
the very idea of a concerted journalistic campaign against Sheridan, (which conjures up the 
Scriblerian attacks on Rich, Colley Cibber, and Walpole over the fate of Gay’s Polly in 
1730); even the fact that Sheridan does not easily fit the characterization in the Reformer, 
since this mismatch parallels the insertion of Cibber into the Dunciad in place of Theobald, 
(as an act of spite after an acrimonious dispute between him and Pope in the early 1740s). 
  Helen Burke brings her assumptions about Punch’s Petition to her reading of this 
short-lived journal.  While agreeing with T.O. McLoughlin in seeing the project as revealing 
Burke’s early sentiments of Irish nationalism, she pushes the theory a step further by arguing 
that McLoughlin focuses too narrowly on the influence of the existing Patriot tradition and 
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overlooks a covertly pro-Catholic agenda woven into Burke’s sympathy for the native Irish 
gentry.71  Her position rests heavily upon Sheridan’s support for the fiercely Protestant 
Lucas, and on her stress upon the Swiftian-Hiffernanian Punchinello leitmotif discussed 
above.  In a recent study of eighteenth-century Irish writers, McLoughlin, under the heading 
of “Burke’s early cultural nationalism,” has suggested ways in which The Reformer imitates 
familiar Popeian critiques of dullness and debased taste to blast Sheridan and his audiences 
for their “uncritical acceptance of ‘English prejudice’” and their servile acceptance of 
colonial oppression.72  He illustrates this position by reference to attacks on British 
playwrights and actors that appear in the earlier issues in particular, and by the intensity of 
the description of “the utmost Penury in the Midst of a rich Soil” that marks the theme of the 
seventh issue’s essay.73  Elsewhere, situating the journal within Burke’s burgeoning 
aspiration to become a writer and critic, McLoughlin notes the uniqueness of a paper dealing 
“more often than not implicitly, with the city’s theatre as a manifestation of the cultural 
vitality of a national socio-economic system,” and suggests that this reveals a Burke already 
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harboring the strength and passion of suppressed resentments, “crusad[ing] for an Irish 
identity for Irish culture.”74  
There is certainly more to The Reformer than an opportunistic plug for Brenan’s play, 
and it should, indeed, be taken together with Punch’s Petition as indicative of Burke’s 
affections for his native land.  As a fresh, precocious graduate, he has more than Sheridan’s 
theater management in his sights, and, behind the Popeian verse and Swiftian satire, the 
internal evidence of the paper shows a group of friends engaged in a serious exploration of 
what it means to engage with Dublin’s “public sphere.”  But both Burke and McLoughlin 
divert us from the real significance of its patriotic, or, rather, Patriot program by explaining it 
retrospectively through the lens of Burke’s later texts, by applying anachronistic concepts, 
and by assuming, too narrowly, that it was Burke’s own, undiluted ideological creation.75  In 
fact, The Reformer attests to two themes in particular: the continuing influence of Pope and 
Swift on a rising generation of aspiring public critics, and the desire of Burke and his friends 
to articulate from within that tradition a re-formation of a Swiftian “Hibernian Patriot” 
program of cultural and political self-education appropriate to the changing religious and 
commercial dynamics of Ireland in the 1740s.76  It was in this latter maneuver that Sheridan, 
Lucas, and their new political allies (like Bolingbroke and the Pelhams across the water) 
emerged as not just obstacles to cultural aspirations, but, through their adherence to rigid 
constitutional and historical interpretations of liberty, as potential betrayers of Patriotism.  
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Increasingly, their rhetoric appeared to denote not the rejuvenation of true public spirit at 
which it purportedly aimed, but disorderly faction disguised.    
The first two issues of The Reformer, which sold, reportedly, an impressive one 
thousand and five hundred copies respectively, flowed smoothly from Punch’s Petition.  
They castigated theater manager and patrons for their attention to shallow, imported drama, 
and charged them with ignoring their duty to patronize the morally educative productions of 
the native Republic of Letters.  The specific target of Sheridan’s management is never lost 
sight of in the run of issues, recurring in numbers 8, 10, and 11 as the season’s program 
unfolded; nor is the centrality of the relationship between taste in the theater and the broader 
appeal to a recovery of moral spirit among the Irish people: for “the Depravation of Taste is 
as great as that of Morals, and tho’ the correcting the latter may seem a more laudable 
Design, and more consistent with public-Spirit; yet there is so strong a connection between 
them, and the Morals of a Nation have so great Dependence upon their Taste and Writings, 
that the fixing the latter, seems the first and surest Method of establishing the former.”77  This 
point is given specificity in the eighth issue, when the author is advised by “one of the Smarts 
of this City” that “to rail at what the People lik’d, was the worst Way in the World to gain 
their Esteem,” and in the tenth, where Edward Moore’s recently staged Foundling is 
critiqued as symbolic of the formulaic, sentimental entertainment that has dislodged the true, 
Classical vis comica and its noble task, “by ridiculing the Follies, and Vices of Men, to make 
them ashamed of them.”78   
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Moore’s piece was one of several imports from London that Sheridan used this 
season, and which earned the dismissive judgment of The Reformer: “A Set of Writers have 
stolen into the Esteem of this City, who while they continue in vogue, will never suffer good 
Taste to make any Advances among us; such are Farquhar, Cibber, Centlivre, &c. and the 
fustian Tragedies of Lee and Young.”  While Farquhar was Irish, the other names, juxtaposed 
against appeals for native Irish talent might suggest support for McLoughlin’s cultural 
nationalist and anticolonialist interpretation.  But the fixing of this discussion within familiar 
currents of broader criticism—regret for the passing of the art of satire, contempt for the 
expense lavished on “Fiddlers, Singers, Dancers and Players”—makes the national appeal to 
home-grown talent incidental to the wider problem of the debasement of taste and the driving 
of moral purpose and political criticism from the stage.  As Jonathan Swift had earlier 
suggested in his poem “Mad Mullinix and Timothy,” it was undoubtedly convenient to 
British colonial rule and the Protestant political elite to turn the city’s entertainments insipid 
and the populace comatose; but this “national embarrassment” was also part of a character 
flaw that was blind to ethnicity—the indolent beggary, extortion, and inventive paralysis that 
had been produced by absentee landlordism that is the subject of a vicious Swiftian 
admonition against “Whoredom, Idleness, Thievery, and all manner of Debauchery” supplied 
by “S” in issue 9.79  One solution to this indolence, as Pope, Dodsley and the Tully’s Head 
circle evidently understood, started with a reengagement of the audience with home-grown 
culture (Brutus, the “Virgin Queen”) and native talent.  Serious cultural and historical 
education, rather than cultural protectionism and political nationalism, was the best response 
to French fopperies and English comedies: the former policy was rooted in the very 
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principles of civic participation and benevolence, while the latter were artificial constructs 
imposed from above. 
The Reformer does, however, attempt to live up to its name and balances its disgust 
over the state of public taste with some positive models for achieving a revitalization of 
public spirit.  The first is institutional.  The journal makes a number of commendatory 
references to organizations, “formed for the support of useful Trades and Charities,” that 
symbolize and give effect to the principles of civic improvement. These include the Dublin 
Society, founded in 1731 (which Burke, at one of the Club sessions, had suggested might be 
supported by a tax on absentee landlords), the Physico-Historical Society, founded in 1744, 
and the charter schools that had been established to instill industry, loyalty, and religion in 
the city’s youth.80  The second is moral, and focuses upon the proper character of a 
“gentleman.” As the Patriot’s task is to “establish a spirit of Benevolence, good sense, and 
religion in [Dublin],” the Patriotic duty of The Reformer is to restore public spiritedness 
citizen by citizen; but that requires the identification of the virtues necessary for such vital 
public involvement.  We have already met the urgency of this issue of “gentlemanliness” in 
the disciplinary reforms of Provost Baldwin at Trinity College and in the origins of the Kelly 
riots in 1747.  However we choose to interpret Burke’s emotional investment in that latter 
episode, the frequent use by writers in this period of the “buck” or “smart”—the “anti-
gentleman,” who debased leadership and squandered responsibility by a sterile application of 
his personal, physical, and financial resources—was intended to show forcefully that 
breeding alone was no guarantee of gentleman status.  This picture of the gentleman in 
negative was popularized by Addison in the Spectator, and it appears several times in the 
Reformer, where, for example, the wandering writer is vexed to see in the coffee houses of 
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Dublin, “so much Gentility, with so little Appearance of Reason,” or gentlemen whose 
discussion was of “their wenches, or who danced best at the Theater.”  The writer’s friend 
Asper (possibly Hiffernan) argues persuasively in the sixth issue that “the young Gentlemen 
of this Age, partly from Nature, partly from Education, have got a low kind of Prudence, and 
are taught to think every Thing that does not gratify the Senses, unsubstantial and trifling, 
and fit only for romantick Heads.”81    
But the idea of the Patriotic “gentleman” is given positive, concrete form in that 
famous seventh issue, in which, after a bitter attack upon landowners and their neglect of 
their subtenants that is now generally regarded as an indication of Burke’s indignation at the 
consequences of a repressive denominational colonialism, “AE” furnishes the story of a 
“Gentleman of Fortune” who reforms the life and productivity of his tenants through careful 
cultivation of the local economy.  While much of the attention to this essay has focused on 
the opening vivid description of “the utmost Penury in the Midst of a rich Soil,” this text’s 
most recent editor correctly points out that the latter section fits closely with a genre of 
contemporary Patriot pamphlets.  In one such publication, A View of the Grievances of 
Ireland (1745), a “True Patriot” argues from the same stark starting point for a more astute 
implementation of the goals of the popery laws that will produce the gradual elimination of 
Catholicism through the integration of a class of middle-status—that is, “gentleman”— 
Catholic landowners.  This would produce a new, cohesive class of public-spirited 
individuals, such that, “Had many of our Gentlemen the same just Way of thinking, we 
should no doubt see this Nation in a short time in the most flourishing Condition, 
notwithstanding all the Disadvantages we labour under…”82  In its stress upon the evils of 
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absenteeism, this Reformer is also probably indebted to the reissuing of Thomas Prior’s 
infamous pamphlet Irish Absentee Lords, first published in 1729.  Prior, together with a 
number of his acquaintances including the Cork landowner, politician and writer Sir Richard 
Cox, saw absenteeism as a moral rather than a constitutional or political issue: at least, a 
fierce stand against absenteeism need not imply any sympathy toward constitutional 
independency at all, and was as compatible with the full exercise of the popery laws as it was 
with covert Catholic sympathies.83 
Far from an “unstable” conservative nostalgia for the native, hereditary aristocracy, 
this program for reconciling education, breeding, and taste in the “gentleman”—a proper 
citizen of the Republic of Letters and of the Patria—could be taken as a striking validation of 
the role of the novus homo.  But, if so, it is a highly conditional one, since The Reformer 
holds its fiercest attacks precisely for “those who owe much of their own Fortune to their 
parts, [but are] so slow in rewarding them in others, and…so diligent in raising Funds for 
Folly, but none for Science.”  Henry Fielding shows us in Tom Jones that education, no more 
than breeding, is sufficient to make a gentleman.  In the failings of the religious zeal of 
Tom’s tutor Thwackum and the philosophy of his other mentor, the free-thinker Square,  
Fielding reveals the limitations of Shaftesbury’s detached aesthetics, which, in its 
dispassionate approach to the qualities of judgment and taste, lacks the je ne sais quoi of a 
gentleman’s.  Not unlike Spence’s stress upon the importance of religion to the critic and 
poet, the virtues of an educated, but not inspired, gentleman can become desiccated and 
sterile.  We see in the fourth issue of The Reformer, for example, how the preference shown 
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to a foreign dancer over a native writer is cleverly imputed to “the Politeness of the 
Audience, who would not dishonour their Country, by ill-treating a Foreigner; but let them 
consider that this Complaisance is a Detriment, not to say Disgrace to our Nation; Politeness 
we grant in itself very laudable, but when, by Misapplication, it opposes that greater Virtue 
Publick-Spirit it is liable to the severest Reproach.”84   
The virtue of a gentleman, then, must be infused with a status-free acer spiritus ac vis 
to realize its true civic potential.   At root, this means that the recovery of the “gentleman” is 
a religious issue, and public spirit, while it is awakened, nurtured, and engaged at a local 
level, has its origin and ultimate goal in “the love of Mankind.”  We might not expect to find 
great religious import in a youthful paper of literary criticism; but it is there in the moral 
censoriousness of the early essays, in S’s (Shackleton’s?) strident attack on the “Canker of 
Idleness” and “Ruse of Sloth,” and in the Maundy Thursday sermon (written by “U” but 
entirely consistent with Burke’s style), in a way that shows how the religious focus, 
uncomfortable with denominational qualifications, has shifted to the broader program of 
civic tolerance and latitudinarian conscience.  Issue 11, in particular, contains a fascinating 
assault upon “The two greatest Enemies of Religion…Infidelity and Blind Zeal” and argues 
that “a true religious Life has the same Efficacy to the prevention of both.”  It might finally 
be noted here that Burke was to pen a few years later, in London, some short essays on the 
character of “a wise man,” “a good man,” and “a fine gentleman,” in each of which it is the 
lack of religious coordinates in the superficial politeness and virtues of these figures that 
renders their public roles sterile.85   
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Nor should any of this surprise us, since it had been Hutcheson’s goal while in Dublin 
to promote a concept of benevolence that held to the civic importance of religion while 
acknowledging the need to divorce benevolence from the fear or promise of future reward.  
This maneuver, central to his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 
which appeared in 1725, was both a defense of Locke against the criticisms of his former 
pupil and an implicit recognition that Shaftesbury’s own Classical moral parameters, strictly 
understood, could not provide the moral underpinning of the natural affections required to 
insure public order in an increasingly unwieldy and diverse public sphere.86  “I doubt,” 
Hutcheson observes, “we have made Philosophy, as well as Religion, by our foolish 
management of it, so austere and ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot easily bring 
himself to like it; and those who are Strangers to it, can scarcely bear to hear our Description 
of it.  So much it is changed from what was once the delight of the finest Gentlemen among 
the Antients, and their Recreation after the Hurry of publick Affairs!”87  Burke may not have 
accepted Hutcheson’s solution to the secularizing tendencies of Shaftesbury and his 
followers, but it would be hard to argue that the “association in defense of Irish wit” was not 
in tune with the spirit of Hutcheson’s enterprise.88   
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Against such a manifesto for civic rejuvenation, the enemy was only incidentally and 
partially British colonial rule.  A more urgent problem was the enemy within—the sort of 
Protestant Patriot who used history and reason to produce a hardening and narrowing of Irish 
civic identity and fed upon the language of religious bigotry.  The Reformer encounters such 
a figure amid the self-obsessed characters—“Divines, Gentlemen, Grave Citizens, Scholars, 
Fops, Pedants, Lawyers and Politicians”—who inhabit the capital’s bars and coffee houses, 
where he is circulating covertly to test reactions to his journal.  Amid this disconnected 
group, in an inner room, the Reformer spies an earnest orator, declaiming passionately in the 
cause of Sheridan and against the Reformer himself, who “must necessarily be some 
Scoundrel, who was tempted to write thus for the sake of a Dinner.”  “The Meanness of this 
last Reflection,” the essayist continues, “so grated me, that I could not help stepping up, and 
representing to him, how unworthy of a Gentleman such Expressions were; which so raised 
his Choler, that the Cudgel, which till now stuck under his Arm, began to appear in his Hand; 
when one of his Auditors…cautioned me to have a Care what I said, for that, to his 
Knowledge, this angry Person was one of Manager’s [sic] Partizans, who had it in his 
Commission to abuse all who dared dislike is Proceedings.”  As the writer retires, the orator 
takes his opportunity to lead the rest of the crowd against The Reformer, and those who lack 
the stabilizing orientation of true taste fall to partisanship masquerading as righteous 
judgment.  They have been beguiled by an ignis fatuus, which AE (Burke?) helpfully 
identifies in issue 12 with “a flighty bombast Stile, without connection or order [or] full of 
that low kind of City Pertness, so conspicuous in waggish Apprentices, joined to some 
Market Phrases and some Parody.”89  For Burke and his Irish Patriot reformers, it is here, in 
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the heart of Dublin’s public spaces, even within the boundaries of the Irish Republic of 
Letters and the ranks of the Patriots, that the true enemy of liberty and order is to be found.  
In his introduction to a selection of Swift’s Irish pamphlets, Joseph McMinn 
describes the “Hibernian Patriot” in the following terms:  “Swift’s patriotism is real, but it 
belongs to eighteenth-century Ireland not to modern romantic nationalism.  It is based solidly 
on the idea of public service.  It is conservative but critical, against useless change but 
forever demanding improvement.  The pamphlets expose many contradictions of the colonial 
relation with England, but they can never envisage a resolution of those contradictions.”90  
The evidence of his early literary experiments suggests strongly that this was the spirit of the 
Irish Republic of Letters with which Burke and his associates identified. 
 
 
V:  Reconstituting Patriotism 
 
T.O. McLoughlin, pursuing his theme of Burke as a frustrated polemicist, argues that 
Burke was tinged with “cynicism and disillusion” by the end of The Reformer’s run of 
thirteen copies; but the insight, once more, fails to take full account of the immediate goals of 
the project.  There was no practical sense in agitating for Brenan’s play after April, since the 
season closed then.  Besides, the final few issues of the journal suggest more strongly than 
frustration the mapping out of a new, more ambitious publishing enterprise to follow the 
Poems on Several Occasions.  For example, we find in those pages advertisements for a 
proposed publication entitled “The Foolish Miscellany,” a “choice Collection of the most 
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singular and entertaining Pieces of Dulness that have been written or published for this three 
Years past in this City.”  The project falls entirely within the spirit of the Scriblerians’ Peri 
Bathous, as “perhaps as poinant [sic] a Satyr upon the Scriblers of these Times, as ever was 
written.”91  More immediately, though, a number of alternative publishing opportunities 
arose for Burke and his friends through the fierce pamphlet war that was being generated by 
Charles Lucas’s tenacious political ambitions in Dublin.  It was this extended contest that 
was to bring to a head the tensions within the Patriot tradition that we have been tracing in 
this chapter so far.  In so doing, it was to place the capstone on Burke’s cultural and political 
aspirations as he prepared his move to London, and, incidentally, to further enhance his 
marketability in the particular surroundings of Tully’s Head. 
Charles Lucas was born in 1713, in County Clare, of Cromwellian planter stock, and 
trained for a profession in medicine.  From the time of his appointment to the Dublin City 
committee as a representative of the guild of apothecaries, in 1741, he associated himself 
with the imputed liberties of the Protestant free citizens and freeholders of the city and 
fomented opposition to what he saw as the monopolistic privileges of the aldermen.  
Manipulating every device available in Dublin’s “public sphere” to promote his populist 
agenda, including the stage, he sealed his reputation as a dangerous demagogue when he 
stood for a vacant parliamentary seat in Dublin in 1748.92  Issuing more than 200,000 printed 
words in defense of his candidature, he was eventually threatened with imprisonment for 
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sedition and fled to the Isle of Man days before the poll, in October 1749.  He was to return 
home eleven years later, transformed by events into the vatic protector of Protestant 
hegemony in the island.   
The Lucas affair of 1748-49 was a pivotal moment in Dublin politics and yet it has 
been surprisingly understudied.93  Burke’s involvement in the pamphlet wars that surrounded 
Lucas’s election campaign is thought either to have been indirect, arising, as we have seen, 
from Lucas’s associations with Thomas Sheridan earlier, or speculative, relying upon the 
uncertain attribution of a number of anonymous political tracts, both for and against Lucas’s 
candidature.  In any event, Burke’s assumed Catholic sympathies are generally considered by 
commentators to have placed him in opposition to Lucas.  That view is strengthened by his 
evident friendship with Paul Hiffernan, whose Tickler, as we have seen, was openly hostile to 
Lucas, and it has recently been argued that Burke was involved in the production of another 
such attack, the Censor Extraordinary, which masqueraded as a special edition of Lucas’s 
propaganda mouthpiece, the Censor, and parodied the Lucasian position ad absurdum.94  
Certainly, by 1761, when Lucas returned triumphantly to Dublin from exile, Burke had come 
to see the old Patriot as a “Mountebank” and expressed wearily the wish that he would 
“descend from his stage,” and cover his political blunders with his “medical quackery.”95   
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Sean Murphy has recently revived Samuels’s contention that Burke wrote in support 
of Lucas by identifying five articles in The Censor, signed “B,” that are “almost certainly the 
work of the young Edmund Burke.”  Given that we can be sure Burke was opposed to the 
popery laws and to anti-Catholic rhetoric, Murphy is obliged to accompany his attribution 
with a modification of our perception of Lucas’s religious bigotry, and he duly claims that 
Lucas withdrew somewhat from the fierce anti-Catholicism of his “Barber’s Letters” in 
support of Sheridan, which had appeared in 1747.96  While it appears beyond doubt that 
Lucas, whatever his personal views, wanted his Patriot stand for liberty to be interpreted as 
naturally anti-Catholic (since its rhetorical opposite, “slavery,” was most effectively and 
urgently associated with the apparatus of popery and the Catholic priesthood), it is true that 
Protestant orators could benefit, in these calmer times, from fudging the distinction between 
Catholic religious doctrine and the church’s position on the temporal power of the papacy.97 
Murphy’s reopening of this debate over Burke’s attitude to Lucas, while inconclusive in 
itself, at least allows us space in which to reconsider the complexities and inner tensions of 
the Irish Patriot position in these pivotal years, and to avoid the tendency to simplify it by 
considering it only as the prelude to more sharply defined nationalist and sectarian 
movements later in the century.98  In making the valuable point that Burke’s anti-Lucasian 
stance has rested until now largely on assumptions of his Catholic sympathies, Murphy helps 
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us to recover aspects of the intellectual context of Dublin in the 1740s that we have 
encountered in The Reformer, such as the continuing vibrancy of Irish-British Patriot 
discourse, and the moral and religious context within which public spirit and civic 
participation were understood.  We must add to these one further one: the significance of 
historiographical analysis and legal precedent in defining the constitutional liberties at the 
heart of the Patriot program.  Each of these aspects illuminates in its own way subtle and not 
so subtle divergences in outlook between Burke and Lucas that would explain the former’s 
antipathy toward the latter in intellectual and rhetorical rather than social and religious terms.  
They could also, incidentally, be seen to broaden the scope of Murphy’s authorial 
investigation further than he appears to contemplate by raising the question: Why couldn’t 
Burke have written both for and against Lucas? 
The literature of Lucas’s parliamentary campaign in 1749 illustrates in a number of 
ways the significant level of interaction between the Republic of Letters in Dublin and 
London.  In particular, Lucas shared the dire, formulaic English Patriot diagnosis of 
corruption in the body politic, the threat of civic “Bondage…effac[ing] all Rudiments of 
Public Spirit,” and the attendant identification with “all Men of Genius and Morals, who, 
scorning to stoop to the mean and sordid Ends of private Parties, or Factions, have the 
general Good of Civil Society, principally, if not solely, at heart.”99  The Censor 
acknowledges its debt to Bolingbroke, Pulteney, and the Craftsman from the outset, and 
those borrowings appear prominently in an emphasis on the dangers of infection from 
London and its “scalawag” stooges in Dublin.  The admonition becomes increasingly frantic 
as the contagion of moral bankruptcy is spread all the more virulently through the tentacles 
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of the expanding commercial metropolis of London.  Indeed, Lucas wonders whether 
eradicating the source of the infection is even an option any more:  
I fear, incurable poison to the state; Fraud, Venality and Corruption, into the 
Fountain-Head of our Liberties, ELECTIONS and PARLIAMENTS; and, by Bribes 
and Pensions cunningly applied; suppressed, or extinguished the vivifying Spirit of 
LIBERTY and PATRIOTISM, in England; their Parliaments have been running 
counter to the Principles of their Policy, to the very Ends of their Institution …”100 
 
Irishmen have to be more keenly educated in the political and civil rights they 
have inherited: “It is time…to be put in Mind,” Lucas affirmed, “that Liberty is 
not the Product of any particular Soil, nor inherent to any particular Climate,” in 
furtherance of which, he republished the British Free-holder’s Political 
Catechism, written by that “true Patriot of a neighbouring Country,” under a 
modified title in 1748.101    
Lucas and his supporters, like Irish Patriots more widely, were in fact negotiating a 
difficult path between, on the one hand, a critique of political corruption and cultural 
enervation that respected no national boundaries and, on the other hand, the particularities of 
Ireland’s situation, which became increasingly centered upon its constitutional history.  This 
required a perpetuation of the language of political opposition as it existed in England, not 
least because Lucas’s campaign was designed to have purchase with parliamentarians in 
Westminster who had next to no knowledge of Ireland.  In an attack on the Walpolean years 
that could have come directly from Bolingbroke’s writings, Lucas states that, “It is most 
certain, that while British parliaments stood on pure, constitutional principles, such an 
Outrage on the Rights and Liberties of Ireland, as governing it, by Laws, made without the 
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Consent of the People; was never attempted.”  At the same time, Lucas had to particularize 
his rhetoric for his Irish audience, which he did by demanding the recovery of legislative 
independence in a way that built upon Molyneux through the remembrance of a catalog of 
injustices inflicted by the English on that country.  This was a pitch that was certainly 
politically—though not culturally—“nationalist,” and, ironically, it was a maneuver that 
drove him to a further conceptual borrowing from the British Patriots, the historiographical 
tradition associated most closely with Bolingbroke by which liberty was understood to reside 
within canonical texts that must be contested, recovered, and preserved, in their legal and 
linguistic purity.  As a result, we see that much of Lucas’s propaganda, including such a 
“popular” vehicle as The Censor, focuses on the support for legislative independence and 
popular liberties enshrined in historical charters and a particular interpretation of Ireland’s 
incorporation into the constitutional inheritance of the English nation.   
Lucas stated his historical position most directly, if not lucidly, in A Tenth Address to 
the Free Citizens, and Free Holders of the City of Dublin, which appeared early in 1749.  
Here, he claims that “it is, on all hands confessed and agreed, that the Constitution of Ireland 
was settled and established upon the same Foundation and Principles, with that of England; 
Being made a free, independent and compleat Kingdom, under the Crown of England.”  The 
conclusion he draws from that proposition, that “there was no general Rebellion in Ireland, 
since the first British Invasion, that was not raised or fomented, by the Oppression, 
Instigation, evil Influence, or Connivance of the English” was to be the cause of his 
indictment on a charge of treason later in the year and his flight into exile.102  In the first 
Censor, dated June 3, 1749, he states, feigning the impartiality of the antiquarian, that one of 
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the editor’s goals is “to collect a History of the antient and present State, or Constitution, of 
all the Cities, Boroughs, and Towns Corporate in this Kingdom.  And to enquire into, and 
explain the true Causes of the Devastation of many, once considerable, Towns, in this 
Kingdom.”  On a later page is advertised the publication of “Magna Charta Libertatum 
Civitatis Dublini: The Great Charter of the Liberties of the City of Dublin. Transcribed and 
Translated into English, with explanatory Notes. Dedicated to his Majesty, and presented to 
his LORDS JUSTICES of IRELAND.  By C. Lucas, a Free Citizen.”  The Magna Charta 
itself, a common focal point for the liberties of the Britannic Constitution, provides the 
measure, in future issues, of the loss of liberties by Dublin’s citizens that forms the subject 
matter of the essays.103  As in the Tenth Address, Lucas draws from Bolingbroke and the 
older tradition of seventeenth-century constitutional thought to affirm Molyneux’s earlier 
denial that Ireland had been “conquered” by Henry II, while stressing that the Irish lords 
willingly entered under the protections and liberties of laws stretching back to Anglo-Saxon 
times.  Thus, the pre-conquest origins of English constitutional liberties recover their direct 
significance for the Irish, having been exported under the Plantagenets through consent of the 
indigenous people, not by conquest.   
In this way, Lucas effects an historical union of Norman and later English settlers in 
an alliance that transcends, or, at least, subordinates, the strict denominational divide between 
Protestant and Catholic; but the move carries a number of further significant implications.  
The recovery of rights assumed “time out of mind” follows a narrative, familiar from 
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Bolingbroke’s writings, that privileges the collapse of the superstition and ignorance 
associated with Catholicism and the pope’s historic claims to plenitudo potestatis.  As a 
result, Lucas can leave his hearers free to draw the conclusion that the grip of priest-craft 
renders Catholics incapable of the exercise of the duties of a free citizen.  It is something of a 
judicial and political parallel with the economic reductionism echoed in a “True Patriot’s” 
insistence that “there was something in the Spirit of Popery incompatible with a laborious 
life.”104  At the same time, this approach to constitutional liberty leaves little room for an 
effective, theoretical attack upon the moral or legal rectitude of the penal laws, since their 
origins are evidently bound in with the preservation of rights recovered in the Revolution 
Settlement.    
It seems precisely to have been this historical methodology, and its political 
applications, that concerned Burke.  To some degree, this may have been a generational 
issue.  For Burke and his immediate associates, the defining experience of Patriotism was not 
the establishment of the Williamite settlement in Ireland but the loyalty and quiescence of the 
Irish Catholic population during the Jacobite rebellions of the eighteenth century.  This 
perception could only weaken the prejudices that bound respectable Catholics to a history of 
insurgency, priest-craft, and foreign intervention, and it threw back into discussion the 
immediate context within which the legal disabilities against Catholics had been established.  
It also reopened investigation into the roots of earlier Catholic rebellions in Ireland, 
especially that of 1641, and looked to history for a different narrative that was founded not 
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on matters of exclusion and independence, but on liberty and slavery as denominationally 
blind and as moral rather than constitutional issues.    
Lucas’s Irish history could also be interpreted as threatening, rather than 
consolidating, order precisely because it failed to allow subsequent events to work upon and 
mediate the raw material of historical charters and texts.  The liberty it ushered forth was 
dangerously abstracted from the contexts within which it had originally been articulated, and 
the proof of the pudding here lay, as so often, in the rhetoric through which such abstractions 
were propagated.  Thus, the satirical Censor Extraordinary, in shadowing Lucas’s demagogic 
parliamentary campaign, is careful to commence each issue with a specimen of the false 
sublime.  The thirteenth number, for example, opens with this particularly impressive comet: 
“Whosoever taketh a View of the State of this Nation from the first Dawnings of 
Government in it, will see a Scene, perhaps, the most melancholy that History affords; such a 
Succession of TYRANNY, handed down under the Names of Kings, Priests, Lords, Lords 
Lieutenants, Lords Deputies, Lords Justices, Lords Bishops, and Lords ALDERMEN, and all 
the Lords who have lorded over us…etc.”105  Accompanying such speechifying, the journal 
published spoof charters, such as that of “the Reign of William Rufus, Ann. 27. Gul. 2di” 
against the corruption of local officials, which carefully complains at the same time that, 
“Our Justices behave as if they knew nothing of this Act, which is yet unrepealed.”106  
Surrounding such pseudo-erudite fare are parodies of Lucas’s recurrent stress, in the Censor, 
upon the casual brutality and arrogance of “high boasted” gentlemen and Jesuitical intrigues 
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among the Catholic priesthood.  The resultant effect is that of veiled threats of violence 
which might put us in mind of the coffee-house orator and his cudgel in The Reformer. 
Beside any generational factor, personal experiences clearly contributed to Burke’s 
search for a more “usable” approach to Ireland’s constitutional history than that being offered 
by Patriots such as Lucas.  Here, his Nagle ties to Cork are certainly important, not as sources 
of marginalization and repression but as illustrative of the practical benefits that could be 
derived from a concept of citizenship more flexible in respect of personal religious 
commitment.  In a letter dated July 12, 1746, shortly after the defeat of the Jacobite rising at 
Culloden, Burke confided to Shackleton that he had been “read[ing] some 
history…endeavouring to get a little into the accounts of this our own poor Country.”107  The 
key here for Burke was discovering an historical perspective that undermined the brittle, text-
based narrative of liberty and servitude without whitewashing popery or opening a back door 
to the complete secularization of politics and public spirit.  This ambition was to draw him to 
a growing band of Catholic intellectuals and antiquarians, such as John Curry and Charles 
O’Connor, who were intent on integrating the evidence of Gaelic history into the study of 
liberty and civilization in Ireland, and, more contentiously, revising the record of the 1641 
Catholic rebellion.108  But Burke did not have to enter these circles to engage in such 
revisionism.  Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that the most significant influence on 
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his historical outlook in the short term was a doyen of the Protestant settler Establishment, 
the Cork landowner and politician Sir Richard Cox.    
Cox’s grandfather, Sir Richard Cox, had spent some years in self-imposed exile in 
Bristol, but returned to Ireland in the service of William III, crushing Jacobite resistance as 
governor of the county and city of Cork in the aftermath of the rising of 1689-91, and being 
rewarded with the post of lord justice of Ireland under Queen Anne.  The younger Richard 
Cox’s writings reflect an intellectual as well as personal debt to his grandfather, who, as a 
Tory committed to the 1688 revolution, had written a loyalist history of his native country, 
Hibernia Anglicana (1689-90) and An Essay for the Conversion of the Irish (1698), in which 
he had argued that the Gaelic and British peoples came from the same ethnic stock.  From a 
similarly loyal position, he had criticized the proposed restrictions on the Irish woolen trade 
in 1698 on the grounds that they would harm both English and Protestant interests in the 
island.109  The family’s fortunes had been affected both by the threat of Catholic rebellion 
and the vagaries of party politics, and this genealogy perhaps explains the sensitivity to the 
interplay of circumstances and history, of caution and innovation, that runs through the 
writings of both Coxes.  When he inherited the family properties, the grandson showed 
himself an imaginative estate manager, promoting linen manufacture over wool and 
encouraging the immigration of skilled Protestant weavers from northern Ireland.110  By the 
mid-1740s, he was, like his grandfather sixty years earlier, expressing a cautious optimism 
over the growth of the Irish economy, perhaps influenced by the urban and commercial 
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renewal taking place in the city of Cork at the time.111  Heavily invested in the Patriot cause, 
Cox found his own credentials, together with those of his family, challenged forcefully in 
1749 by Charles Lucas, who objected to the family’s adherence to Ireland’s constitutional 
dependence upon Great Britain.112  Cox responded through a number of works against Lucas, 
including a series of seven short papers entitled The Cork Surgeon’s Antidote, against the 
Dublin Apothecary’s Poyson (1749) that made him, in Samuels’ words, “by far the most 
powerful and virulent opponent of Lucas.”113  It was, in fact, Cox who was instrumental in 
setting in motion the charges against Lucas that resulted in the latter’s flight, and he was 
rewarded by being appointed collector of customs for Cork in 1750.  Somewhat against his 
enemies’ claims of venality, he then clashed with the authorities at Dublin Castle during the 
money bill dispute of 1753-56, at which time he was lauded by Burke’s old friend Beaumont 
Brenan in his poem The Patriots.114 
While there is no surviving proof of a direct relationship between Burke and Cox, 
some circumstantial and textual evidence suggests they were moving close together in the 
same political and literary orbit.  Circumstantially, Cox’s estates and political base at 
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Dunmanway, Co. Cork, were not far from those of John Perceval, 2nd Lord Egmont, for 
whom we know Burke was to work during his early years in London.  Cox’s and Egmont’s 
similar positions within the Patriot camp are attested by the fact that Egmont’s powerful plea 
for the removal of British restrictions on the Irish wool trade, Some Observations on the 
Present State of Ireland, Particularly with Relation to the Woollen Manufacture (1731) was 
misattributed to Sir Richard Cox by contemporaries.115  More telling are the arguments and 
rhetoric that Cox employs in his texts to attack Lucas’s historical claims for “Independancy” 
and his related charges against English misgovernment in Ireland reaching back through 
1641 to the original acceptance of Magna Carta by the Irish nobles.  In the tense atmosphere 
of 1749, Cox was less interested in refuting Lucas’s facts than in tracing how “restless and 
turbulent spirits” were fashioning an explosively disorderly concept of liberty out of a 
pseudo-genealogy of half understood and butchered charters.  He upbraids Lucas for his false 
historical memory and his secret desire to “play the Tyrant, as MASSIANELLO [of Naples] 
did before him,” and caricatures him as a modern-day Thersites, “Loquacious, loud, and 
turbulent of Tongue” whose chief joy was “To Lash the Great, and Monarchs to Revile.”116  
Ultimately, Cox wished to argue that Lucas’s historical defense of independency would only 
play into the hands of a resurgent papist interest by sowing discord among Protestants, 
thereby resulting in the reintroduction of slavery.  We might be reminded here of the 
comment made by William Dennis in the early days of the “Club,” and directed at Burke, 
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that “modern patriots urge every thing an introduction to popery and slavery, which they 
don’t like.”   
Against the Lucasians, Cox offered a vision of progress brought about by cautious, 
prudential reform in the face, and not at the beck and call, of agitators of the lower ranks of 
society, and the thrust of his appeal to the voters of Dublin was threefold.  First, in the words 
of S.J. Connolly, he launched “an effective critique of Lucas’s autodidactic obsession with 
ancient grants and charters, arguing that texts and precedents form the remote past must be 
read in their historical context.”117  From this basis, he appeals to the steadying hand of 
prescriptive right as shown through history, and argues that “Independancy” as it is extracted 
from old charters is “a Doctrine, which had but little force, when it was first broached, but is 
totally enervated, by a long Possession against it, and by the Authority, against which it 
Points, being now necessarily interwoven with our Constitution, and intermixed with all our 
Property.”118 
This prescriptive historical authority informs Cox’s second, political point, which is 
that reform accompanies order and can never come out of disorder.  To be effective, reform 
must be directed through accepted channels of authority, and its implementation entrusted to 
responsible gentlemen, versed in prudence, and well situated within the political 
establishment.  In A Serious and Seasonable Address to the Citizens of Dublin (1749), in 
language sometimes strikingly redolent of Burke later, he advises his readers on their 
selection of public representatives in the spirit of such historically-rooted prudence.  While 
“A ready Disposition to censure Governors, and a solemn Avowal of redressing publick 
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Grievances…has ever been the notorious Conduct of ambitious and aspiring Minds,” 
gentlemen should be guided in their choice of representative by the following facts: that no 
government has ever been good enough to avoid the censure and condemnation of “restless 
and turbulent Spirits”; that defects must exist in every administration; that errors complained 
of are often “of the smallest Kind” and redressing them frequently “proves of more 
pernicious Consequence to the Community than the Errors themselves, were they real, could 
have done”; that a discretionary power within every government must exist “to recede a little, 
in some Instances, from the strictness of stated Rules and Laws”; that “the lowest among the 
People are very unfit Instruments” for reforming even dangerous abuses of power; that there 
will surely be a number of “good and disinterested Minds” found in any government equal to 
the task of rectifying abuses and restoring “the good Order of that Administration, wherein 
they preside.”119   
Finally, Cox addresses the constitutional implications of his position by arguing that a 
prudent, historically-grounded acknowledgment of the reality of Irish constitutional 
subservience to Britain is a source of, and not a hindrance to, Irish liberty:  “He who 
represents a DEPENDANCY to be the free Choice of IRELAND, puts her into the most 
amiable Light, of using her Liberty, so as not to abuse it; and preferring her true Interest, to 
the vain Caprice of her licentious Children…”120  Beside the practical economic benefits he 
sees accruing to the Irish linen manufacture and entrepreneurial estate management from 
such a constitutional relationship, his argument accords on a theoretical plane with the 
position of the Rockingham Whigs when they passed the Declaratory Act in respect of the 
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American colonies in 1766.  Burke was a vocal supporter of this Act because, not in spite, of 
his conciliatory attitude toward to the colonies, arguing that concessions were much more 
feasible within a context of the unquestioned theoretical constitutional supremacy that the 
Declaratory Act affirmed.  It is not so well known that a similar act had already been passed 
in respect of Ireland, in 1719.121  
It could be reasonably stated, then, that Sir Richard Cox, who, in his local political 
and commercial enterprises, epitomized the spirit of the Patriotic gentleman lauded in The 
Reformer, was also the pamphleteer whose political tracts are most reminiscent of Burke’s 
own emerging political rhetoric.122  His critiques of Lucas return time and again to the violent 
undertones of the rhetoric and the boundless application of “liberty” in the abstract, and to 
the need to pursue reform within the existing constitutional arrangement, however flawed 
that might be.123  In his emphasis on the contextualization of historical material we can 
identify a strain of Patriotism that combined a more integrative and orderly path to progress 
with a pragmatism that could accommodate the gradual enfranchisement of civic-minded 
Catholics.  Of all the possible influences upon Burke in his days before leaving for London, 
                                                 
121
 The official title of the act was the Dependency of Ireland on Great Britain Act. 
 
122
 Other examples of this rhetorical similarity are: “[Q]uerulous Malcontents” possess “a turbulent 
Disposition to unhinge all Order”;  gentlemen should not be swayed by “a noisy and popular Declamation for 
Liberty and Property, the boasting Cant of defending your Constitution, or a theatrical Declaration about the 
Redress of Grievances, but a well grounded Knowledge of the genuine Sentiments and Character of the 
Candidate who addresses you”;  “A laboured Piece of splendid Oratory and Elocution in these 
Instances…resembles the Bombast and Fustian of a Mountebank”; “Their darling Prerogative, Liberty, they 
extend to such a boundless Comprehension, that no Ordinance they imagine ought to bind them, which they do 
not approve of, or which offers any Degree of Violence to so sacred and universal a Blessing.”  See, A Serious 
Address, 7, 7-8, 8, 31.  There are passages too long to quote here (6, 15), the application of reductio ad 
absurdum to counter a strict legal fundamentalism (29), and, in closing, a paean to “A more powerful and 
opulent City…in our neighbouring kingdom…who generally chuse their Representatives in Parliament, from 
those of the superior Rank amongst themselves, and as constantly give the Preference to such as are most 
eminent for their Interest, Wealth, and Reputation” (34).  
  
123
 See, for example, the doggerel by a “Friend to Liberty” printed in Censor, no. 5, p.3.  Lucas’s 
position of independency can be traced developing over the summer of 1749, and is clearly stated in Censor, no. 
20 (October 7-14, just before Lucas’s flight).  Significantly, and as a rein on the language of nationalism, Lucas 
returns to English historians for his justification, as in Censor, no. 5, p.2. 
 199 
from Hiffernan to Dennis to the Scriblerians themselves, it is Cox who, in this game of 
speculation, deserves the most prominent place.  Why has this not been noticed before? 
Perhaps the question can best be answered by posing another one: Where would the 
Cox connection take us, and Burke, in matters of religion and nationalism?  Here, the need to 
see Burke as standing at the threshold of Irish Catholic or nationalist liberation movements 
requires us to distance him from the doomed agendas of figures such as Cox, or to interpret 
those agendas in language that makes their failure self-evident.  Cox’s brand of “dependent” 
Patriotism, seen through the lens of later nationalist movements and growing sectarian 
violence, appears paradoxical at best and, at worst, confirms our expectations of the bigoted 
conceit of colonialism.  In matters of religion, Murphy describes Cox as “uninhibited in [his] 
attacks on Catholicism”; but this is stated, in part, to soften the anti-Catholicism of Lucas by 
contrast.  Cox certainly refused to question the historical record of 1641, and his view of 
Catholicism was that it predisposed its members to poverty and indolence, and to the thrall of 
a foreign power.  But precisely because of this, he saw constitutional “dependency” on a 
strong Britain as bringing commercial and therefore moral benefits equally to Catholic and 
Protestant Irish.  “The Increase of the Protestants,” he writes concerning the achievements of 
his linen enterprise, “is entirely by Tradesmen and their Families, and generally from the 
North: But that of the Papists is, by Labourers and their Families, who are, in their Way, as 
necessary, and by good Discipline, are turned to the best Use, and give us many excellent 
Spinners.”124  It is, in fact, hard to see Burke objecting either to the tenor or the sentiment of 
this passage.  Burke would have parted company with Cox over over the Penal Laws; but 
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even here Cox left his readers room for maneuver through his repeated emphasis that “an 
Over-strictness in the Execution of Laws may become the highest Injury” and that “not to 
allow [the] Liberty of receding from the Strictness of them in certain Points, as the Necessity 
and State of Things may require, would in all Probability be productive of the greatest 
Evils.”125  It could, indeed, be argued that for a young man in Burke’s situation, Cox’s 
dependent Patriotism held a greater possibility of reform in religious affairs and among the 
gentry who held power than that of the Lucasians, and much less danger of such a change 
being accompanied by serious social upheaval.  In all this, it is important to bear in mind 
Michael Brown’s astute comment that, “[W]e should not confuse Burke’s antipathy for the 
jobbing ascendancy for a hidden affiliation with the religious belief system offered by 
Roman Catholicism.  To be sympathetic to the plight of the Roman Catholic community does 
not imply any intellectual assent to their foundational assumptions.”126   
In respect of nationalism, too, we have already seen how Burke espoused a 
constitutional preference very similar to Cox’s theory of liberty and dependency later in his 
political career.  Cox’s contest with Lucas reminds us that Patriotism contained within it 
widely variant paths toward one goal.  That goal of Irish cultural and economic self-
sufficiency, realized through the capacity for Irish gentlemen to cultivate a vibrant public 
spirit, was shared by Cox and Lucas, and the former would have had little to object to in the 
Censor’s observation that, “This Island is happy in it’s Climate; and nothing, but Inattention 
to the true Interest of the Country, could render it incapable of supporting it’s Inhabitants.”127  
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The more important question, after years of increasing stability and prosperity was, rather, 
what was most likely to jeopardize that interest.  If some saw Independency—or what some 
term nationalism—as the antidote, others, with contrasting perceptions of history, reached 
exactly the opposite conclusion.  In either event, Patriotism need not lead to nationalism, 
need not even imply sympathy with it, and this is the intellectual and political space where a 
careful reading of Burke’s early critical and journalistic writings places him most 
realistically.     
This is not to say that Burke was a devoted follower of Cox’s any more than it 
assumes his total rejection of Lucas’s revisionism.  But the controversy between Cox and 
Lucas does thicken and consolidate the Patriot context of Burke’s credentials as he prepared 
to travel to London.  An affinity with Cox’s critique of Lucas’s program would also 
accommodate Burke’s possible alliance with Hiffernan, and it certainly conforms to what we 
know of his adherence to Rockinghamite constitutional thinking later in his life.128  At the 
same time, it is fully in tune with Burke’s evident anxiety to preserve the discourse of the 
gentleman in the public sphere against the encroachments of “dullness” or social disorder.  It 
does not require the repressed presence of crypto-Catholic or anti-colonialist sympathies, but 
creates space for a more authentic understanding of a vibrant, principled and partly 
generational division within the Irish Patriot tradition itself, played out in the minute book of 
the Club, in Punch’s Petition, and in the pages of The Reformer, distinct from and 
antagonistic both to Lucas’s constitutional nationalism and to Catholic revanchism.     
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As events turned out, Burke and those who thought like him were to become 
frustrated by the disappointments of the 1750s (disappointments paralleled in the relationship 
with the American colonies during the next decade).  The money bill crisis and a downturn in 
the economy fueled the growth of the Catholic League, led by men such as O’Conor and 
Curry, and more extreme forms of Protestant separatism.  In the early 1760s, the “Whiteboy” 
rural disturbances exposed the lost opportunities for constitutional reform and formed the 
background to Burke’s bitter “Tracts on the Popery Laws,” which were never published 
while he was alive.  Around the time that he was working on these notes, and now employed 
in Ireland under William Gerard Hamilton, chief secretary to the lord lieutenant Lord 
Halifax, Burke wrote to his friend Charles O’Hara, a member of the Irish parliament:  “I own 
I am somewhat out of humour with patriotism; and can think but meanly of such Publick 
spirit, as like the fanatical spirit, banishes common Sense; I do not understand that Spirit, 
which could raise such hackneyed pretenses, and such contemptible Talents, as those of Dr 
Lucas to so great consideration, not only among the mob, but, as I hear on all hands, among 
very many of rank and figure.”129   
But these disappointments lay in the future.  The evidence suggests that when he left 
Dublin in 1750, Burke did so believing that the union of crowns, administered by Patriot 
gentlemen, held the best hope for releasing the potential of an Hibernian public spirit that 
could reconcile the country’s fractured religious and ethnic past.130   
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VI:  Selling Irishness 
 
On October 6, 1759, Burke’s roommate at Trinity, William Dennis, now an ordained 
minister in the Church of Ireland, wrote to his old friend Richard Shackleton: “So long is it 
since I have heard from the triumvirate, I have most valued these fifteen years.  Ned [Burke], 
like a Colossus, strides above us wrapped in his own sublimity he cannot look down on his 
humble friends.  Brennan [sic] has strayed to London, and is lost amid the crowd of new wits 
and new faces and forgets those who valued him most; and you enveloped in shades, worried 
with teaching sense to the thoughtless, and morals to the truant, retain no sense of that strong 
moral tie friendship.  Though the youthful vanity of writing first connected us, yet something 
more than vanity I hope keeps alive the remembrance of each other—Idem velle ac idem 
nolle is true of our devotion to virtue and learning.”131  Beneath the banter, it is hard to miss 
the accusation of treachery in these words.  The schoolteacher and the clergyman remain to 
plough their Patriot duty, while the poet and the playwright seek their own fortunes in 
Babylon.  Here, surely, we also glimpse a residual trace of the personal dynamics that were 
once at work in the Club, and in the Reformer project, with Dennis stoking a fire that could 
always illuminate the higher purpose that lay beyond “the youthful vanity of writing.” 
For Burke, Dennis’s reproach might have been harsh, but it is true that his move to 
London signified nothing new either in his goals or in the style through which he attempted 
to achieve them.  Compared to his friends, there was less in the particularity of his homeland 
that fashioned his identity because he saw that identity in broader terms.  “In vain we fly 
from place to place to find,” he wrote in 1751, “What not in place consists, but in the 
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mind.”132  Our approach to Burke’s early life through the recovery of the complexities and 
practicalities of the concept of “Patriotism,” and its cosmopolitan and socially orderly 
significance, helps us to understand how these sentiments reconcile Burke’s attachment to 
the trials of his native land and family with his regenerative sense of optimism for the 
benefits of British rule in Ireland as he moved to London.  And it helps us to understand that 
Burke’s own Irish identity was in as many ways an advantage as a hindrance to his career 
once he had arrived there. 
Burke did, of course, experience obstacles arising from his Irish background, but all 
those occasions of which we have a record date from his political career, and, ironically, are 
likely to have been stirred by his speedy promotion into the confidences of the powerful 
Marquis of Rockingham.133  The sparse evidence of the years 1750-56 show him to have 
been able to utilize a network of Irish contacts from Bath to London, including Nagles from 
his mother’s side of the family, and, buttressed against penury by his father’s money and his 
position at the Middle Temple (with its own lineage of Irish students), he would have found 
time and contacts enough to wind himself into writing short pieces for a supplementary 
income.134  In this, his Irish perspectives would have proved attractive, both politically, with 
the eruption in the early 1750s of sensitive issues over the disposal of an Irish budgetary 
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surplus in 1753 and the debate over the raising of Irish Catholic regiments to fight in 
Portugal, and culturally, given the continued high level of interaction between the theaters of 
Dublin and London.135  When we add to this scenario the general evidence of a more benign 
stereotype of the Irishman in English society sketched by Joep Leerssen, and the considerable 
cultural, economic, and intellectual links between southern Ireland and Bordeaux, and then 
add to it all Burke’s own family associations with Edmund Spenser and the ruins of 
Kilcolman castle in the Blackwater Valley of County Cork, we can see how Burke would 
have offered just the mix of native talent, cosmopolitan aspirations, and personal interest to 
suit the business of Tully’s Head.136   
As we have noted above, we do not know how Burke came to the attention of Robert 
Dodsley.  We can, however, discover important clues from the professional patronage 
networks that were available to him as an Irishman.  He was, indeed, writing pamphlets for 
John Perceval, 2nd earl of Egmont, by 1758, and the association may well have gone back 
several years.137  Egmont (1711-1770), as we have seen, was a prominent landowner in 
County Cork, and he had been highly influential in the opposition politics of Leicester House 
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from 1749 until the death of the Prince of Wales two years later.  His Faction Detected, by 
the Evidence of Facts, published in 1743, was an intricate attempt to trace the distinction 
between faction and opposition in the shifting circumstances of Walpole’s fall, and his 
growing anger at the betrayal of the Patriot cause imputed to the Pelhams was articulated 
most strongly in An Examination of the Principles, and an Enquiry into the Conduct, of the 
Two Brothers; in Regard to the Establishment of their Power, and their Prosecution of the 
War, until the Signing of the Preliminaries (1749). The same year, on a visit to Ireland, 
Egmont was feted in the pages of Lucas’s Censor as “our illustrious Countryman who has so 
long eminently distinguished himself by his Love of his Country and his general patriot 
Spirit, in the British parliament, as to endear him to all the good Subjects of this 
Kingdom…”138  Given that Egmont was much more closely associated with Sir Richard Cox, 
this passage reinforces Egmont’s status as an ideal of the commercially- and agriculturally-
progressive, Patriot landowner, who fearlessly and independently worked his influence both 
sides of the Irish Sea.  It was an ideal that was to appear late in Burke’s rather awkward 
defense of Irish absentee landlordism, issued on behalf of his patron, Charles Watson-
Wentworth, 2nd Marquis of Rockingham and the greatest absentee landlord of the age. 
As far as his value to Dodsley was concerned, perhaps we can get closest to this by 
striking a contrast with the trajectory of another Patriot writer who, for a while, was an 
important figure in the Tully’s Head lists.  Henry Brooke, like Burke, was an Irish-born 
lawyer and writer, though from a generation earlier.  Having studied for a while under 
Thomas Sheridan Sr., and graduated from Trinity College, Dublin, Brooke entered the 
Middle Temple, after which he shuttled between London and Dublin, and between a legal 
and literary career, until he broke into the limelight in 1738 with Dodsley’s publication of his 
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translation of the first book of Tasso’s Gerusalemme Liberata.139  The following year, 
Brook’s status among Patriots was consolidated when his play Gustavus Vasa was banned by 
the Lord Chamberlain for its perceived anti-government invective.  This work, also published 
by Tully’s Head, was staged successfully in Dublin five years later by Sheridan under the 
title The Patriot.  But his later play, Jack the Giant Queller, did not fare so well.  It was 
banned by the authorities there in 1749, leading Charles Lucas, for whom Brooke was 
working at the time, to rail against this “late unprecedented and unaccountable Violence 
offered the Stage” in Dublin.140  Brooke, who had wisely returned to his native land in 1739, 
became a strong supporter of Lucas’s, and Helen Burke, labeling him “Lucas’s chief 
propagandist,” presents him as illustrative of the religious intolerance of the Irish Patriots.141  
Brooke had, indeed, lent his hand to his native country by warning Protestants in his 
Farmer’s Letters to the Protestants of Ireland (1745) of the potential for Catholic risings in 
1745 and 1746, a stance confirmed in his later Spirit of Party (1754); but by this time his 
rhetoric appears to have become strained, disproportionate to the realities of the Catholic 
threat, and he turned his attention to research into ancient Irish history and to novel writing 
until his death in 1783.  After Gustavus Vasa, he had nothing more published through Tully’s 
Head, except a prologue to Edward Moore’s The Foundling (a play that was heavily 
criticized in The Reformer when it appeared at Smock Alley).  If James Prior is correct, then, 
in stating that Burke had written pamphlets against Henry Brooke, under the pseudonym 
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“Diabetes,” there is something almost symbolic about Burke’s appearance at Tully’s Head.  
As Henry Brooke had been Dodsley’s Irishman in 1739, the development of Patriot thought 
on both sides of the Irish Sea shows us how fittingly Burke could take his place a generation 
later.142  The following chapter will show how Dodsley was particularly attracted by the 
revised Patriot history that Burke forged in Dublin, and how it could be incorporated 
profitably into the critical rhetoric of the mid-century Patriot at Tully’s Head. 
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Correspondence, 1:363.  I am inclined to doubt the authenticity of this letter, which has come down to us only 
second-hand—see Edmund Burke, The Beauties of the Late Right Hon. Edmund Burke 2 vols. (London, 1798), 
1:vii-x. 
Chapter 4:  Burke’s History 
Nunc demum redit animus.1  
 
I:  Dodsley’s Historian. 
 
In 1757, following the success of the Vindication of Natural Society, Robert Dodsley 
published Burke’s tract on aesthetics A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful.  While the Philosophical Enquiry has become the second most 
studied of Burke’s writings, it is not so well known that in the same year Dosley also 
contracted with Burke to produce a multi-volume abridgment of English history from ancient 
times to the reign of Queen Anne.  He proposed publication by Christmas of 1758 and a 
generous payment of three hundred pounds by installment.2  Quite possibly, Dodsley’s 
confidence in the young Irish immigrant was also influenced by the appearance of another 
work, An Account of the European Settlements in America (1757).  This was a two-volume 
history of the colonization of the American continents by the European powers that ranged 
from the voyage of Columbus, through the conquests of the Spanish, Portuguese, French, 
Dutch, Danish, and English, to the settlements of Georgia and Nova Scotia.  Internal and 
external evidence suggest that this work was largely written by Burke’s kinsman William 
Burke, and it has never appeared in the corpus of Edmund Burke’s works; but F.P. Lock has 
                                                 
1
 Tacitus, Agricola, 3.1.  “Now, at last, our spirit is returning.” 
 
2
 The contract is dated February 25, 1757.  For the full terms, see Tierney, Correspondence of Robert 
Dodsley, 510. 
  210 
argued persuasively that Edmund’s involvement was significant.3  In any event, we have seen 
that Burke’s interest in history was serious and deep, both in Dublin, with his criticism of 
existing accounts of Irish history and their political application by Irish Patriots such as 
Charles Lucas, and in London through his satirical use of Bolingbroke’s Letters on the Study 
and Use of History to expose the methodological limitations of philosophical skepticism in 
historical writing.  Seen against this background, Dodsley’s plans for the “Abridgment” and 
his concurrent intention to hire Burke to write an annual historical essay for his new 
journalistic enterprise, the Annual Register, suggest that the bookseller was setting up his 
Irish protégé as something of an “in house” historian.   
As things turned out, Burke’s historical career was promising but short.  He 
completed around 90,000 words, or 300 pages, of the “Abridgment” before he finally laid 
down the project, probably by the end of 1762.  In three books, he had covered the conquests 
of the Romans, Saxons, and Normans, incorporating informative digressions on such topics 
as the customs of the ancient Britons, Saxon and feudal law, monasticism, and the Crusades, 
and closing with the death of King John in 1216.  No part of this work was published in 
Burke’s lifetime, although six sheets, headed “An Essay towards an Abridgment of the 
English History,” were run off in 1760 by Dodsley’s printer John Hughs, who set a further 
nine sheets.4  The whole text first appeared in the fifth volume of The Works of the Right 
Honourable Edmund Burke (1812), edited by Walker King and French Laurence.5  
Intriguingly, it was accompanied by a number of other examples of Burke’s eclectic 
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 Lock, Edmund Burke, 1:127.  From the evidence of Dodsley’s copybook we can see that payments 
for the publication were drawn by both William and Edmund. 
 
4
 Burke, Correspondence, 1:164n1. Copies were discovered among the papers of Robert Dodsley. 
   
5
 William B. Todd, A Bibliography of Edmund Burke (Godalming: St Paul’s Bibliographies, 1982), 42 
and Plate 1, 240-41. 
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historical interests.  There is, first, a much shorter piece entitled “Fragment: An Essay 
towards an History of the Laws of England.”  Probably written around 1757, it is unclear 
whether this was intended for incorporation into the “Abridgment” at some stage or as a 
synopsis for a separate work.  It is more overtly polemical in style than the “Abridgment,” 
challenging the conventional teaching of legal studies in Britain at the time for their narrow 
and unhistorical conception of the uniformity of the English common-law tradition.  Another 
incomplete draft included in the Works, entitled “Hints for an Essay on the Drama,” has been 
mentioned in the previous chapter in connection with Burke’s campaign against Thomas 
Sheridan in support of his friend Beaumont Brenan’s play “The Lawsuit.”  Since it can be 
dated internally to around 1761, it provides evidence of Burke’s enduring interest in the 
theater and, perhaps, of the subsequent influence upon him of Dodsley, Warburton, and 
Thomas Warton, who had all been working on literary and dramatical histories in the 1740s 
and 1750s.6   
There is one more project from Burke’s pen that could, in a number of respects, count 
as an historical work: the so-called “Tracts relative to the Laws against Popery in Ireland.”  
Drafted around 1764, this uneven survey of the content, intentions, and effects of the popery 
laws extends to more than 16,000 words.  It contains an angry critique of the laws in all their 
aspects and was shaped both by Burke’s irritation at the historical propaganda that supported 
the Protestant power structure in Ireland and by his first-hand experiences of parliamentary 
politics in Dublin during the sessions of 1760-1 and 1762-63, when he was employed as 
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 Warburton produced historical essays on chivalric romance, mystery and morality plays, and fiction 
in the 1740s; Dodsley’s draft history of drama has been mentioned above, p.76; Thomas Warton began work 
upon a history of English poetry as soon as his Observations on the Faerie Queene had been published, in 1754, 
although the work was not completed until 1774.  Dodsley’s former neighbor, and Thomas Sheridan’s assistant 
manager at Smock Alley, Benjamin Victor, published The History of the Theatres of London and Dublin in 
1761.  
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private secretary to the British politician William Gerard Hamilton in the office of the lord 
lieutenant’s secretary.7  Michel Fuchs speculates that Burke was contemplating writing his 
own history of Ireland at this time, a project that would have diverted him from completing 
the “Abridgment,” but that he gave it up for reasons of political discretion, or lack of time, or 
because he was daunted by the emotional burden it would have placed upon him.  All we 
know for sure, from his private correspondence, is that Burke became increasingly 
overwhelmed by the requirements of his secretarial post in the early 1760s, and all the more 
so when Hamilton was promoted to the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer of Ireland in 
1763.  Indeed, conflicting literary and political demands finally brought about an 
acrimonious break between Burke and Hamilton two years later.  By that time, however, the 
second furor historicus appears to have cooled, since Burke promptly entered employment as 
private secretary to Thomas Watson Wentworth, 2nd Marquis of Rockingham, a move that 
effectively ended any academic historical aspirations he may still have harbored. 
This chapter will examine Burke’s historical writings for what they tell us about their 
author’s understanding of the role of history as a vehicle of public criticism and moral and 
civic education.  In so doing, it will focus particularly on the “Abridgment,” since that is the 
most substantial of the historical texts that we can attribute entirely to Edmund Burke; but the 
analysis will be supported at various points with references to the other material mentioned 
above.  Through a brief survey of how these early writings have been evaluated in the past in 
relation to Burke’s wider thought, I intend to show how potentially valuable avenues of 
investigation have been underutilized owing to a narrow and weakly-contextualized concern 
for using Burke’s historical thought to supplement interpretations of his later 
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 These experiences are well and fully described in Louis Cullen, “Burke, Ireland, and Revolution,” 
Eighteenth-Century Life 16 (1992), 21-42.  For Cullen’s dating of the “Tracts,” see p. 39. 
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antirevolutionary beliefs or the hidden tensions of his Irish identity.  Instead, we need to read 
his history less through the lens of his Reflections or of his evidently disappointed hopes for 
his native land, and more in the immediate context of his Tully’s Head associations.  This can 
be done structurally, as a product designed to exploit perceived trends in the reading market, 
stylistically, as an experiment in historical criticism designed to provide an authoritative 
medium for educating gentlemen in their civic duty, and conceptually, as a means of making 
plain the true foundations of “natural” order in “artificial” society.  Understood on each of 
these levels, the “Abridgment” emerges as an historiographical achievement in itself, an 
essay in a revised Patriot history that provides a sophisticated, imaginative, and distinctive 
survey of the lineage of “liberty” in England.  It also appears in Burke’s own bibliography as 
a close continuation of the satirical message of the Vindication by other means.  In an 
astutely modulated rhetorical setting, it offers an historical narrative to engage, arouse, and 
educate its audience while exposing alternative histories that offer only a critical ignis fatuus, 
or a system of analysis that creates division where it claims disinterest and disorder where it 
professes to reveal true order.8   
This comparison within Burke’s early historical writings is long overdue.  Indeed, 
these texts received surprisingly little scholarly treatment for some one hundred years after 
they first appeared in print.  Uncertainties about the extent of Burke’s authorship may explain 
the neglect of the Account of the European Settlements, and the “Tracts” was problematic for 
the sheer vehemence of its critique of British governmental policy in Ireland.  As for the 
“Abridgment” itself, by the time it saw the light of day, in the early nineteenth century, it 
                                                 
8
 This goal, which is a key aspect of the Vindication, as we have seen, is well summed up in the 
following from The Reformer’s “AE”: “The false Spirit [ignis fatuus] is like an undisciplined Army, its first 
Attack is furious, in which if it fails it is of no further Use; but the true like a well trained one, wins by 
Constancy, Regularity, and continued Heat.” Burke, Writings and Speeches, 1:121. 
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appeared a pale and outdated shadow of the substantial “philosophical” histories of Hume, 
Gibbon, and Robertson.  On a superficial reading, many of its ingredients were familiar, even 
formulaic.  There were strong echoes of Montesquieu in the attention Burke had given to 
climate, geography, and manners, while the sources upon which the narrative drew—Caesar, 
Tacitus, Bede, and Matthew Paris, for example—were the accepted fare of eighteenth-
century works such as the histories of Rapin de Thoyras and Tobias Smollett.  As late as 
1943, the historian G.M. Young felt justified in dismissing the “Abridgment” as essentially a 
French translation, too derivative to be remarkable.9  Those features of the work that will 
emerge from this account as distinctive and worthy of examination, such as the incorporation 
of providence within the narrative, the rehabilitation of religious institutions in the growth of 
civilized societies, and the deliberate fracturing of any organic or systematic pattern of social 
and political development, were hardly going to register with historians preoccupied by the 
Enlightenment as a secularizing and systematizing process of interdisciplinary analysis.10      
 The fact that the “Abridgment” was sacrificed to Burke’s political ambitions has also 
encouraged commentators to consider it only insofar as it is thought to prefigure later 
political positions.11  Even then, it is mined for passages that support historical observations 
scattered throughout Burke’s more famous texts, rather than as a product in itself.  Not 
surprisingly, then, when Burke’s historical thought did start to attract serious attention, 
during the Cold War, it was as part of the debate over the ideological uses of Burke’s 
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 G.M. Young, “Edmund Burke,” Procedings of the British Academy XXIX (1943), 6. 
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 See Johnson Kent Wright, “Historical Thought in the Era of the Enlightenment” in A Companion to 
Western Historical Thought, ed. Lloyd Kramer and Sarah Maza (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002). 
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 For Burke’s move to politics and its relationship to the ending of his historical and literary projects, 
see Thomas W. Copeland, Our Eminent Friend Edmund Burke:  Six Essays (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1949), esp. chapter 2, and Walter D. Love, “Burke’s Translation from a Literary to a Political Career,” 
The Burke Newsletter 6, no. 2, 376-390.  It may also be significant that Robert Dodsley died in 1764. 
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antirevolutionary works.  John C. Weston published the first extended study of Burke’s 
history in the early 1960s.  In his pioneering article he looks to the “Abridgment” to explain 
the problem of how Burke could reconcile his belief in the organic constitutional progress 
that had been perfected in the Glorious Revolution with the phenomenon of the French 
Revolution.  Weston finds the answer in Burke’s particular sense of providence and free-will 
as they are revealed in his view of history.12  According to Weston, Burke’s history teaches 
us that man is happiest when he realizes that society is a providential gift of God, ultimately 
unfathomable, and humbles himself accordingly by revering the past and displaying an 
accompanying skepticism toward utopian projects of improvement.13  Through prudent 
statesmanship of this kind, an ordered liberty could take root in constitutional agreements 
across the medieval and modern periods, reaching a state of perfection in the settlement of 
1688-89; but its continued security is heavily dependent on the perpetuation of that historical 
sense of religious awe.  By this interpretation, Weston shows the survival and growth of 
liberty to be contingent, in Burke’s mind, upon moral leadership in a way that usefully 
undermines assumptions that Burke’s political views were essentially organic and proto-
Romantic.  But his insights also depend upon fitting together Burke’s historical utterances 
across forty years of political life with little attention to intent, rather than first distinguishing 
Burke’s idea of history from his use of historical material.   As a result of this, and perhaps 
also of Weston’s training in political science, Burke’s view of history is given a false 
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 John C. Weston, Jr., “Edmund Burke’s View of History,” Review of Politics 23, no. 2 (April 1961), 
203-229. 
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 Weston might have noted in defense of his argument Burke’s notes on “Philosophy and Learning”:  
“Whatever tends to humble us, tends to make us wiser.  Whatever makes us wiser, makes us better, and easier, 
and happier.” A Note-Book of Edmund Burke, 85.  There are many instances of Burke linking such humility 
with reflection on the tragedies and triumphs of history, or “the rise and fall of kingdoms…” (ibid.), such as the 
following famous passage: “when kings are hurl’d from their thrones by the Supreme Director of this great 
drama, and become the objects of insult to the base, and of pity to the good, we behold such disasters in the 
moral, as we should behold a miracle in the physical order of things…” (Burke, Reflections, 175).   
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consistency, and a coherence that depends upon the Reflections and later antirevolutionary 
writings.  Furthermore, the formative context of important mid-century debates is lost, and 
Burke’s idea of providence becomes essentially the “negation of ideology” (to use Stuart 
Hughes’s succinct term) rather than something more active in its principle.     
In 1963, Peter Stanlis, in what is still probably the best single-volume anthology of 
Burke’s writings, gave over twenty pages to excerpts from the “Abridgment,” arguing that it 
confirmed Burke’s Christian Aristotelianism: “His veneration of antiquity, his awareness of 
the slow organic growth of institutions and nations and of man’s subordination to moral and 
civil laws, and, above all, his sense of the intricacy and mystery at the core of man’s life on 
earth, flowed from his faith in historical revelation.”14  As in Weston’s case, this is the 
“Abridgment” interpreted through later writings, especially the Reflections, and neither 
commentator attempts to compare the text with other contemporary histories, or relate its 
purpose to an intended audience of its time.  Some progress was made on that front, however, 
by C.P. Courtenay, whose Montesquieu and Burke appeared at the same time as Stanlis’s 
anthology and incorporates both the Account of the European Settlements and the 
“Abridgment” into early-eighteenth-century Anglo-French and Franco-Irish intellectual 
debates on historiography and moral philosophy.15  Courtenay’s work remains important in 
reminding us of the impact of French historical writing on British thought at the time, 
although his references to Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rapin-Thoyras require supplementing 
with more recent work on less familiar figures such as François Hotman and Henri comte de 
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 Edmund Burke, Selected Writings and Speeches.  Edited by Peter J. Stanlis (Washington, D.C.: 
Regnery Gateway, 1963), 65. 
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 C.P. Courtenay, Montesquieu and Burke (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963). 
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Boulainvilliers.16  Courtney’s attention to Burke’s undoubted debt to Montesquieu, however, 
is sufficient to reveal important methodological links between the “Abridgment,” the 
Vindication, and the Annual Register.17  Perhaps even more valuably, it points to divisions 
within the mid-century French République des lettres that emerged with the early writings of 
Rousseau in particular and that may have sharpened Burke’s awareness of the implications of 
the debate with British free-thinkers such as John Toland and, later, David Hume.  These 
divisions have been explored very ably in the works of Mark Hulliung and Dena Goodman.18   
But Courtenay is also firmly rooted in the post-war “History of Ideas” tradition that is 
too uncritical of the familiar Francocentric narrative of the Enlightenment. His understanding 
of Burke’s own relationship with French thought is, therefore, restricted by a failure to 
incorporate the influence of British and Irish writers, most significantly Shaftesbury and 
Toland himself, upon French thinkers in the early years of the century.19  That weakness also 
turns the book’s greatest strength into one of its characteristic flaws: in heaping too much 
weight upon the one intellectual link between Burke and Montesquieu, it neglects the 
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formative nature of the physical and personal circumstances through which that influence 
was mediated.  
 With the end of the Cold War, and in line with the reorientation of Burke scholarship 
outlined in the Introduction above, Burke’s historical thought has received fresh 
consideration, although the Reflections and Burke’s later writings on Empire have remained 
tenacious filters for any reinterpretation.  James Conniff, for example, in The Useful Cobbler: 
Edmund Burke and the Politics of Progress (1994), has updated Weston’s enquiry by 
considering how Burke could reconcile his evident belief in a just or benign providence with 
his horror at, and implacable opposition to, the unfolding revolution in France.  Also 
concerned to expose hubris in the New Conservative critique of Communism, Conniff sees 
the key to Burke’s dilemma in the progressive constitutionalism that he finds in the 
“Abridgment.”  Burke’s “accomplishment was to recognize that the past could be a guide to 
the future, and, therefore, need not be set in opposition to it.”  As a “theorist and practitioner 
of representative government,” he understood that parliament could act as an appropriate rein 
on the inevitable dynamics of change in the state to the degree that it balanced interest-based 
party politics with a conflict-resolution model of government.  Conniff concludes that Burke 
found this balance in the Revolution Settlement, believed it was being defended by the 
American revolutionaries, but felt that the philosophes and revolutionaries in France were 
ignoring it, with fatal consequences, in their own haste to assume the reins of providence.20  
While Conniff’s eye is firmly set on Burke’s final years, his analysis would certainly help to 
explain Burke’s lack of sympathy with Bolingbroke’s atavistic and Polybian strain of cyclical 
history; but the “Whig progressive” label also places him closer to the systematic thought of 
the Scottish Enlightenment than the religious and rhetorical aspects of his providential 
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narrative allow.  In part, Conniff is simply reflecting the tenacious desire among many Burke 
scholars to secularize the religious aspects of Burke’s thought in line with assumptions about 
the early Republic of Letters; but the consequent flattening of Burke’s historical imagination 
is also related to the selective and over-literary contextualization of that work:  Conniff (a 
political scientist like Weston) persistently translates the language of the “Abridgment” 
“second-hand,” as it were, through a welter of quotations pulled from works that were shaped 
in circumstances quite different from those that surrounded Burke in the 1750s. 
 If Conniff’s Burke—liberal, progressive, optimistic—is an historian for the New 
World Order of the 1990s, Michel Fuchs and Thomas McLoughlin present a more 
parochially grounded and pessimistic historian, who employs history to launch a veiled 
challenge to the injustices of colonial rule in his native Ireland.  The salient arguments of 
Fuchs’s work have been discussed above, and the “Abridgment” is easily fitted into Fuchs’s 
thesis of repressed colonial identity.  It is Fuchs who suggests that Burke may have 
abandoned the “Abridgment” through disappointment at the failure of his historical 
researches to provide a clear solution to the problems of Ireland.  Noting with characteristic 
perception that Burke links the emergence of liberty with violent conquest, Fuchs imagines 
his subject silenced by the inescapable truth of the English conquest of Ireland—that, unlike 
the earlier conquest of England and Wales, it had brought few of the civilizing improvements 
that marked the narrative of English history itself.  This Burke is a soul stretched between the 
desire to expose this tragic deformity in Ireland’s colonial history and the professional need 
to hold his counsel, finding some meager consolation only in his later political crusades, 
which served as a sort of vicarious Imperial critique.  Fuchs’s position is similar to that of 
T.O. McLoughlin, whose Contesting Ireland (1997) presents a significant contribution to our 
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understanding of Irish eighteenth-century historiography, with its focus on the mid-century 
debate over the conquest of Henry II and the issuing of Magna Carta in Ireland.  McLoughlin 
dexterously employs his approval of the writings of Charles O’Conor of Balanguere to 
suggest that Burke harbored a hope that Protestant and Catholic could be reconciled through 
an integrated historiography that would blend respect for an ancient Irish civic tradition with 
the existing Protestant narrative of constitutional liberty.  Such aspirations, carried on well 
into his political career, finally came to grief, McLoughlin argues, in the disappointment of 
Thomas Leland’s History of Ireland from the Invasion of Henry II (1773), which Burke had 
hoped would challenge commonplace Protestant legends of the innate treachery of Irish 
Catholics and their priests.21  In treating of the early writings specifically, McLoughlin 
focuses on Burke’s conception of Empire, rather than conquest (a priority that will be 
disputed below) and this emphasis allows him to contrast with later comments on the glories 
of the British Empire the “much more complex and ambiguous attitude to empire and to 
England” that emerge from the wasted years of English colonial rule painted in his treatment 
of Medieval Ireland and in the “Tracts.”  Thus Burke’s unpublished history gives 
posthumous voice to the muted nationalist.  
There is much to be gained from concentrating on the Irish background of Burke’s 
historical writings, and it will be argued below that implicit parallels between the experiences 
of England and Ireland as conquered nations are vital parts of the purpose of the 
“Abridgment.”  Problems arise, however, when one assumes that Burke’s particular 
perspectives on Ireland’s history form not just a part, albeit a significant part, of the 
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unfolding map of mankind, but the key to the map itself.22  McLoughlin, like Fuchs, rightly 
indicates that Burke’s historical obsession was conquest and empire, but since both writers 
see those terms as matters of constitutional and cultural nationalism, they fail to grasp the 
many levels upon which Burke’s narrative is working.  As a result, the cosmopolitan and 
comparative dimensions of Burke’s thinking are subordinated to an overriding national 
identity, and this, as we have argued above, inverts the sense of the Patriotism to which 
Burke was committed.  When he observes that, “Conquest is both the past and present of 
Ireland,” Fuchs is merely stating what was, in Burke’s mind, an historical truism.  The issue, 
rather, was how to embrace that providential and non-moral reality and elevate it into a force 
for social and political improvement—how to balance loss and gain by combining the 
elegiac, awesome features of conquest and settlement into a transformed, cohering public-
spiritedness. 
 In his magisterial biography of Burke, F.P. Lock provides the most extensive 
treatment yet of Burke’s early historical writings.  Particularly useful is his examination of 
the Account of the European Settlements, where he highlights some of the key themes that 
prefigure the “Abridgment” there: the social benefits of organized religion, the economic 
virtues of religious toleration, and political wisdom of an anti-monopolistic commercial 
policy.  Lock points out that, in the Account, the Burkes praise the constitutions of 
Pennsylvania, Maryland and the Carolinas for their toleration, recommend the 
encouragement of colonial trade through promotion of non-competitive staples and small-
scale farming such as indigo and silk, and present the Jesuit commonwealth of Paraguay as 
an epitome of effective colonization in both its good and bad respects.  In line with his later 
                                                 
22
 Burke famously referred to “the Great Map of Mankind” in a letter to William Robertson, 9 June, 
1777.  See Burke, Correspondence, 3: 351.  Less well-known is Warburton’s use earlier of the term the “map of 
man”—see p. 59 above, and Ryley, William Warburton, 53. 
  222 
stress on Montesquieu’s influence in the “Abridgment,” Lock fleshes out the Burkes’ debt to 
the French Jesuit Lafitau’s pioneering anthropological study Moeurs des sauvages 
ameriquains (1724).  Consistent with this Continental orientation, when he turns to the 
“Abridgment” itself, Lock largely passes over Ireland’s contested historiography and offers 
as the focus of Burke’s agenda an alternative via media:  this time one that provides an 
accessible and usable history by moderating the deterministic ambitions of existing universal 
histories without falling into the opposite extreme of antiquarianism.23   
Lock’s intention to place Burke among pioneers of “a new kind of ‘philosophical’ 
history” such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Bolingbroke, emerges as both the strength and 
chief limitation of his textual analysis.  His close association of Burke’s historical thought 
with that of Montesquieu confirms the findings of Courtenay without adding a great deal to 
the picture.24  But, more importantly, it enables him to throw into relief the areas where that 
association fails.  Putting to one side specific disagreements on anthropological 
interpretations such as the origins of the trial by ordeal, the central point is “the question of 
Providence, for which Montesquieu’s material causes left little room.”25  Here Lock has put 
his finger on a crucial divergence that takes us back to the Vindication, where deism and 
free-thinking undermine our appreciation of the natural social order by replacing the 
mysteries of revealed religion with eloquent but empty sophistries.  Burke, it must be 
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stressed, is questioning the abuse of philosophy, not the application of reason, and his 
incorporation of providence in the “Abridgment” is a remarkable corrective aimed at one 
perceived tendency of philosophical history.  Lock is absolutely right to focus his attention 
here, and yet ironically it is precisely by doing so that his own understanding of 
“philosophical” history is exposed as too vague to carry the weight assigned to it.  “For all 
Burke’s critical acumen and sense of anachronism,” he writes, “[Burke] remains firmly 
within the humanist tradition that regarded history as ‘philosophy teaching by examples’.”26  
This is a contentious and unsupported assertion that begs the question, and it is made more 
puzzling by Lock’s own use of another term, Burke’s “moral historiography,” a page later.  
The difficulty here, as with “Patriotism” and “Nationalism,” lies in a confusion of modern 
and contemporary terminology.  In this case, Lock fails to recognize that “philosophy” and 
“philosophical” had become loaded and contested terms within the very environment in 
which Burke was writing, and that providence was central to the debate.27 
It is worth briefly recapitulating the issues at stake here.  The hopes of some thinkers 
was that “natural” philosophy’s rational and experimental methods, pursued to their fullest 
degree, would recover “natural” religion and finally dispel the obscurities of theology or 
Scholastic metaphysics.  These hopes were quickly subjected to skepticism by philosophers 
as well as churchmen who may have been sympathetic to the idea of theologia prisca and its 
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status within the Reformed church tradition, but who feared the new philosophy’s potential 
for irreligion and extreme skepticism.  Many such figures, taking Locke as their authority, 
warned from within the Republic of Letters of the consequences of the substitution by stealth 
of metaphysical for moral arguments.  In a wider epistemological view, they also considered 
the enthusiasm with which some philosophers discarded any evidence that appeared 
paradoxical or contradictory as simply replacing one species of intolerance with another.  
This was, indeed, the thrust of Leibniz’s response to John Toland’s Christianity not 
Mysterious (1695), in which Leibniz argued that the inescapable finitude of the human mind 
requires us to accept the authority of traditional Christian mysteries that cannot be proven 
unambiguously to be “sine ratione.”28  To deny any paradox or revelation simply because it 
is irrational in our terms is not to rediscover natural religion but to butcher religion with the 
tools of philosophy, and to replace sacred mysteries with secular ones.  John Reedy and 
Justin Champion have shown, in excellent studies, how an invasive philosophical rationalism 
impacted both divine and profane history in the latter half of the seventeenth century, in the 
wake of Bayle’s writings.  This is why the question of the nature of the Mosaic dispensation 
became such a battleground in the early decades of the eighteenth century, and we have 
observed later manifestations of that debate in Burke’s Vindication and in Montesquieu’s 
praise of Warburton’s scholarship.29  For critics such as Spence and the Wartons, as we have 
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seen in the first chapter above, this question of the appropriate parameters of philosophical 
method was prefigured in the aesthetic and literary writings of the Elizabethan renaissance.  
Sir Philip Sidney’s orthodox Aristotelian thoughts on the distinct qualities of philosophy and 
history in their subordinate relation to poetry—the ultimate conveyor of truth—provided the 
coordinates for the Tully’s Head circle as it worked to reinforce the distinctive contribution 
of history to the art of criticism, a goal they worked toward not only by challenging the 
encroachments of natural philosophy but by recovering history’s religious and rhetorical 
facets.  Any approach to Burke’s history that overlooks their work will fail to grasp the full 
complexity of Burke’s own relationship with the dominant historical currents of his time, 
particularly “philosophical” history, and underestimate the extent to which his dramatic and 
poetic interests were essential in shaping his historical imagination.30 
Carefully situated between Fuchs and McLoughlin on the one hand, and Lock on the 
other, Seán Donlan’s treatment of Burke’s historical thought shows a shift in the 
interpretative focus to Burke’s own professional training in law.  In a cluster of scholarly 
articles, Donlan has drawn together Burke’s education at the Middle Temple, his reading in 
natural law, and his dissatisfaction with English jurisprudence and legal scholarship to 
explore the central role that Burke gives to manners in his historical analyses.  One helpful 
                                                                                                                                                       
on the Study and Use of History in 1752, “that all who hereafter shall be so weak or so wicked to write against 
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effect of this shift has been to elevate the “Fragment” from an appendage of the 
“Abridgment” to a project in itself, albeit an unfinished one.  Donlan argues that it is here 
that we find the kernel of a natural law approach rooted not in Thomist or neo-Aristotelian 
philosophy, as Stanlis argues, but in the responses of seventeenth-century European theorists 
such as Grotius and Pufendorf to problems of property rights, possession, and international 
law.  Just as these jurists were responding to the dire upheavals of the wars of religion, so 
Burke’s narrative of successive conquests of England, with their waves of usurpation and 
confiscation and disruption of customs and manners, exposes the weakness of arguments that 
situate rights and liberties in an unbroken legal tradition like the much-vaunted English 
common law.31  Such arguments, according to Burke, simply failed to acknowledge the 
complex environment from which positive law took its authority and against which its 
capacity to establish a true natural social order had to be measured.   Since the same could be 
said of constitutional settlements, Burke’s position entirely undermined the arguments of 
Patriots such as Bolingbroke and Lucas about the source of order and liberty in the body 
politic.  Instead, Burke muddies the waters with a concept of prescriptive right that embraces 
providential discontinuities by appealing to equity rather than original right.   
Donlan, like Conniff, sees Burke’s “Abridgment” as almost a precursor of the 
“Scottish ‘philosophical’ and ‘conjectural’ histories” of the 1760s and 1770s, though he 
concedes that it lacks the substructure of distinctive stages of societal development and a 
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stress upon the primacy of commerce.32  Donlan does a serious service to Burke’s history by 
rooting his natural-law perspectives more firmly in the broader context of Irish and Scottish 
intellectual thought, heavily influenced as this was by Shaftesburian and Hutchesonian 
responses to Grotius and Pufendorf.  Not least, he raises Burke’s intentions above the 
immediate concerns of Irish historiography and correctly emphasizing that those intentions 
were “not anti-Imperial or anti-colonial.”33  Similarly, this highlighting of Burke’s stress 
upon manners and customs as the prime validators of law, and therefore of liberty and order, 
enables us to see how Burke could be both a passionate critic of the popery laws and a 
“British patriot” dedicated to the union of the kingdoms of England, Scotland, and Ireland. 
At the same time, though, Donlan’s focus on the legal and natural-law background serves 
Burke’s years at the Middle Temple at the expense of his evident passion for the laws of 
aesthetics and rhetoric as authenticators of the common sense of mankind.  Thinking, 
perhaps, too clearly with the mind of a lawyer himself, Donlan sees rhetoric only in its 
persuasive capacity, and not, as Burke did, as the conveyor of a hidden order under apparent 
disorder.  Providence, about which Donlan has little to say, is not just an invisible hand, but a 
reconciler of reason and imagination, of paradox and order.  Without its divine referents, 
Burke’s understanding of natural law has very little traction. 
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II: Marketing History 
 
The limitations of existing analyses of Burke’s historiography, then, arise largely out 
of a persistent failure to understand his early works in the immediate context of Tully’s Head, 
where the critical tools of Patriotism were being rescued from the secularizing tendencies of 
“free-thinker” philosophers.  This chapter will examine the practical and intellectual ways in 
which Tully’s Head shaped the history Burke wrote as a self-conscious Patriot.   
We might reasonably start such an examination with some of the practical marketing 
issues that bore upon Dodsley’s decision to encourage Burke’s historical muse.  James 
Tierney states that “Dodsley was principally a publisher of poetry,” and Dodsley was, indeed, 
most famous for his Collection of Poems; but the judgment requires some modification, since 
even Tierney’s own evidence suggests that, by the early 1750s, the bookseller had begun to 
look for fresh ways to package moral and critical messages for an ever-expanding market.34  
Before 1750, “poetry” formed the largest category of Tully’s Head titles year by year; but by 
Tierney’s own method of categorization, this was never to be the case thereafter.35  It is true 
that Dodsley brought out a fourth volume of his Collection of Poems in 1755, and added a 
fifth and sixth three years later; but it should be noted that, while sales remained high and the 
critics’ comments were positive, Dodsley chose to subsume the later volumes into complete 
sets, to be purchased along with new editions of the earlier volumes.36  Dodsley also appears 
to have found gathering material for the latter collections increasingly problematic, and relied 
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heavily on the tardy and reclusive William Shenstone for submissions and recommendations.  
In 1747, he refused Young’s price of one hundred guineas for the copyright of the three latest 
books of Night Thoughts, and focused instead on reissuing the earlier ones.  Seven years later 
he turned down Berckenhout’s solid translation of Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock’s Messiah, a 
project that he had himself initiated, only to publish a poor quality prose translation of the 
work ten years later.37  Furthermore, Dodsley had some personal intimations of a shift in 
popular taste.  After the tremendous success of his Oeconomy of Human Nature (1750), he 
worked hard on his own four-part poetic enterprise “Public Virtue”; but the reception of the 
first installment, “Agriculture,” was so disappointing when it came out in 1753 that he 
appears not to have progressed any further.38  He had similar difficulties with his 
Melpomene: or The Regions of Terror and Pity, which was only finally published, with all 
due humility, in the first issue of his own Annual Register.39   
If he sensed that the market for poetry was shrinking, to what types of works did Dodsley 
turn?  It is, perhaps, significant that Dodsley appears not to have thrown much investment 
behind the increasingly popular field of fiction by the time of his death in 1764.  Instead, the 
Tully’s Head publication lists suggest that Dodsley plumped chiefly for moral tracts—short 
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works like his own Oeconomy, collections of republished essays such as Spence’s Moralities, 
articles from The World (1753-56) and The Museum, and a miscellany entitled Fugitive 
Pieces, on Various Subjects (1761), and, of course, eclectic literary collections such as 
Warton’s Virgil (1753).  But Dodsley was also evidently aware of the popularity of history 
among the mid-century readership, where multi-volume narratives had been a staple of the 
book market for some decades, and, with characteristic imagination, he explored the potential 
for combining the edification of moral tracts with the entertainment value of history to 
elevate the latter as a facet of “polite” education.40  Dodsley was not, of course, a pioneer in 
recognizing the moral and civic role history could play within a curriculum designed for the 
modern gentleman;  this had been a central aspect of educational theory at least from the 
sixteenth century, and, as we have observed above, an ingredient in the circles of Elizabethan 
courtiers and men of letters.  Charles Rollin had discussed the pedagogic importance of 
history later in his highly influential Method of Teaching and Studying the Belles Lettres 
(1734), setting a sturdy template that recurs in a string of similar volumes such as James 
Buchanan’s Complete English Scholar (1753).  But Dodsley can be seen to have diverged 
from that template in interesting directions.  His own pedagogic manual, the Preceptor 
(1748), stresses that any historical method designed for rising gentlemen must not only 
instruct and delight but engage the passions in the cause of benevolence.41  In other words, 
history must aspire to the poetic universal even as it is tethered to the particularities of human 
events, since only then can it truly uncover, and make us love, the natural order that lies 
                                                 
40
 Dodsley published through Tully’s Head a number of editions of Voltaire’s Siècle de Louis XIV, in 
the original and in English translation in the early 1750s. 
 
41
 Horace famously wrote that the highest goal of verse was docere, delectare, movere.  For the 
original quotation, see Ars Poetica, ll. 333-34.  The aspiration was not for history to challenge poetry, but to 
bring it closer to the poetic ideal. 
  231 
beneath narratives of apparent disorder.  This education of the imagination required a history 
authorized not only by scientific standards of evaluation, but through the force of honest 
rhetoric.   
In the fourth section of the Preceptor, “Chronology and History,” an imaginary 
governor introduces his pupil to “that Study, which above all others conduceth to make a 
Man knowing, prudent, and virtuous.”  As the benefits of the study of history are unfolded, it 
becomes evident that Dionysius Halicarnassus’s famous dictum that history is “philosophy 
teaching by examples” is seen to be insufficient, in itself, to satisfy the aspirations of the 
historian.  Instead, we are presented with a much more ambitious and encompassing view of 
history as a “Representation of Mankind, in all the various Circumstances and Conditions of 
Life,” incorporating not just the ideals of civic virtue, and the corresponding “Detestation of 
Vice” in talents misapplied, but the delight in imagining oneself “an Eye-witness to the 
astonishing Changes and Revolutions” by which “we become instructed in the several 
Windings and Labyrinths of the Human Heart, and may be said to enter into the Commerce 
of the World, before we meddle with the Business and Transactions of it.”42  History, in this 
view, is not just informative and admonitory, but imaginative and transformative: “By 
pursuing the Records of past Ages, we carry ourselves back to the first Original of things, 
and enter upon a new Kind of Existence.”  While the result of this transformation might 
strike us as unexceptional, it actually entails an engagement and openness to the contours of 
social duty that distinguishes it both from the Stoical Jeremiads of the Craftsman and the 
propaganda of Walpole’s courtiers.  The mind of the gentleman, “rightly constituted,” is “not 
intoxicated with Prosperity; but still looking forward, and foreseeing the Possibility of a 
Change, disposes itself to submit without Murmuring or Regret.”  The lessons of history are 
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designed to educate the reader in a Patriotic duty in which the free will is tempered by 
humility before the unfathomable dispensation of providence, the only way by which public 
spirit and public order can be reconciled in the common good.  Without that humility, there is 
little to prevent Patriotism itself becoming just one more esoteric system competing cynically 
for control over a humanity reduced to little more than machines in an historical narrative of 
ignorance and exploitation.  It was this flat, mechanical view of mankind that, as 
commentators such as Bullitt and Mahoney have pointed out, Swift worked up in his satire; 
and it was that same flat, mechanical view of mankind that some commentators suspected 
had infected Pope’s Essay on Man through the influence of Bolingbroke.  In the context of 
Tully’s Head’s Popeian legacy, then, history offered a fresh way of articulating the ideas that 
Pope was thought to, or should, have been fashioning in his Moral Essays and, later, in his 
“Brutus” project—that is, prying open the true, conflicted state of man and allowing us to 
glimpse within him the artificial and the natural working in a symbiotic, not an antagonistic, 
relationship.     
This revised Patriotism necessitated changes in the structure, style, and methodology 
of historical writing.  Structurally, while the great historical narratives, from Rapin to 
Voltaire, sold well, multi-volume histories could also place a serious initial financial burden 
on their publishers.  James Rivington made an excellent £20,000 out of the publication of the 
first volume of Tobias Smollett’s Complete History of England in 1756—but it had cost him 
£32,000 to produce!  John Knapton fell into bankruptcy in 1755 partly owing to the expense 
of publishing Rapin’s History of England.43  The growth of the journal market, however, 
which accelerated from 1730, offered an opportunity to provide history in a more accessible 
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form, and, incidentally, to exploit the crossover between history and current affairs, since the 
former was not subject to stamp tax.  Quick to sense the opportunity, Dodsley ran in The 
Museum (1746-47) a series of historical essays by John Campbell which were later published 
in one collection as The Present State of Europe.44  In addition, the “Succinct History of the 
Rebellion” that ran in The Museum during the Pretender’s rebellion was reissued under one 
cover the year after the journal closed.45  These were smart money earners in themselves; but 
Tierney also sees Dodsley’s integration of news and history as a weapon in his fight with 
Cave’s formidable Gentleman’s Magazine, and argues that, through The Museum, readers 
“could not only enjoy passing entertainment but also gain comprehensive and integrated 
views of contemporary domestic and foreign affairs, a service for which there had been no 
precedent in periodical literature.”46  Later, Dodsley was to employ a similar maneuver in the 
Annual Register (1758- ).  Here, Burke was to compose and compile an annual “History of 
the Present War” and a separate “Chronicle” of significant events that blurred the distinction 
between history and current affairs.47  This more flexible structure was carried over to some 
degree in Burke’s “Abridgment,” where a brisk narrative, largely lacking footnotes, was 
accessibly subdivided, and interspersed with detailed diversions on topographical, legal, and 
cultural matters.  Indeed, there is a need for more investigation into the ways in which 
Dodsley and Burke could be said to have helped redefine the whole idea of an “abridgment” 
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since, earlier in the century, this form of historical writing was largely a fleshing out of 
chronology with passages from Classical and medieval works, a vehicle of instruction and 
reference rather than reflection.48   
Structural adaptations such as these required corresponding developments in style, of 
which Burke’s “Abridgment” offers some interesting illustrations.  In the first place, the goal 
of carrying the reader into the “windings and labyrinths of the human heart” lent itself to a 
rhetoric that closely mirrored the ideal theater of the Reformer: energizing the narrative in a 
way that avoided partisan identifications, engaging the passions while retaining an apparent 
objectivity, avoiding flights of sensational description, and reuniting the “sacred” and 
“profane” in historical interpretation.  We do, indeed, find Burke skillfully modulating his 
rhetoric, winding himself into carefully selected dramas with the deliberation and eye to 
detail of an accomplished set designer, then accelerating into clipped Tacitean summaries 
that, in their perfect poise, refuse to close accounts with the dramatis personae, but leave the 
audience suspended in sympathetic indecision.  The chapter dealing with the reign of Henry 
II, for instance, commences with a brisk survey of the royal lands and dynastic diplomacy 
before gliding into an extended treatment of two defining episodes, the Becket controversy 
and the invasion of Ireland.  Each of these provides a sub-narrative that broadens the context 
of the reign and ensures that, when we are called to play the part of critic, “we may…not,” in 
Burke’s own words, “judge, as some have inconsiderately done, of the affairs of those times 
by ideas taken from the present manners and opinions.”  Returning us then to the personal 
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treachery that divided Henry’s family at the end, Burke closes with the striking image of the 
king’s abandoned corpse, stripped and laid in an empty church, “affording a just consolation 
for the obscurity of a mean fortune, and an instructive lesson how little an outward greatness 
and enjoyments foreign to the mind contribute towards a solid felicity, in the example of one, 
who was the greatest of kings and the unhappiest of mankind.”49  With such accomplished 
literary skills, Burke’s achievement was to compose a conceptual as well as a factual 
abridgment for public consumption. 
At another level, we find in the “Abridgment” a sharp contrast to the lofty intimacy of 
Bolingbroke’s historical style.  While the noble lord passes his esoteric lessons in statecraft 
on to his acolyte through the faux-intimacy of private letters made public, Burke, studiously 
committed to transcending faction in the recovery of true public-spiritedness, is fishing in 
other waters.  He is searching out the gentleman who frequents the theater of taste, who 
aspires to the honors of a true public servant, and who wishes to obtain not an initiation into 
some corpus of coded knowledge but a heightened sense of his duties as they arise out of his 
social position, which he believes to have been set providentially by the Creator’s 
dispensation for man’s conflicted nature.  Burke establishes his authority with this audience 
through a studied objectivity.  He seats himself alongside his audience conveying a judicious 
balance of physical and moral determinism, reason and providence, and a deliberate humility 
in the face of the paradoxes and apparent contradictions that history presents.  After 
describing graphically the scale of depredation brought about by the barbarian invaders of 
Roman Britain, Burke muses:  “We are almost driven out of the circle of political enquiry: 
we are in a manner compelled to acknowledge the hand of God in those immense 
revolutions, by which, at certain periods, he so signally asserts his supreme dominion, and 
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brings about that great system of change, which is perhaps as necessary to the moral as it is 
found to be in the natural world.”  It is a far cry from the Vindication’s rationalizing of the 
massacres of the ignorant armies thrown up by artificial society, and it shows how Burke’s 
rhetorical purpose—as artfully contrived as the other, certainly—is to establish an inclusive 
complicity with his audience that flatters them by nurturing their faculties of imaginative 
self-recognition, rather than their mastery of pure philosophical method.50  And just as the 
Vindication seeks to expose the deficiencies of philosophy’s grasp of the “first Original of 
things,” so the “Abridgment” might be read as an essay in how the imaginative 
internalization of history can forge a more natural and ordered critique of “artificial” society.  
For, in Burke’s world, the dynamics of change do not originate in stem-conspiracies; but our 
understanding is quickened, as it were, by the sheer scale of complexity and conflicted 
workings of human nature—a sort of “historical sublime,” the impact of which is heightened 
by the measured and open way in which the historian, eschewing the meteors of style, forces 
us to confront the fragile and obscure interface between our individual and social natures.       
Burke’s style was underpinned by a methodological framework familiar to the Tully’s 
Head circle of the 1750s.  This included, on a conceptual and philosophical level, an 
adherence to what were perceived as John Locke’s standards of historical evaluation.  These 
incorporated the realm of religious mystery and held the line, as it were, against the more 
skeptical and secularizing positions of writers such as Shaftesbury, Toland and, of course, 
Bolingbroke himself.  More practically, writers such as Thomas Warton and Richard Hurd 
exposed the shallowness and inflexibility of skeptical philosophy by their efforts to fully 
contextualize historical literature and by opening up Spenser’s poetry and the tradition of 
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chivalric romances to wider interpretation as windows upon the social and political history of 
their times.  More contentiously, this method of contextualization was also applied to the 
delicate task of rehabilitating writers who incorporated tales of miracles in their histories.  
William Warburton’s Julian was just such a work, focusing on an examination of the 
evidence for the “providential” destruction of the emperor’s project to rebuild the Temple of 
Jerusalem.  Warburton wrote to Hurd that the thrust of the final section of the book was 
addressed to the question, “What evidence is required, and what is its peculiar nature, that 
will justify a reasonable man in giving credit to a miraculous fact?”51  Such a project, in 
Warburton’s hands, was clearly intended as a riposte to “atheists” like Hume, and a further 
defense of the authenticity of the Mosaic dispensation; but the “Abridgment” indicates that 
Burke appreciated the freedom this technique offered for a sophisticated and nuanced picture 
of medieval religiosity as a social force in his own history.  The historian’s prime job was to 
assess the sincerity of professions of divine intervention in sources by placing them firmly 
against the standards and expectations of their time, and to accept that such sincerity itself 
constitutes, in an active sense, historical truth.  Thus, while Medieval chronicles were, in 
their time, “received with a blind credulity,” he writes, “they have been since rejected with as 
undistinguished a disregard.  But as it is not in my design nor inclination, nor indeed in my 
power, either to establish or refute these stories; it is sufficient to observe, that the reality or 
opinion of such miracles was the principal cause of the early acceptance and rapid progress 
of Christianity in this island.”52   
It might be possible to interpret Burke’s position here as simply a prudent nod to 
religious respectability; but such an interpretation would need to ignore a number of 
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significant points: Burke’s own professions of a belief in a personal God, repeated both 
privately as well as publicly; his consistent assertions of the limited extent of man’s 
understanding as a created being; the fact that defending Medieval monastic chroniclers was 
hardly an article of faith in polite society.  Indeed, Burke pushes rather further in the latter 
area even than most.  Warburton argues in the introduction to  Julian that writers such as 
Bede and Matthew Paris should not have their honesty, discernment and veracity dismissed 
across the board just for giving credence to “every strange tale of Monkish extraction,” since 
this was simply the “general contagion” of the time.53  Burke’s own judgment of Bede, 
couched in that characteristic reassuring detachment, would seem to go further:  “On the 
whole, though this father of the English learning seems to have been but a genius of the 
middle class, neither elevated nor subtil; and one, who wrote in a low style, simple but not 
elegant; yet when we reflect upon the time, in which he lived, the place, in which he spent his 
whole life, within the walls of a monastery, in so remote and wild a country; it is impossible 
to refuse him the praise of an incredible industry and a generous thirst for knowledge.”54 
Far from making the age of Bede or the Medieval monks even more remote from the 
reader, evaluating the literature in its own context was intended, almost paradoxically, to 
strike up identification or sympathy through recurring moral themes and patterns which could 
be detected more sharply the more a text was understood in its social function.  This eliciting 
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of self-recognition through curiosity at difference was a favorite method in Burke’s rhetoric 
throughout his life, and what worked in the field of moral literature also worked in the wider 
field of language and culture.  So, in the “Abridgment,” Burke deepens his audience’s 
understanding of their Britishness, or Patriotism, by leaning at key moments on England’s 
peripheral relationship to the European continent.  His opening chapter, entitled “Causes of 
the Connections between the Romans and Britains,” is a brisk geographical and 
anthropological survey of Europe in which England emerges into focus through a recounting 
of the movements of peoples and the shifts in Imperial diplomacy.  In part, this is a 
recognition of his debt to Montesquieu in its attention to climate and geography:  “Though I 
am satisfied from a comparison of the Celtick tongues with the Greek and Roman, that the 
original inhabitants of Italy and Greece were of the same race with the people of northern 
Europe, yet it is certain, they profited so much by their guarded situation, by the mildness of 
their climate favourable to humanity, and by the foreign infusions, that they came greatly to 
excel the northern nations in every respect, and particularly in the art and discipline of 
war…”55  But it is also—if we dwell a moment on that reference to “foreign infusions”—
designed to soften the particularity of Englishness and to place national shibboleths in their 
correct hybrid and interconnected nature.  This applies chiefly to the Common Law tradition, 
but even in matters of marginal detail Burke concedes priority to others.  Druidism, for 
example, could not have been spread to France from the Celtic tribes of Ireland and England, 
as Caesar supposed, since, “I find it not easy to assign any tolerable cause, why an order of 
so much authority, and a discipline so exact, should have passed from the more barbarous 
people to the more civilized; from the younger to the older; from the colony to the mother 
country.”  By the same token, the reader is educated in the rudiments of British Druidism 
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through a syncretic approach that focuses on its resemblances to “the Jewish priesthood, the 
Persian Magi, and the Indian Brachmans”—and even the Roman priesthood in “the original 
objects or in the general mode of worship, or in the constitution of their hierarchy.”56  Burke 
stays very close to Warburton’s argument here as outlined in the Divine Legation of Moses.57  
It is a position that allows him to make the role of religion in artificial society appear quite 
natural while also undermining the view of writers such as Toland and Hume that uniquely 
terrible aspects of the Druid system meant that it was rightly exterminated by the Roman 
invaders—a point Burke knew only too well could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the 
situation of the Catholic priesthood in Ireland.  But, in the broadest methodological sense, it 
is a way of presenting an English history that is never Anglocentric, so the passions and 
affections are diverted from the parochial to their ultimate end in the widest incorporation of 
mankind.  In this we are reminded of the difference between Burke’s British Patriotism and 
the parochial nationalism with which he is often erroneously identified.           
The theme that, above all, binds these features into a coherent methodology is the 
rehabilitation of allegory as a conveyor of truth, a maneuver that, as argued above, was 
central to the reassessment of Pope’s Patriot legacy, and to the criticism of Bolingbroke’s 
influence on the poet’s work.  We have also noted how the contextualizing of allegorical 
works and their observations on the human condition, as in the Faerie Queene or in growing 
interest in Medieval and early-Modern chivalry, provided a way into the social and political 
history of the times.58  Allegory also offered a scheme of criticism that reined in the excesses 
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of modern philosophical reasoning without returning to the language of superstition and 
obfuscation.  There are a number of reasons for this.  First, its critical purchase is based upon 
a relationship between the particular and the universal that preserves the prior and prime 
reality of the particular.  As such: it provides a crucial counter to symbolism or idealism, by 
which particular historical events gain significance only as they relate to the higher reality of 
a universal concept—the abstract norm or ideal;  it subverts the orthodox Aristotelian 
position that history’s weakness, in relation to philosophy and poetry, is its incapacity to 
furnish the mind with a method for contemplating and understanding the universal; and it 
inverts the use of historical material as instructive parallels by aspiring to read the present 
into the past, rather than the past into the present.59   
Second, precisely because it works on the accretion rather than the selection of 
evidence, allegory is resistant to systematization.60  Burke’s refusal to impose a “system” on 
history was to become a distinguishing feature of his later political career—a preference for 
the inexact science of prejudice over the programs of scientific conviction—and it is 
signified in the syncretic anthropology and his studied, persuasive air of inconclusiveness 
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that we have noted above.  Of course, the systematizer (like Bolingbroke) often professed a 
posteriori humility, and not always in bad faith.  Such a person might only be exposed 
ultimately through the false tone of his rhetoric:  allegorical imagery requires a reverent, 
ordered imagination to translate experience from one generation to another with natural 
conviction, and those who lack this imaginative faculty are exposed by unnatural meteors of 
style, false or sophistic analogies, and simplifications that jar with the discerning, educated 
audience.  Most important, then, is the relationship of allegory to the air of providential 
mystery that surrounds its narratives.  From the artifices of imagination and from historical 
evidence, allegory draws a true representation of the conflicted nature of man in sharp 
contrast to any pessimistic formula for the rise and decline of civilizations, or, worse, the 
alienated savage who has been civilized out of his nobility.61 
Finally, allegory renders the strange or exotic familiar and may also transform the 
familiar and make it strangely enchanting.  It is in the context of such transformations that 
Burke’s Patriotic affection for the local and native must be seen, not as an expression of 
some nascent parochial nationalism.  Burke’s point, best conveyed allegorically, is that the 
strangeness and diverse forms of such affections is not a barrier to, but precisely evidence 
for, the universality of our duties.  It is one of the responsibilities of the historian to 
personalize and particularize these affections, but never to romanticize them, and to teach his 
readers to feel them almost before they are understood.  It is history aspiring toward the 
poetic.62   
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A useful illustration of the methodological points at issue here may be found in 
differing contemporary evaluations of the Cyropædia, Xenophon’s famous account of Cyrus, 
founder of the Persian Empire.  This work was problematic as a piece of profane history 
since it appeared to be rather a collection of fables and moral exhortation than a serious 
attempt at biographical narrative.  Cicero had questioned its historical value in a letter to his 
brother Quintus, arguing that Xenophon’s goal had not been “truth” so much as an 
illustration of a just government and exemplary rulership.  Bolingbroke appeared to assent to 
this sundering of the factual and the moral in his Letters on the Study and Use of History, 
where, while praising Xenophon’s historical skills, he interposes a reservation about this 
particular work:  Xenophon and Thucydides, in contrast to Herodotus,  “wrote on subjects on 
which they were well informed, and they treated them fully: they maintained the dignity of 
history and thought it beneath them to vamp up old traditions, like the writers of their age and 
country, and to be the trumpeters of a lying antiquity.  The Cyropædia of Xenophon may be 
objected perhaps; but if he gave it for a romance, not a history, as he might for aught we can 
tell, it is out of the case: and if he gave it for a history, not a romance, I should prefer his 
authority to that of Herodotus, or any other of his countrymen.”63  A more nuanced response 
to the relationship between moral instruction and factual accuracy had been presented by the 
poet Edmund Spenser, who used the Cyropædia in his Preface to the Faerie Queene to justify 
his own “Allegoricall devises” as a way of fashioning the gentleman of the times “in virtuous 
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and gentle discipline.”  “For this cause,” he writes, “is Xenophon preferred before Plato, for 
that the one, in the exquisite depth of his judgment, formed a Commune Welth, such as it 
should be; but the other in the person of Cyrus, and the Persians, fashioned a government, 
such as might best be: So much more profitable and gratious is doctrine by ensample, than by 
rule.”64  Rollin builds this elision of philosophy and narrative by recommending this profane 
history on account of its conformity to the sacred (decidedly not an option for Bolingbroke), 
and confidently includes Xenophon in his catalog of educative works for students.  In his 
History of Cyrus he restates his confidence: “The authority of this judicious historian ought 
not to be lessened by what Cicero asserts in his first letter to his brother Quintus,” he argues, 
since “the substance of the events and facts may be considered as true, as they are confirmed 
by their conformity to the holy scriptures.”65  Rollin’s opinion is repeated in Dodsley’s 
Preceptor, where it is stated that, “the History of Xenophon, as it is itself the best connected, 
and the most probable of any, so does it exactly agree with Scripture, which on account of its 
Antiquity…would evidently deserve the Preference to the Greek Accounts, were we to 
consider it as no more than a bare History of these Times.”66  The young Burke, we might 
recall, recommended the Cyropædia for Shackleton’s use in school, being unable to think of 
any work “fitter for Boys who are beginning to Comprehend what they read.”67  We now see 
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what Burke meant by that term “comprehend.”  Just as the historicizing of allegorical works 
served to cast fresh light on the social and political history of the times in which they were 
composed, so Burke allegorizes history to enlighten the Patriots of his own time. 
 
III: Patriot History 
 
Burke’s goals in writing his “Abridgment” were conventionally “Patriotic” and his 
sources, generally, unremarkable; but his execution was radically subversive of the 
philosophical approach that had come to identify Patriotism in the first half of the century.  
He planned to trace the emergence of liberty through a narrative that showed how the 
aspirations of the human spirit, working with the grain of human nature, are oriented toward 
the emergence of a constitutional and legal order in society.  But whereas conventional 
histories sought to isolate the meaning of liberty in history at particular points of triumph or 
eclipse (such as the collapse of the Roman Republic, the renaissance of Elizabethan England, 
or the triumph of the Revolution Settlement), Burke sought it through history, in the 
aggregate of crises and discontinuities that formed the memory and experience of loss or 
gain, and that occasionally, by a concatenation of factors, became released in a spirit of 
political resistance.  This is why the allegorical imagination was crucial for Burke in 
conveying his underlying meaning.  It is a point illustrated by the emphatic and distinctive 
way in which Burke fashioned his narrative of liberty upon two key concepts: paradox, or the 
recovery and refining of the order of liberty precisely in circumstances of apparent chaos and 
disorder; and providence, or the mysterious concurrence of events and associations through 
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which the memory of an ordered liberty is sensed, articulated, and realized.  As Burke wrote 
in 1761, in his review of Hume’s history of medieval England: “It will be curious to observe 
from what a strange chaos of liberty and tyranny, of anarchy and order, the constitution, we 
are now blessed with, has at length arisen.”68   
If the pseudo-Bolingbroke claimed to have discovered a natural disorder lurking 
under the apparent order of artificial society, Burke set out in the “Abridgment” to show 
precisely the opposite, and the paradoxes that are central to Burke’s plan here, rather like the 
imputed crimes of artificial society in the Vindication, are also viewed in the external and 
internal relations of governments.  With respect to the external paradoxes, we find the 
“Abridgment” divided into three books that deal, respectively, with the invasions of the 
Romans, Saxons, and Normans.  Burke points out repeatedly that each of these invasions was 
enormously destructive, not only of political systems, but of every aspect of social life.  The 
Romans wrought a “great change” in “the manners [of the Britons]; their art of war; their 
religious and civil discipline”: under the onslaught of the German tribes the Britons were 
“much more broken and reduced than any other nation”: and during the Norman Conquest 
“The English laws, manners, and maxims were suddenly changed.”69  Burke argues 
unequivocally for the central importance of conquest—violent and, at least in the first 
instance, destructive—to our understanding of liberty; but his attention is drawn to the 
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disruptions and subsequent interactions of colonization rather than to native resistance.  In 
the second chapter of the work, the author inserts a lengthy account of “the first peopling of 
this island; the manners of its inhabitants; their art of war; their religious and civil 
discipline.”  This is done not merely for antiquarian reasons, but “as not wholly unnecessary 
towards comprehending the great change made in all these points, when the Roman conquest 
came afterwards to be compleated.”70  Burke graphically and symbolically reinforces the 
magnitude of such change by recounting the story of how the Roman general Suetonius 
Paulinus “burned the Druids in their own fires” after the subjugation of their center on the 
Isle of Man.71  Here, indeed, there is something distinctive about the English experience: as 
Roman power receded, the native Britons faced the incursions of the Saxons and were “much 
more broken and reduced than any other nation, which had fallen under the German power.”  
Burke justifies this statement with evidence of “[t]he sudden extinction of the ancient 
religion and language.”72  These catastrophic irruptions are followed by descriptions of the 
gradual recovery of social and political equilibrium, and of an accompanying “memory” of 
order that attunes the conquerors and acclimatizes the vanquished to the new circumstances, 
but also remains to be energized again at points of future crisis.  It is the functioning of this 
memory, with its rational, emotional, instinctive and customary components, the crucible of 
loss and gain, that forms the sense of liberty and thereby transforms the trauma of conquest 
for both settlers and settled.   
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When we turn to the internal paradox of “liberty and tyranny, anarchy and order,” we 
find that Burke inverts the expected layering of social order and disorder, marking the 
periods of stability and flourishing merely as brief episodes in, or digressions from, the 
narrative pattern, which is forcefully centered upon points of friction and competition 
between institutions.  Constitutional uncertainties at the beginning of the reigns of the 
Norman kings, for example, form the crucible for the emergence of a sense of ancient 
liberties among the Norman and Angevin nobles and clergy, so that a constitutional 
uncertainty that “exposed the nation, at the death of every king, to all the calamities of a civil 
war” actually made Henry I give “to the whole kingdom a charter of liberties, which was the 
first of the kind, and laid the foundation of those successive charters” that, instantiated in the 
collective memory, “at last completed the freedom of the subject.”73    
It is through this chain of disjunctions and uncertainties that Burke attempts to 
describe the memory of liberty, which is not a yearning to return to a primitive state of 
natural order but distress at the loss of familiar social patterns and understandings.  As such, 
liberty may be said to inhabit the gaps where institutions and customs rub against each other 
in a state of imbalance and heightened contestation.  But what is remarkable about Burke’s 
perception is that this contestation is not so much one between classes or orders as between 
secular and religious institutions.  In Roman Britain, the invaders’ total overturning of the 
Druidical institution is revealed to have had unpredicted and dangerous consequences for the 
establishment of Roman civilization and rule in that it aroused the furious resistance of the 
indigenous population and brought about their subsequent enslavement.  The Romans had 
destroyed not just a system of religious belief, but the institution in which all social liberties 
that were understood to exist at the time had been invested.  From Burke’s Lockean 
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perspective this means, in particular, the authority to summon and dissolve “publick 
assemblies” and the mediation in legal issues that arose among the “freemen and heads of 
families.”  While the long-term benefits of the destruction of Druidism may have been 
considerable, the issue at hand was the immediate sense of disorder and the fractured 
aesthetics of liberty that required judicious handling by the conquerors.  The establishment of 
Christianity and its attendant hierarchy brought with it new frictions in different forms since, 
in a sense, the religious was now colonizing the secular.  In the Anglo-Saxon world that 
replaced the Roman occupation, political violence and monastic discipline coexist as two 
inseparable facets of life, with Saxon kings sometimes renouncing the sword for the cloister.  
Later, the Crusades revealed a similar conjunction of religious devotion and chivalry, out of 
which paradox of loyalties, further advances in the conception of liberty were to be struck.74  
At the same time, “Papal and Imperial powers mutually gave birth to each other” and the 
Italian city states, “By contending for a choice in their subjection, grew imperceptibly into 
freedom, and passed through the medium of faction and anarchy into regular 
commonwealths.”75  Culturally, it is in the crucible of the moral and physical chaos of 
Stephen’s reign that the deeply ordered system of knight errantry is formed: raw power 
absorbed and tempered by the authority of a king of Peace.  We can see why Burke later 
viewed the passing of the age of chivalry not as a liberating revolt against the outdated 
manners of an oppressive social order but as the loss of man’s knowledge of his own capacity 
for evil and therefore the prelude to a new and terrible disorder.    
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  Burke’s insights into the dynamics between secular and religious institutions is quite 
astonishing for a society that was used to hierocratic conspiracy theories and saw Medieval 
religion as destructive of liberty and natural order.  Bolingbroke considered all history before 
the end of the fifteenth century to be of mere antiquarian interest: “To be entirely ignorant 
about the ages that precede this era would be shameful…But to be learned about them is a 
ridiculous affectation in any man who means to be useful to the present age.  Down to this 
era [of the Renaissance] let us read history: from this era, and down to our time, let us study 
it.”  Burke shows how the study of medieval society, precisely in its apparent paradoxes, 
reveals to the curious the inextricable relationship between natural and artificial society.  By 
affirming the providential origins of society, the religious underpinnings of civilization, and 
the necessity of both for true liberty, it vitally thickens our understanding of liberty and earns 
its place in the education of the modern Patriot.   
The significance of Burke’s recovery of the contribution of religious institutions to 
the history of liberty can hardly be overstated.  In a way analogous to the literary work of 
Spence and the Wartons, Burke argues that the true critic and citizen learns through history 
that rightly ordered public-spiritedness is fundamentally religious, since religion has effected 
the transition from a rude to a civilized liberty.  “The first openings of civility,” Burke writes, 
“have been every where made by religion,” and this is not only because man’s religious 
instincts are a natural and ineradicable part of the tension between the personal and the social 
that accompanies him everywhere, but because those instincts, being ineradicable, must be 
refined and ordered through the teachings of a structured religious class, as the history of 
“artificial” religion has shown from the Egyptian priesthood on.76  This aspect of Burke’s 
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revision of Patriot critical thinking is well illustrated in the “Abridgment” in the treatment of 
two religious institutions given short shrift by the free-thinkers and deists:  Druidry and 
Medieval monasticism. 
In line with his template for the rise of priest-craft and the fall of “true religion,” John 
Toland had considered the Druidic system as ushering obfuscation into ancient Celtic 
society: “They dexterously led the people blindfold, by committing no part of their Theology 
or Philosophy to writing, tho’ great writers in other respects; but their dictates were only 
hereditarily convey’d from masters to disciples by traditionary Poems, interpretable 
(consequently) and alterable as they should see convenient: which is a much more effectual 
way, than locking up a book from the Laity, that, one way or other, is sure to come first or 
last to their knowledge, and easy perhaps to be turn’d against the Priests.”77  Burke was 
considerably more even-handed.  Labeling a number of aspects of the Druid religion as 
“almost universal” in primitive societies, including belief in the immortality of the soul, 
observance toward rude stone, human sacrifice, and “some notions...of a Being eternal and 
infinite,” he observes that “no Heathen Priesthood ever came up to the perfection of the 
Druidical.”  This might, of course, be taken ironically, if Burke had not gone on to explain 
the practical uses to which the Druids put the authority they drew from these religious 
instincts:  “Justice was in all countries originally administered by the priesthood; nor indeed 
could laws in their first feeble state have either authority or sanction, so as to compel men to 
relinquish their natural independence, had they not appeared to come down to them enforced 
by beings of more than human power.”  The “triple respect” that Druidic science gained in 
the areas of medicine, politics and religion “was in general usefully exerted,” and not least 
                                                 
77
 Toland, Specimen of Critical History, 10. 
 
  252 
because it also provided a repository of memory upon which customs and manners (and 
therefore laws) rested.  Burke rejects Toland’s assertion that the bards were separate from the 
body of the Druids, incorporating them instead as a “class of the Druids” and complicates his 
cynical view of their oral tradition by contrasting the cohering and stabilizing tendency of an 
unwritten memory with the logocentric Athenian Academy, where “everything was 
disputed.”78  
Burke’s treatment of the Medieval church is similarly revisionist.  In a chapter largely 
devoted to the social and political impact of monastic institutions, he argues that the Saxon 
monks were praiseworthy in their “zeal for personal freedom.”  Besides their significant role 
as clerks and archivists, the monks “urged their powerful penitents to the infranchisement of 
their own slaves, and to the redemption of those, which belonged to others; they directed 
them to the repair of highways, and to the construction of churches, bridges, and other works 
of general utility.”  In matters of charity, they were “the sole channel, through which the 
bounty of the rich could pass in continued stream to the poor.”  Under great reformers such 
as Dunstan, they led by example, being “unmarried; austere in their lives; regular in their 
duties; possessed of the learning of the times; well united under a proper subordination; full 
of art, and implacable towards their enemies.”79   It is hard not to see in Burke’s descriptions, 
mutatis mutandis, a reflection of the public spiritedness he believed was now required of the 
gentleman Patriot, a point confirmed by Burke’s concern that the interaction of religion and 
liberty can only be understood fully when the status of both the regular and the secular clergy 
is seen in the context of their own times.  In another elucidating digression, as a prelude to 
his account of the struggle between Henry II and Becket, Burke explains how the privileges 
                                                 
78
 Burke, Writings and Speeches, 358-59, 349, 351. 
 
79
 Ibid., 1:415. 
  253 
of the clergy, seen in their historical milieu, was justified as benevolent according to the 
standards and possibilities of the time: “Thus, necessary to the great by their knowledge; 
venerable to the poor by their hospitality; dreadful to all by their power of excommunication; 
the character of the clergy was exalted above every thing in the State; and it could no more 
be otherwise in those days, than it is possible it should be so in ours.”80  We should also note 
that the great churchmen Burke mentions—Lanfranc, Anselm, Langton—were often 
operating in conflict with, or at least independently from, papal power.  In this way, Burke 
could distinguish antipopery from anti-Catholicism, and more confidently apply his 
methodology to counter the way in which free-thinking Patriots confounded the two and 
married anticlericalism with irreligion. 
The paradoxical ways in which liberty appears to take historical form indicate, in 
Burke’s thinking, that the gift of liberty is providential.  That means that, while it will never 
be something that humans can “fix” in a philosophical equation or a code of law, it will 
always form an aspect of memory and feeling, associated with our reasoning but always 
obliging us to reconcile our intellect to what is mysterious in our own social forms and 
habits.  It is also providence that transforms freedom into ordered liberty, because providence 
discloses the order that rational analysis alone can never replicate.  Let us take its 
incorporation in the “Abridgment” in two stages: first, as an expression of the anthropology 
of man’s social nature, and secondly in its more unambiguously religious aspect.   
For Burke, the primary concern of anthropology is an examination of how man’s 
associative and individualistic impulses are held in productive tension.  Physical 
environment, its local dangers, resources, and allurements, gives this tension its particular 
expressions.  But while Burke’s “Abridgment” commences appropriately with a grand 
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climatic and geographical survey of the European continent, this is certainly not intended as a 
tapestry or panorama of essentially static national characteristics.  Indeed, the most striking 
feature of Burke’s Europe is its constant, unpredictable motion and reconfiguration by the 
“spirit of migration.”  In a passage that superficially echoes the Vindication, Burke writes:  
“Ancient history has furnished us with many instances of whole nations, expelled by 
invasion, falling in upon others, which they have entirely overwhelmed; more irresistible in 
their defeat and ruin, than in their fullest prosperity….Thus the bleak and barren regions of 
the North, not being peopled by choice, were peopled as early, in all probability, as many of 
the milder and more inviting climates of the southern world; and thus, by a wonderful 
disposition of the Divine Providence, a life of hunting, which does not contribute to increase, 
and war, which is the great instrument in the destruction of men, were the two principal 
causes of their being spread so early, and so universally over the whole earth.”  Burke is at 
pains to point out that these demographic shifts were not merely the result of overpopulation, 
but “grew out of the ancient manners and necessities, and sometimes operated like a blind 
instinct, such as actuates birds of passage.”81  In this way, the determinism and immorality of 
the act of invasion are undermined at the same time.  Environmental features and the ethnic 
identities and manners of indigenous groupings clash or combine here with invaders armed 
with memories and mores of their own that help to define their expectations, with the result 
that the existing artifices of society cannot fail to leave some mark on the way the newcomer 
satisfies his appetite.82  In later, more settled societies, the “spirit of migration” is channeled 
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through more organized ventures such as pilgrimages and crusades, but the effects are 
similar:  “It is not wholly unworthy of observation, that Providence, which strongly appears 
to have intended the continual intermixture of mankind, never leaves the human mind 
destitute of a principle to effect it.  This purpose is sometimes carried on by a sort of 
migratory instinct; sometimes by the spirit of conquest; at one time avarice drives men from 
their homes, at another they are actuated by a thirst of knowledge; where none of these 
causes operate, the sanctity of particular places attracts men from the most distant quarters.  
It was this motive, which sent thousands in those ages to Jerusalem and Rome; and now in a 
full tide impels half the world annually to Mecca.”83 
When we turn to the religious aspect of Burke’s use of providence, we do not, with 
one possible exception, encounter any intimations of direct divine intervention.84  Burke is 
not advocating a return to the providential history of writers such as Bossuet.  Nor do we find 
affinities with Protestant apologists such as William King, who ascribed to providence the 
favorable winds that carried William of Orange to the rescue of Protestant Ireland in 1690.  
And certainly Burke would have rejected the more insidious relation of miraculous events 
circulated to build a Protestant martyrology out of the contested accounts of the Catholic 
massacres of 1641.85  Yet he is firm in his belief that religion operates as an independent 
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force, working with the grain of human nature to quicken those associative impulses in a way 
that may only be revealed post hoc facto.  Of the miracles that attended the conversion of the 
Saxons in the seventh century he states that, “the introduction of Christianity, which under 
whatever form always confers such inestimable benefits on mankind, soon made a sensible 
change in these rude and fierce manners,” to the degree that “[i]t is by no means impossible, 
that, for an end so worthy, Providence, on some occasions, might directly have interposed.”86   
Similarly, the Crusades, in their original design to protect the pilgrim routes between the 
West and the Islamic centers, served indirectly to perpetuate the West’s profiting from “the 
improvements of that laborious people” the Saracens, and to foster “that intercourse amongst 
mankind, which is now formed by politicks, commerce and learned curiosity.”87   
 
 
IV: Recovering Patriotism: Redeeming Empire 
 
How, then, might Burke’s paradoxical and providential history have contributed to 
the revision of Patriotism as it was being pursued at Tully’s Head?  In a directly polemical 
sense, it marginalized, or transcended, the Whig and Tory debates that were raging over the 
ancient constitution as a repository of Saxon “liberty.”  Bolingbroke had made this historical 
perspective a central feature of his critique of the corruption and dullness that he believed 
post-revolutionary Whigs such as Walpole had instituted to bury English liberty.  Fortunately 
for Bolingbroke’s followers the spirit of liberty among figures of elevated mind was resilient, 
and could be transmitted through knowledge of its historical origins and of the various guises 
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adopted by its enemies, both lay and clerical.  In Letter IV of the Remarks on the History of 
England, Bolingbroke argues that neither William I, while “he imposed many new laws and 
customs [and] made very great alterations in the whole model of government,” nor his sons 
could “destroy the old constitution; because neither he nor they could extinguish the old spirit 
of liberty.”  He continues: “As losing the spirit of liberty lost the liberties of Rome, even 
while the laws and constitutions, made for the preservation of them, remained entire; so we 
see that our ancestors, by keeping this spirit alive and warm, regained all the advantages of a 
free government, though a foreign invasion had destroyed them, in great measure, and had 
imposed a very tyrannical yoke on the nation.”88  This was an analytical paradigm derived in 
part from the Commonwealthmen of the seventeenth century, and shared with writers such as 
Molesworth and Molyneux.  Burke unequivocally undercuts the premises employed here by 
revealing them as static and inflexible.  Most persuasively, in a lengthy digression he shows 
how the English Common Law, far from lending plausibility to the lineage of an ancient 
constitution by preserving intact principles formulated “time out of mind,” was, by the 
thirteenth century, “in a great measure composed of some remnants of the old Saxon 
customs, joined to the feudal institutions brought in at the Norman Conquest.”89  He 
concludes: “All these things are, I think, sufficient to shew of what a visionary nature those 
systems are, which would settle the ancient Constitution in the most remote times exactly in 
the same form, in which we enjoy it at this day; not considering that such mighty changes in 
manners, during so many ages, always must produce a considerable change in laws, and in 
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the forms as well as the powers of all governments.”90  Positive law, no more than a 
constitutional arrangement, can incorporate man’s natural rights in their perfection, or even 
in their highest possible degree.  It can only aspire to represent the harmonious balance 
between the natural and the artificial that emerges first and foremost in custom, manners and 
memory.91  We will see below that this approach is central to Burke’s critique of the popery 
laws in Ireland. 
Conceptually, Burke’s use of providence to reintegrate the religious and the secular in 
history carries with it significant implications for key concepts of the Patriot discourse.  In 
Burke’s mind, the consequence of driving out the mystery from historical analysis is to 
flatten and constrict the examples that inform us of our duties toward our native land.  The 
Patriot who secularizes his love of country by framing it, however unwittingly, in 
metaphysics, turns it also into a faux religion and builds his criticism on a fundamentally 
disordered basis.  The recovery of a truly religious dimension leads us to a deeper order and a 
reinvigorated conception of liberty precisely by putting a check on our systematizing and 
forcing us to search for it in the unfolding social patterns that history weaves from the 
footprints of man’s conflicted nature.  Philosophy is insufficient for understanding that 
pattern, in all its diverse guises and situations.  To “comprehend what we read,” we must 
instead be prepared to approach the natural and the artificial, order and disorder, slavery and 
liberty with a mind steeped in allegory.  As we noticed in the Vindication, this understanding 
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is related to a critical perception of society that draws from a strain of natural-law thought 
distinct from Thomism or proto-Romantic primitivism and heavily influenced by Pufendorf.  
In the Whole Duty of Man, Pufendorf states that:  “Man is an Animal very desirous of his 
own Preservation; of himself liable to many Wants; unable to Support himself without the 
Help of other of his Kind; and yet wonderfully fit in Society to promote as common Good.”  
That said, it is foolish sophistry to attempt to distinguish man in his natural and artificial 
states.  “The Rules of this Fellowship,” Pufendorf continues, “which are the Laws of Human 
Society, whereby Men are directed how to render themselves useful Members thereof, and 
without which it falls to pieces, are called the Laws of Nature.”  Succinctly put by 
Pufendorf’s most recent editors, the natural law comprises the “rules through which man 
imposes sociability on himself, as the comportment needed for security.”92  It is in this 
comportment that liberty exists—a function of instinct and memory as well as rational 
judgment that calls upon the fabric of artificial society to help balance the individual in the 
art of self-socializing. “Liberty,” Burke was later to say in his speeches on the American 
colonies, “inheres in some sensible object”; yet, if liberty is time-bound, Burke also 
understood it to be timeless, and universal only in its particularity.   
This allegorical transformation of the key Patriot term “liberty” applies to another, 
too:  “public-spiritedness,” or benevolence, cannot be understood, let alone exercised, in a 
universal sense until we have learned how to love the particular circumstances and 
associations that providence has assigned to us.  In a similar way, the lessons the Patriot 
discovers in his own country’s history become preceptors of public spirit in its widest sense, 
and so Burke’s providential history has the power to transform the cycle of decline into the 
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constant prospect of rejuvenation: though also, of course, the constant danger of catastrophe.  
The duty of the Patriotic statesman is to learn how to ride providence, and to transform it into 
hope for the future rather than regret for, or hubris at, the past.  That critical moral window is 
the price we pay for liberty; but in the balance, history teaches the wise and humble that the 
hope of success begins where philosophical systems end.   
 
  Although it remained unfinished, the “Abridgment” as it stands has a certain 
completeness, since the final chapter, concerning the disastrous reign of John and the signing 
of the Great Charter, appears to have been written as the climax to a first volume.  Not only 
does its lively narrative incorporate all the facets of paradox and providence that we have 
examined above, but the events of the reign were central to the debate among Patriots in 
Britain and Ireland over the relationship between liberty, the Constitution, and English law.  
To plumb any direct political application for his revised history, we need to consider how 
Burke reconfigures the popular Patriot “memory” of 1215, and its parallel with 1688-89.   
Burke introduces the chapter with a rhetorical flourish rare in the work as a whole:  
“We are now arrived at one of the most memorable periods in the English story: whether we 
consider the astonishing revolutions, which were then wrought; the calamities, in which both 
the prince and people were involved; or the happy consequences, which, arising from the 
midst of those calamities, have constituted the glory and prosperity of England for so many 
years.”  There follows a familiar narrative of John’s struggles with rival royal claimants, with 
his own barons, with the Roman Church, and with the king of France, culminating in the 
drama at Runnymede, “a place, long consecrated by publick opinion, as that wherein the 
quarrels and wars, which arose in the English nation…had been terminated from the remotest 
  261 
times.”  Here John signs the two documents, Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest, 
which “laid the foundation of English liberty.”  As in the rest of the “Abridgment,” Burke’s 
written sources are unremarkable; but his focus subverts the usual narrative at crucial 
points.93        
The symptoms of disorder traced in earlier reigns—uncertain succession, institutional 
frictions, papal and royal competition, foreign invasion, economic and social dislocation—
appear to the reader to converge in John’s troubled reign.  The new king swiftly consolidated 
his succession through the removal of his rival, Arthur, and the intimidation of the French 
king Philip II Augustus, so that, by 1204, “[t]he good fortune of John now seemed to be at its 
highest point.”  But, Burke continues, that fortune “was exalted on a precipice; and this great 
victory proved the occasion of all the evils, which afflicted his life.”  Like the predatory 
conqueror of a foreign land, John squeezed his territories dry of money, disrupted trade, and 
added “personal vices” to the “impotent violence of his government.”94   
John compounded his tyranny, and hastened his own end, through the reckless 
disrespect he showed to the church, an institution whose power he underestimated, despite 
the lessons of his father’s reign.  Consequently, a dangerous compact grew up between the 
secular and spiritual lords.  Out of the undirected and loosely-understood complaints of the 
barons, Archbishop Hubert and his successor Stephen Langton forged the “memory” of an 
elective monarchy with the tools of learning drawn from their archives, their schools, and the 
power of Innocent III’s resurgent papacy.  In 1208, when John refused to admit Langton as 
archbishop of Canterbury, a papal Interdict added to the existing sense of disorder: “divine 
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service at once ceased throughout the kingdom: the churches were shut.  The sacraments 
were suspended.  The dead were buried without honour, in highways and ditches; and the 
living deprived of all spiritual comfort.”  John’s subsequent excommunication confirmed the 
people in “the most terrible confusion” of conflicted duties and allegiances.  John himself, 
fighting now on three fronts since Langton had broken with the papacy, was finally forced to 
turn his kingdom into a fiefdom of the pope’s; but when his revived power was abruptly 
smashed by the French king at the battle of Bouvines in 1214, barons and archbishop 
conspired under Langton’s guidance to force him to sue for peace.95  After a close survey of 
the terms of Magna Carta and the Forest Charter, Burke proceeds briskly with John’s final 
attempt to escape the implementation of these liberties, the invasion of England by French 
troops, and the king’s own death.  A comparison of the reigns of Philip II and John closes out 
the chapter and the “Abridgment.” 
This familiar narrative of England’s revolution for liberty is, in Burke’s hands, 
characteristically shot through with paradoxical readings that challenge the interpretations of 
philosophers and lawyers.  That “grand revolution in favour of liberty,” states Burke, 
occurred in “the most turbulent and calamitous” reign in England, when “the principles of 
freedom were predominant, though the thing itself was not yet fully formed.”  To add 
complication, it was, in the eyes of its proponents, a revolution to reform feudal law, “not to 
destroy the root, but to cut short the overgrown branches of the feudal service,” in which the 
most prominent doctrine motivating their actions was “the doctrine of an unalienable tenure.”  
Only when our understanding has been grounded in such particularities does Burke mention 
those aspects of the charters that “went deeper than the feudal tenure.”  These included, 
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famously, the right to the judgment of one’s peers, the right of habeas corpus (“the grand 
article, and that, which cemented all the parts of the fabrick of liberty”), and the extension of 
the liberties gained by the royal vassals to their own dependents and so on down the strata of 
feudal obligation.96  They are all points that invested the English system with a new 
distinctiveness when compared to the more tightly structured feudal aristocracy that emerged 
in France, but their historic importance was hardly signified in the original documents. 
Despite the paradoxes and disjunctions upon which it rests, Burke’s radical reordering 
of the narrative of resistance in John’s reign enables him to extrapolate timeless lessons from 
time-bound particularities.  That act of translation, however, asks of the reader an 
imaginative and allegorical mindset prepared to reorder the historical narrative as moral fable 
and pursue truth beyond the tethers of philosophical method.  On these terms, Burke leads us 
to seek continuities in the seemingly disorderly dynamics of resistance rather than in the legal 
achievements of revolution itself.  When the leading rebels did attempt to give substance and 
direction to their discontents, they resorted to a “memory of the ancient Saxon liberty” that 
Burke has already indicated was defective.  And even “[their] idea…of liberty was not (if I 
may use the expression) perfectly free,” since “they did not claim to possess their privileges 
upon any natural principle or independent bottom, but, just as they held their lands, from the 
king.”  Yet Burke wishes us to accept that the memory, for all its legal fictions, was also real 
in the deeper sense that it answered to an instinctive sense of social disorder and a manifest 
disjunction between the natural and artificial order.  This is why it was capable of immediate 
purchase and transcendent historical significance when it found articulation in an existing 
tradition of documented rights.  It is a point best conveyed in Burke’s own words, as he 
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describes the slow consolidation of the barons’ revolt.  Since this episode presents something 
of a climax to the work as it stands, and since its interpretative rhetoric is crucial to the 
reformed Patriot theme of this dissertation, it is worth quoting at some length:   
The English barons had privileges, which they knew to have been violated: 
they had always kept up the memory of the ancient Saxon liberty; and if they 
were the conquerors of Britain, they did not think that their own servitude was 
the just fruit of their victory.  They had, however, but an indistinct view of the 
object, at which they aimed; they rather felt their wrongs, than understood the 
cause of them; and having no head nor council, they were more in a condition 
of distressing their king, and disgracing their country by their disobedience, 
than of applying any effectual remedy to their grievances….Langton saw 
these dispositions, and these wants.  He had conceived a settled plan for 
reducing the king; and all his actions tended to carry it into execution.  This 
prelate, under pretence of holding an ecclesiastical synod, drew together 
privately some of the principal barons to the church of St. Paul in London.  
There having expatiated in the miseries which the kingdom suffered, and 
having explained at the same time the liberties, to which it was entitled, he 
produced the famous charter of Henry I, long concealed, and of which, with 
infinite difficulty, he had procured an authentick copy….The barons, 
transported to find an authentick instrument to justify their discontent, and to 
explain and sanction their pretensions…depart to confederate others in their 
design.97 
 
This process perfectly reflects Burke’s natural order of reality—the artificial lies 
implicit in the natural, and “order” is the realization of those laws that are in accord with the 
manners, memory, and instinct of the people—that is, the artificial arrangements that 
constitute society.  But we also see in this passage an ingredient that is distinctively Burke’s.  
Having already failed to get the king to sign one petition “declaring their liberties, and 
praying that they might be formally allowed and established by the royal authority,” the 
barons had realized “that no design can involve all sorts of people, or inspire them with 
extraordinary resolution, unless it be animated with religion.”  This is why Langton was able 
to become the “first mover in all the affairs, which distinguish the remainder of this reign” 
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after his return from exile in 1213.   The church as an institution, providentially and in many 
senses unintentionally, was vital in the process of conceptualizing liberty: “The continual 
struggle of the clergy for the ecclesiastical liberties laid open at the same time the natural 
claims of the people; and the clergy were obliged to shew some respect for those claims, in 
order to add strength to their own party.”98  Burke’s stress upon Langton’s contribution 
differs markedly from Rapin, where it is not mentioned, and Smollett, where it is 
undeveloped.99  For Bolingbroke, as we would expect, the concourse of ecclesiastic and 
secular interests is accidental rather than providential:  “It is true that during these contests 
Magna Charta was signed and confirmed, and the condition of the people, in point of liberty, 
very much improved.  But this was the accidental effect of the contest between the kings, the 
barons, and the clergy.”100  This is the approach adopted by Hume later in his own history. 
In the “Abridgment,” Burke appears to have drawn an implicit parallel between the 
revolutions of 1215 and 1688 that takes the reader in two directions simultaneously.  By 
stressing the alien, feudal context in which Magna Carta and the Forest Charter were 
composed, he divests them of their power as iconic representations of a pristine constitutional 
order, and detaches the Revolution Settlement from any supposed chain of historic “liberties” 
that might validate constitutional or legal policies instituted in its name.  But by throwing the 
spotlight onto the nature of baronial resistance and the disorder of the time, he restores a 
sense of familiarity: a disputed succession, friction between church and state, the fear of 
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tyranny articulated through the memory of rights enjoyed “time out of mind,” a rebellion 
quickened by foreign intervention and charters proclaiming an historical rather than 
philosophical justification for resistance.  The result is subtly to redirect the line of enquiry 
from how we understand 1688 in terms of 1215 to how we shift the collective memory of 
liberty from modes of resistance to modes of benevolence: how, in absorbing the trauma of 
revolution, we reintegrate and reinforce public spirit and public order.  
This line of enquiry brings us full circle, back to Burke’s Ireland, where the Glorious 
Revolution did, of course, have direct practical application.  As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, debate over Irish liberties since the final defeat of James II had hinged upon 
historical continuities between Magna Carta and the Protestant settlement, and the related 
question of whether the Irish nobles had assented to the constitutional changes brought about 
in the wake of Henry II’s intervention.   (The link between constitutional liberty and 
Protestantism was made stronger by the fact that Innocent III had absolved John, as a papal 
vassal, from adhering to the charter, and this is almost certainly the reason why Burke 
stresses the breach between Langton and Rome that preceded the baronial revolt.)  Had the 
Irish barons of the medieval period willingly accepted Henry II as their feudal lord at the 
council held at Cashel in 1172, and had they later assented freely to the terms of the Great 
Charter?  Or had both events been aspects of a brutal conquest?  Burke’s “Abridgment” 
affirms the latter; but it also attempts to soften the impact of that naked truth for the Ireland 
of his own time by guiding us to the more urgent issue of how it could still form the basis of 
an inclusive Irish liberty.  It is a subtle and ingenious maneuver performed through careful 
engagement with current historiographical debates. 
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Taking Burke’s argument chronologically, we should note first his interest in the 
recovery of early Irish history.  Researches in this field brought with them weighty 
implications for Ireland’s colonial identity as they posited an ancient Irish civilization with 
close ties to Continental and even Mediterranean cultures and possessing ancient 
constitutional liberties or, at least, identifiable conceptions of civic liberty, that mirrored the 
ancient constitution of the Germanic tribes.  One potential benefit of this research was, in the 
words of Jacqueline Hill, “the capacity to appeal to patriots and unionists, to native Irish and 
Anglo-Irish and to Catholics and Protestants.”101  We know that Burke was sympathetic to a 
sophisticated treatment of ancient Irish history through his encouragement, for example, of a 
greater knowledge of Gaelic among historians.102  In part, he hoped that such researches 
would correct the prejudiced and dismissive accounts of Irish culture propagated by writers 
such as Hume; but he would doubtless also have welcomed Walter Harris’s attempts to 
historicize and understand Ireland’s historic myths and legends in his Hibernica; or, Some 
Antient Pieces relating to Ireland (1747).  With certain reservations, Burke also promoted the 
work of his acquaintance Charles O’Conor, who argued that the civil powers of Druidism 
had failed to affect ancient Irish society as much as other societies owing to “the constant 
Use of Letters among the People, and…that free and happy Genius of the Laity, for 
examining into the Reason of Things.”103   
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Burke was, however, also sensible to the dangers of romanticizing Ireland’s past.  
These were exemplified in the attempts of Henry Brooke and Colonel Charles Vallancey to 
push beyond O’Conor and Harris and uncover a highly sophisticated Irish civilization, 
anciently educated, bound to the Mosaic and Egyptian spiritual traditions, and yet skeptical 
of the acts of the Druidic priestly class.104  First, such an exalted common ancestry could be 
used not only to elevate respect for the indigenous population, but to justify the forcible 
Anglicization of the Irish Catholics.  Since it assumed a fall from a state of “natural” 
enlightenment at the hands of superstition and priest-craft, it served to bolster the argument 
of Protestants such as Sir Richard Cox, Sr., who had accepted the unity of Ango-Irish stock 
as the basis of his Essay for the Conversion of the Irish (1698), or of free-thinkers such as 
Toland, whose anti-Catholicism in the name of liberty was resurrected by Lucas.  Each 
believed that the elimination of Catholicism was a moral good proven in history, and could 
therefore argue for the repressive popery laws as progressive legislation.  Second, the 
replication of a Bolingbrokean attempt to see Irish constitutional history through an English 
paradigm gave historical support to the argument for constitutional separation.  As Jim 
Smyth has pointed out, “Irish lawyer-politicians had long insisted upon Ireland’s status as a 
separate and distinct kingdom under the crown, with its own laws, parliament and ancient 
constitution.”105  Third, as Joep Leerssen has shown, an increasing fascination with the 
political role of Gaelic bards and bardic mythology in ancient Irish society tended to 
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reinforce ideas of cultural and national distinctiveness that could provide fertile ground for 
the development of Jacobite and anti-British sentiment.106   
Burke’s approach to memory and resistance in history is designed to defuse these 
problematic associations.  Just as the Norman barons were energized by memories of Saxon 
liberties that they had not, in fact, enjoyed, Irish people were confusing a memory of 
Irish/Gaelic history with historical detail.  Burke accepts the power and import of national 
histories and myths here; but he denies their precise parallels and analogies, stressing instead 
the common experience of conquest and integration that Celts, Britons, and Saxons shared.  
“The people of Ireland,” he states, “lay claim to a very extravagant antiquity, through a 
vanity common to all nations.  The accounts, which are given by their ancient chronicles, of 
their first settlements are generally tales confuted by their own absurdity.”107  Like the 
destruction of Druidry under the Romans, Burke points to the speed and completeness of the 
Christian conversion of Ireland:  “The Druid discipline anciently flourished in that island; in 
the fourth century it fell down before the preaching of St. Patrick; then the Christian Religion 
was embraced and cultivated, with an uncommon zeal, which displayed itself in the number 
and consequences of the persons, who in all parts embraced the contemplative life.”  After a 
period of flourishing under Celtic Christian auspices, the Danish invasions then effected a 
further crushing change, reducing the island to “a state of ignorance, poverty and 
barbarism.”108  
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The implications of Burke’s narrative of conquest and resistance are brought into 
sharper focus still with the narration of Henry II’s invasion and its impact on Irish society.  
Burke explicitly sets up a parallel with the Norman Conquest, stating of the former that it 
“stands a single event in history, unless, perhaps, we may compare it with the reduction of 
Ireland some time after by Henry the Second.”109   Concerning the circumstances of Henry 
II’s occupation and the attitude of the Irish nobles, Burke, in opposition to Molyneux, Lucas 
and others, argues that English rule was emphatically and brutally imposed from above and 
that Ireland was suffered “reduction” into the Angevin system just as England had been 
coerced into the Norman territories.  This explains the high-handed treatment of the Irish by 
John, and the dismissive ethnic descriptions to be found in sources such as Gerald of 
Wales.110  But the point of the parallel is, precisely, that this is no different from the Anglo-
Saxon experience of the previous century.  Indeed, Burke’s use of the term “rude and 
barbarous” in reference to the Saxons is significant because it was a term commonly applied 
by the English in the eighteenth century to the native Irish.111  Of the implications of Magna 
Carta for Irish liberty, Burke’s complex picture of the interrelationship between manners and 
constitutional law makes Irish nobles’ assent to the original charter implausible.  Instead, 
Burke chooses to stress how alien the language of feudal law was to the Irish nobles in key 
respects, something he achieves, characteristically, through careful attention to tanistry and 
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native Brehon law.  He does not deny that the introduction of English and French law opened 
up the potential for strengthening the associative tendencies in Irish society, such as trade, 
commerce, and religious toleration; but he regrets the bluntness with which it was effected.  
At the outset of his treatment of Medieval Ireland, Burke emphasizes the favorable, but 
undeveloped commercial situation in Ireland: “Whilst it possesses…internal means of 
wealth, it opens on all sides a great number of ports, spacious and secure, and by their 
advantageous situation inviting to universal commerce.  But on these ports, better known 
than those of Britain in the time of the Romans, at this time there were few towns, scarce any 
fortifications, and no trade, that deserves to be mentioned.”112  We are reminded by the 
comparison that after a peaceable possession by Rome of more than 300 years, the Britons 
had “derived but very few benefits from their subjection to the conquerors and civilizers of 
mankind.”113  With even greater natural potential, Burke insinuates, what had the Irish gained 
from their conquerors and civilizers after twice as long a period?  The memory of ancient 
liberties was sharpened by the practical injustices that the Irish nobles felt with every passing 
year that colonial rule stood unreformed.  Both were interconnected, and both were damning 
indictments of English failure to ride providence.  
This is how Burke’s revised Patriot history winds its way into the most sensitive and 
pressing aspect of the wider Patriot critique: the problem of the justification of resistance to 
perceived tyranny.  With respect to Ireland, the sensitivity focused particularly on the 
“memory” of the Catholic rebellion of 1641, which was the cornerstone of the popular 
Protestant view that the Irish Catholics, under the thrall of their priestly caste, were so 
inherently treacherous as to use any relaxation of legal penalties as an opportunity for revolt.  
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Hume himself was of this opinion.  In the first volume of his History of Great Britain, he 
argues that the rebellion of 1641 had been particularly wicked for occurring at a time of 
national jeopardy (the struggle between king and parliament) and in the absence of any 
severe legal or religious grievances.114  Burke, however, moves to dispel the unique evil of 
the events of 1641 by using the concept of resistance to include that event, too, among the 
parallels with the iconic Protestant events of 1215.  Just as the barons of 1215 could not, by 
Burke’s account, be said to have conspired to rebel in taking advantage of the government’s 
weakness, or in conspiratorial league with the church, so the Catholic rebellion of1641 was 
caused not by Catholics wanting to eradicate Protestants, nor by the workings of an 
international league of priest-craft (as William King and others had suggested), but by a 
natural, visceral sense of injustice and disorder.  It is no surprise to find that Burke had 
encouraged works, such as John Curry’s Historical Memoirs of the Irish Rebellion in the 
Year 1641, in a letter to Walter Harris (1758), designed to correct the factual details about 
the scale of the reported Catholic massacres of Protestants.115 
Yet the dark side of this parallel remains.  Indeed, Burke’s emphasis on the power of 
an indistinct memory or sense of grievance, on the power of manners, and on the leading role 
of the church in political affairs appears, if anything, to broaden the scope for justifying 
rebellion, particularly against invaders who attempt to eradicate ancient customs, however 
well-meaning their actions.  The link between John’s tyranny and the actions of the English 
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in Burke’s Ireland is brought even closer by Burke’s treatment of the Forest Laws and their 
consequences, which are limned in language strikingly similar to that used about the popery 
laws in his later “Tracts.”  The Medieval Forest Laws “had indeed all the qualities of the 
worst of laws.  Their professed object was to keep a great part of the nation desolate.  They 
hindered communication, and destroyed industry”:  the popery laws of his own time were 
“unjust, impolitic, and inefficacious” and were rendered “void in [their] obligatory quality on 
the mind” because they infringed the very founding principles of law, equity and utility—that 
is, not contractual rights, but the natural impulses that make man, naturally, a member of 
society.116   
The “Tracts,” like the “Abridgment,” remained unpublished in Burke’s lifetime, and 
strictly the text is a political and jurisprudential, rather than an historical, account; but it was 
composed after the author had had first-hand governmental experience of the practical effects 
of the popery laws as secretary to William Hamilton in Dublin, and had seen the recurrence 
of widespread social unrest in the form of the agrarian “Whiteboys” risings in the early 
1760s.117  Thus it may be argued that it reflects Burke’s own working out of the lessons of 
the “Abridgment” and therefore illustrates, as close as we can get, the revised Patriot 
program for Ireland.  At the same time, the way Burke treats resistance in the “Abridgment” 
may serve to temper our response to the “Tracts.”  Through the filter of Pufendorf’s natural-
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law theories, we can see that resistance is instructive, in Burke’s historically informed 
imagination, not so much for what it tells us about rights as what it says about government.  
The history of rebellions is a moral lesson both for rulers and ruled, not a repository for 
factional vengeance.  In its providential and religious dimensions it warns us that there are 
never winners when the artifice of society is stripped away, since the workings of a partial or 
systematic historical memory leads not to the recovery of the natural man, but to the worst of 
all scenarios, the emergence of unnatural creatures—machines with unlimited potential for 
destruction.      
Is there any one figure from the drama of the English history who might serve as an 
example of statesmanship to the modern Patriot?  Given what has just been said about 
Burke’s historical method, this is perhaps an inappropriate question; but we do encounter 
early on in the “Abridgment” the paradigm of a true conqueror, and one who has already, in a 
sense, been allegorized by his original biographer, Tacitus.  This was Gnaeus Julius Agricola, 
who “knew that the general must be perfected by the legislator; and that the conquest is 
neither permanent nor honourable which is only an introduction to tyranny.”  In Burke’s 
account, Agricola is clearly established as a contrast to his predecessor, Suetonius Paulinus, 
whose brutal crushing of Druid-inspired resistance and imprudent rigidity in enforcing 
Roman law inspired Boadicea’s revolt.118  Agricola’s contrasting policy was to soften the 
experience of domination by a careful access to the benefits of incorporation into a great 
civilization.  “In short,” Burke writes, “he subdued the Britons by civilizing them; and made 
them exchange a savage liberty for a polite and easy subjection.  His conduct is the most 
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perfect model for those employed in the unhappy, but sometimes necessary task of subduing 
a rude and free people.”119  With its intimations of the Reformer, it is worth noting that the 
policy that finally brought Agricola’s goals to nothing, besides the enmity of the emperor 
Domitian, was the Romans’ preference for an exploitative fiscal system of taxation over any 
sustained effort to colonize Britain with permanent settlements.  The consequence was the 
province’s speedy collapse before the barbarians in the fifth century.  In his final months of 
life, Burke was to predict a similar fate for his native land at the hands of imported Jacobins. 
 
In structure, style, and argument, the “Abridgment” fits snugly with what we know of 
Burke’s early critical and Patriotic thinking in Dublin and London.  Its rhetorical and 
historiographical features echo his differences with Lucas and Brooke, round out the critique 
of Bolingbroke and the older Patriot generation that we find in the Vindication, and explain 
the anger and disappointments with Patriotism that we find in the “Tracts” and in other of 
Burke’s observations in the 1760s.120  It also bears the imprint of the Tully’s Head circle and 
that wider segment of the British Republic of Letters which strove to counter the dangers of 
skepticism and free-thinking.  Finally, it offers a valuable corrective to the tendency of recent 
commentators to invest Burke’s critique of colonial government in Ireland with suppressed 
nationalist and Catholic sympathies—a tendency furthered by the stress that Irish writers 
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such as Gibbons and McLoughlin have placed upon Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry.  In 
actual fact, Burke’s emphasis upon conquest, dislocation and memory is not a coded and 
updated bardic lament over the violence inflicted 500 years earlier by Angevin conquerors, or 
even over the wasted years of English misrule that followed.  It is, rather, an alarum for his 
fellow British Whigs to seize the possibilities for civic regeneration presented by the 
Revolution Settlement, and a warning that these opportunities will be lost, too, unless, by an 
act of disciplined and religious imagination, history can be made to disclose the pattern of 
liberal order that is embedded in the providential dynamics of man’s social and individual 
nature.   
 Burke was engaged in the writing of a new Patriot history.  Forged in Tully’s Head, 
it is fitting that at its root lay the Ciceronian belief that the laws of nature that drive the 
individual into society carry over from the tiniest platoon to the state, and ultimately to the 
empire.  This is what makes Burke’s history instructive in the constant struggle to reconcile 
empire and liberty.  Yet the “Abridgment” also drew deeply from the glimmer of Tacitean 
hope that we find in the Agricola.  Despite its premature end, Agricola’s governorship 
provides Burke with a paradigm that was to inform his sense not only of the public duties of 
the gentleman but of Britain’s imperial responsibilities.  Might benevolence restore morality 
and prosperity to Burke’s favored empire, as it had Rome on the death of the emperor 
Domitian?   
 
Conclusion 
 
Edmund Burke was elected to parliament in December 1765, just a few months after 
he had been appointed private secretary to the prime minister, Thomas Watson-Wentworth, 
second marquis of Rockingham.  He appears to have come to Rockingham’s notice through 
the offices of two young career politicians, William Fitzherbert and Lord John Cavendish, 
although Lord Charlemont, an Irish acquaintance of both Burke and Rockingham, was later 
to write that Burke had been able also to draw on “the warm recommendation of many 
friends.”1  These friends may well have included more prominent figures such as Lord 
Egmont, for whom Burke had written earlier, who advised the king on the appointment of 
Rockingham’s ministry in 1765 and served in it as first lord of the Admiralty.  In any event, 
they evidently had the combined purchase necessary to help Burke survive the duke of 
Newcastle’s mischievous approach to Rockingham concerning Burke’s suspected Catholic 
and Jacobite sympathies.2  It is also likely that Burke’s appointment was assisted by his close 
friendship with William Burke, who had been a contemporary of Rockingham’s at 
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Westminster school and who was, at the same time, given a post as under-secretary to one of 
the two secretaries of state.   
None of these lines of patronage constitutes a link with the Tully’s Head circle, such 
as we saw at work in Joseph Warton’s relationship with William Hamilton; but they must be 
understood in the context of Burke’s extensive connections in London literary life (with the 
bluestocking Elizabeth Montagu, for example, and with Samuel Johnson, who was a friend of 
Cavendish’s) and of his editorship of the Annual Register from 1758.  All of these 
associations would have smoothed his career path, the more so since a shift from the 
Republic of Letters to the Palace of Westminster was nowhere near as great a change of 
direction as might be thought.3  Burke himself was to observe, and there is no reason to doubt 
his words, that he entered politics with his principles of public service fully formed, and 
those principles are no less significant politically for having been sharpened by an 
apprenticeship in the world of literary journalism. 
The overlap between a literary and a political career has long been acknowledged by 
historians, and has been vigorously cultivated in recent years through the profession’s 
“linguistic turn” and the accompanying focus on rhetorical style and aesthetic theory in the 
language of eighteenth-century statecraft.  Nothing in the previous chapters should be 
interpreted as questioning that overlap.  Instead, the microhistorical approach adopted in this 
dissertation has been designed to examine that common area at a more practical and 
fundamental level, at the point where perceptions of the relationship between nature and 
artifice become matters of judgment and prudence, and where the art of the literary critic and 
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of the political orator exercises its corrective—or destabilizing—effect on the mind of the 
public.  What we have uncovered is the considerable extent to which Burke’s experiments 
with such ideas were shaped and refined in the personal and professional circle of Robert 
Dodsley’s Tully’s Head, through connections to writers now at the very periphery of our 
historical sights and in debates that have passed into obscurity.  Consequently, the evidence 
should persuade us that any consideration of Burke’s political beliefs and parliamentary 
practice has to proceed from a reconstruction of the particular issues that were occupying 
Tully’s Head in the early 1750s, from an assessment of how their responses to those issues 
were grounded in the practical political and professional concerns of the period, and from 
their understanding of the role of the critic in the Republic of Letters which the young Irish 
Patriot aspired to join. 
Specifically, in providing a cross-section of this Republic of Letters centered upon 
Dodsley’s Tully’s Head enterprise, this dissertation has shown how the expansion of the 
literary market mid-century and the contestation over the political and social implications of 
the Glorious Revolution impacted the self-identity of Dodsley’s literary associates and forced 
them to reconsider how they could construct a modern Patriot discourse of criticism, political 
and cultural, that harnessed the energy of broad civic participation to the reinforcement of 
true public order.  In so doing, it has also laid open an alternative picture of the role of 
Burke’s Irishness in his literary and political career that challenges increasingly dominant, 
but anachronistic, nationalist and anti-colonialist contexts.  First, we can make better sense of 
Burke’s early journalism when we ground his Irishness in a narrative of the renegotiation of 
Patriotism and understand it as contributing to a new Patriotic discourse in Dublin in the 
1740s that was intended to reconcile the Protestant settlement in Ireland with greater 
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toleration for Catholics.  Second and consequentially, we see how well-suited Burke’s Irish 
background made him to join in the reflections upon the legacy of Pope’s writings that were 
producing a parallel reinvigoration of Patriotism at Tully’s Head.  Here again, while scholars 
have recently discovered a Burke much more indebted to the literary styles and genres of 
early-eighteenth-century Patriot literature than had been recognized, they have overlooked 
the influence upon his Vindication of the debate over Pope’s legacy and the influence of 
Bolingbroke, a debate that, more than style, fashion, or historiography, epitomized the 
confusion of artificial and natural order that Burke came to believe characterized the false 
and disorderly, but seductive, rhetoric of an older generation of Patriots.   
When we view Burke’s political career in the light of these mid-century 
preoccupations, we build up some resistance to the prevailing temptation to lift his early 
writings out of their immediate contexts and read them in terms of his later positions.  In a 
sense, by recovering the dynamics of the immediate personal and professional networks that 
surrounded Burke’s critical identity, we are returning the “history” to “intellectual history.”4  
As a result, we are better able to grasp certain factors that shed authentic light on the later 
Burke and, just as important, enable us to use Burke’s example to challenge some of our 
assumptions about the intellectual and political history of the eighteenth century.  Those 
factors include the reconfiguration of three crucial ingredients of the remodeled Patriot 
literature that Burke and those with whom he associated considered, in their proper 
combination, essential for bringing public spirit and public order into complete harmony: the 
allegorical, the historical, and the religious. 
                                                 
4
 I am thinking here, in part, about Jeremy Black’s recent provocative appeal for historians to recover 
the context of early-eighteenth-century diplomatic and political history.  See Jeremy Black, “‘George II and All 
That Stuff’: On the Value of the Neglected,” Albion 36, no. 4 (Winter 2005). 
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Burke was drawn to the recovery of allegory as a way of transmitting the true order of 
the human condition, and, rhetorically, he appreciates its capacity to inspire a moral and 
corrective spirit within a received framework of order, and it imparts the coveted acer 
spiritus ac vis precisely as it exposes the incapacity of natural philosophy to achieve the 
same.  Not only does this approach reveal itself in Burke’s acknowledged admiration for 
Milton and in his attested borrowings from Spenser; but it also informs his ironic 
understanding of unrestrained philosophical skepticism as the fount of a new intolerance—
that is, philosophy transformed into secularized religion, and promulgated with all the 
enthusiasm and obscurantism of priest-craft.  In this sense, we find in the Vindication the 
paradigm that enabled him to weave so quick and comprehensive a denunciation later of the 
French revolutionaries, the infamous “philosophers, oeconomists and calculators” of his 
Reflections on the Revolution in France.   
Burke saw that the crucial issues here were being contested most critically in the field 
of history, where the methods of natural philosophy were being applied, as he saw it, like 
blunt tools upon the sources, fracturing and butchering meanings that had been carefully 
layered and packaged for more imaginative minds.  For Burke, as with Warburton, the 
antidote to this vandalism was the reintegration of providence in history in such a way that 
the superficial perception it gave of order overturned was counterbalanced by the 
apprehension it provided of a deeper order unfolding.  This faculty of decoding the “map of 
mankind” is what has been presented above as Burke’s allegorical approach to history, a 
mode of historical analysis that was eclipsed by the success of Hume, Gibbon and the 
Scottish School even before it saw the light of day, but one that arguably contained a more 
sophisticated understanding of how liberty and duty are brought into harmony to generate 
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benevolence and cultural progress in human societies.  It is, at least, in this powerful 
compound of allegory and history that we can discern the outline of Burke’s later critique of 
empire and of British rule in America and India.  His withering challenges to the British 
Establishment on those occasions are the language not of colonial resentment but of Patriot 
Imperialism, of a belief that the affections of the “little platoon” can be transformed into 
universal benevolence, and that “empire” is an inevitable—even, in a metahistorical 
perspective, desirable—phenomenon, providentially sent to draw out the greatest 
achievements of humankind, or tempt the deepest injustices.   
In Burke’s reasoning, the providential order that directs our choice of paths as Patriots 
and citizens is inescapably religious in its source.  Without that religious underpinning, and 
the intellectual humility it demands, allegorical truths are directed only outwards at others.  
As a result, they shrivel into self-serving analogies and parallels.  But, as his experiences as a 
young man in Dublin suggested, this religious awareness must also contain within it the 
capacity to distinguish between the specifics of our “own” religion as it operates upon us in 
our confined platoons and the universal principles that are extrapolated from those specifics 
to produce a syncretic understanding of the truth that religion contains about the nature of 
order.  Religion, for Burke, was not mere Christian Utilitarianism, an icing that he applied 
increasingly thickly to the cake of society as the threat of religious dissent and political 
radicalism grew toward the end of the century; it was a sine qua non of his perception of true 
order, rhetorical, literary, political, and social.  Far from being summoned only in the last 
years of his life, religion informed Burke’s earliest critical writing through his sense of the 
hollowness of the rhetoric of his Patriot enemies, and determined his consistent opposition to 
the extension of civil rights to anti-Trinitarians and atheists.   Burke was neither a deist who 
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donned Catholic garb later in life, nor a crypto-Catholic who camouflaged himself in 
Latitudinarian clothing early on, but that hardest of creatures for us to understand today, a 
committed, enthusiastic Latitudinarian. 
There is one more point worth noting here, since it speaks to the practical as well as 
intellectual influence of the Patriot context on Burke’s parliamentary career.  It has often 
been noted with some puzzlement that Burke appeared in his element as a politician in 
opposition rather than in power.  It is, for example, remarkable how quickly and 
comprehensively Burke was able to fashion a principled defense of organized parliamentary 
opposition—“party” as opposed to “faction”—in his apology for the Rockingham Whigs, 
Thoughts on the Cause of Our Present Discontents (1770).  There were doubtless 
temperamental reasons for this—he was, as C.J. Fox attested, a maddeningly undisciplined 
party colleague; but the allegorical and historical critiques we have analyzed here do describe 
a critical mind very much attuned to the reflective and admonitory, rather than to the active 
and programmatic: they are, to risk a cliché, suited to “speaking truth to power.”  From a 
position of intense loyalty to his small Rockingham platoon, Burke worked upon the 
reconciling of spirit and order that he felt he had achieved in his refashioned Patriot rhetoric 
to spin out a moral critique of power that, as in the case of the American colonies and the 
Hastings impeachment, increased in persuasiveness in proportion as it fell short of its 
immediate goals.  No-one has ever gilded the gadfly with greater aplomb.     
It follows from the premises of this dissertation that Burke’s concerns in the 1750s, if 
not his conclusions, were shared by at least a prominent section of his compatriots and 
professional associates in the British Republic of Letters.  We should, then, finally ask how 
the details of Burke’s relationship with Tully’s Head, and his appropriation of the role of a 
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public critic, might modify or correct some of the assumptions about the intellectual currents 
of the time that accompany the term “Enlightenment.”  It appears, first, that we need as 
historians to work even harder at incorporating the figure of the bookseller in the shaping of 
the texts they produced, and in a way that passes beyond the stubborn, reductionist language 
of author-bookseller antagonisms and exploitation.  Read against the background of a more 
complex and interactive publishing process, where commercial imperatives blend 
realistically with the intellectual, we have seen how the Vindication reveals the existence of a 
vital historical and literary discourse, energized by a sophisticated Latitudinarianism, that 
was designed to peel the history of anticlericalism away from the philosophical attack on 
providence, and thereby save the Established Church and the principle of toleration from the 
virulent turn that deism had taken.  It was a struggle that was not finally lost until the next 
century, but its proponents have generally been assigned prematurely to the margins of lost 
causes.  This study of Burke’s “pre-political” career shows just how urgently we need fresh 
studies in the thought and writings of the churchmen-scholars of the mid eighteenth century, 
figures such as Spence, Warburton, Lowth, and Hurd. 
In the part of this struggle that concerned the perceived excesses of Bolingbroke and 
other British and Irish deists, Burke’s work also points to the continuing vibrancy of an 
international discourse in natural law theory, most particularly in the influence of 
Barbeyrac’s Pufendorf and the use of seventeenth-century jurists to bolster Lockean 
orthodoxy against adherents to a more secularized conception of the relationship between the 
state of nature and artificial society.  Such interaction between French, British and Irish 
citizens of the Republic of Letters is in danger of being overlooked by the growing tendency 
to nationalize enlightenments and to interpret literature of the period in increasingly 
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nationalistic terms.  Instead, Joseph Warton’s and William Warburton’s concerns at the 
deleterious effect of the French moral philosophers on Bolingbroke and his circle should be 
taken more as part of a continuing, transnational discussion about the appropriate parameters 
of intellectual investigation among citizens of that Republic.  Certainly, they are concerns 
that are replicated by Burke as a member of the younger generation in the 1750s, facing the 
rising popularity of writers such as Rousseau.  The evidence as it has been presented in this 
dissertation would suggest that, when Burke wrote his Reflections, he was driven to his feats 
of critical insight more through his identity as a citizen of the Republic of Letters than as an 
Englishman or an Irishman.  This perspective opens up an area rich for further comparative 
research, probing the transnational nature of the fracture that affected public critics in the 
years leading up to the French Revolution. 
Does this mean, though, that we should see Burke coming into his own toward the 
end of his life, with the culminating fight against Jacobinism?   To some degree.  But, as is 
the case with his famous Letter to a Noble Lord, in looking for the real influences on his 
response to that crisis, we need to recognize that he was writing, both consciously and 
unconsciously, as one whose time had passed.  The secret to his explosive engagement with 
his contemporaries was, in fact, the historiographical perspectives upon which he drew from 
his early years: that the upheavals and apparent disorders in history must be played out in the 
orchestration of loss and gain: that, meanwhile, the duty of the Patriot is to embrace history 
by willingly standing athwart it, and to recognize humbly that a deeper order will be revealed 
only with the passage of time.  In 1791, Burke wrote:  “If a great change is to be made in 
human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it, the general opinions and feelings will 
draw that way.  Every fear, every hope, will forward it; and then they, who persist in 
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opposing this mighty current in human affairs, will appear rather to resist the decrees of 
Providence itself, than the mere designs of men.  They will not be resolute and firm, but 
perverse and obstinate.”  Whatever Providence was to bring, Edmund Burke was determined 
to perform his Patriotic duty to the end.5 
 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The passage appears in Burke’s Thoughts on French Affairs (1791).  See Burke, Writings and 
Speeches, 8:386. 
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